Section 6: Business Law by Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview Conferences, Events, and Lectures
2006
Section 6: Business Law
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The College of William & Mary School of Law
Copyright c 2006 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview
Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The College of William & Mary School of Law, "Section 6: Business Law" (2006). Supreme Court
Preview. Paper 233.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/233
VI. BUSINESS
In This Section:
New Case: 05-1256 Philip Morris USA v. Williams
Synopsis and Questions Presented p. 302
"Supreme Court to Weigh Award in a Smoker's Death" p. 313
Linda Greenhouse
"Court Affirms Tobacco Award" p. 315
Ashbel S. Green
"Court Upholds $79.5 Million Punitive Damages Award
Against Tobacco Company" Health Law Week p. 317
"High Court Sends Back Tobacco Case Award" p. 318
David G. Savage
"Jury Awards $81 Million to Oregon Smoker's Family" p. 320
Barry Meier
"Addiction Overturned" p. 322
Douglas W Kmiec
"Jurors Vent Outrage at Industry; p. 324
Joan Biskupic
"Big Tobacco, in Court Again. But the Stock Is Still Up" p. 329
Michael Janofsky
New Case: 05-1120 Massachusetts v. E.P.A.
Synopsis and Questions Presented p. 332
"Justices Take Up Climate Debate" p. 345
David G. Savage
"High Court to Hear Greenhouse Gas Case" p. 347
Juliet Eilperin
"Court Says E.P.A. Can Limit Its Regulation of Emissions" p. 349
Anthony DePalma
299
"2 Sides Do Battle in Court on Whether E.P.A.
Should Regulate Carbon Dioxide" p. 351
Michael Janofsky
"EPA Won't Regulate 'Greenhouse Gases"' p. 353
Aaron Zitner, Gary Polakovic and Elizabeth Shogren
"Bush Defends Emissions Stance" p. 355
Douglas Jehl
New Case: 05-848 Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.
Synopsis and Questions Presented p. 358
"Justices to Hear Environmental Appeal on EPA Emissions Rule" p. 366
Charles Lane
"On Divided Court, Kennedy Emerges as Key in Future Environment Suits" p. 368
Dawn Reeves and Matt Shipman
"DOJ Tells Court Duke Decision is 'Fundamentally Flawed"' p. 371
Electric Power Daily
"Duke Energy Did Not Break Law, Court Says" p. 372
Jerry Markon
"Appeals Court Affirms Lower Court's Decision to Grant Summary Judgement
in EPA's New Source Review Enforcement Action Against Duke Energy" p. 374
Foster Electric Report
New Case: 05-1126 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
Synopsis and Questions Presented p. 377
"Supreme Court to Review Antitrust Case Against Phone Companies" p. 390
Stephen Labaton
"High Court Loads Up on Business Cases" p. 392
Shaheen Pasha
"Wrong Standard Used in Dismissing Antitrust Complaint;
Action Reinstated; 'Modest Burden"' p. 394
Mark Hamblett
300
New Case: 05-381 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.
Synopsis and Questions Presented p. 397
"High Court Will Revisit Weyerhaeuser Case" p. 408
Dylan Rivera
"What Standard Should Be Applied in Predatory Bidding Cases?" p. 411
Neal R. Stoll and Shepard Goldfein
"Weyerhaeuser Monopoly Verdict Upheld" p. 415
Dylan Rivera
New Case: 04-1350 KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
Synopsis and Questions Presented p. 4 18
"Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Patent and Clean Air Act Cases" p. 426
Tony Mauro
"Justices Get Down to Business" p. 427
Ben Winograd and Jess Bravin
"The Patent Epidemic" p. 429
Michael Orey
"Teleflex Patent Declared Valid in Infringement Complaint Against KSR" p. 433
Intellectual Property Today
301
Philip Morris USA v. Williams
(05-1256)
Ruling Below: (Williams v. Philip Morris Incorporated, 340 Ore. 35; 127 P.3d 1165 (2006), certgranted 126 S. Ct. 2329; 74 U.S.L.W. 3668 [2006]).
In 1997, Jesse Williams, the plaintiffs husband, died of lung cancer after smoking three packs aday for decades. After winning her tort case against Philip Morris, the jury awarded Williams
compensatory damages totaling $821,485.50 and punitive damages of $79.5 million. The trial
court capped the noneconomic portion of the compensatory damages at $500,000 and reducedthe punitive damages to $32 million, citing federal standards. The Oregon Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's decision with regard to the punitive damages and reinstated them. TheOregon Supreme Court refused Philip Morris' appeal, but the United States Supreme Courtgranted cert and vacated the Court of Appeals decision, remanding the case to the Court ofAppeals for reconsideration of the punitive damages in light of State Farm v. Campbell. Onremand, the Court of Appeals again decided in the plaintiffs favor. This time, the OregonSupreme Court granted Philip Morris' appeal and proceeded to affirm the Court of Appeals'decision.
Question Presented: 1. Whether, in reviewing a jury's award of punitive damages, an appellate
court's conclusion that a defendant's, conduct was highly reprehensible and analogous to a crime
can "override" the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to theplaintiffs harm.
2. Whether due process permits a jury to punish a defendant for the effects of its conduct on non-parties.
Mayola WILLIAMS
V.
PHILIP MORRIS Incorporated
Supreme Court of Oregon
Decided February 2, 2006
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
GILLETTE, J:
This tort case arose out of the death of Jesse
Williams, a smoker, who died of lung cancer.
Plaintiff Mayola Williams is the widow of
Jesse Williams and personal representative of
his estate. Plaintiff sued defendant Philip
Morris Inc. for, inter alia, negligence and
fraud, asserting a causal connection between
Jesse Williams's smoking habit and his death.
A jury found for plaintiff on both causes of
action. The jury awarded both economic and
noneconomic damages; it also awarded
plaintiff punitive damages of $79.5 million.
The issue before us is whether that punitive
damage award violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Court of
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Appeals concluded that it did not.. . . For the
reasons that follow, we agree.
I. FACTS
Because the jury ruled in favor of plaintiff, we
state all facts in the light most favorable to
plaintiff. . . . Because the parties do not
dispute the way that the Court of Appeals
framed the facts, we quote extensively from
that court's opinions.
Jesse Williams was a lifelong smoker who
eventually died of lung cancer. The cancer
was caused by Williams's smoking.
"From the early 1950s until his
death from a smoking-related
lung cancer in 1997, Williams
smoked [Philip Morris]'s
cigarettes, primarily its Marlboro
brand, eventually developing a
habit of three packs a day. At that
point, he spent half his waking
hours smoking and was highly
addicted to tobacco, both
physiologically and
psychologically. Although, at the
urging of his wife and children,
he made several attempts to stop
smoking, each time he failed, in
part because of his addiction.
Despite the increasing amount of
information that linked smoking
to health problems during that
40-year period, Williams resisted
accepting or attempting to act on
it. When his family told him that
cigarettes were dangerous to his
health, he replied that the
cigarette companies would not
sell them if they were as
dangerous as his family claimed.
When one of his sons tried to get
him to read articles about the
dangers of smoking, he
responded by finding published
assertions that cigarette smoking
was not dangerous. However,
when Williams learned that he
had inoperable lung cancer he felt
betrayed, stating 'those darn
cigarette people finally did it.
They were lying all the time.' He
died about six months after his
diagnosis."
. . . Plaintiff based her fraud claim against
Philip Morris on a 40-year publicity campaign
by Philip Morris and the tobacco industry to
undercut published concerns about the
dangers of smoking.... Philip Morris and the
tobacco industry had known for most of those
40 years, if not all of them, that smoking was
dangerous. . . . Nevertheless, they tried to
create in the public mind the impression that
there were legitimate reasons to doubt the
danger of smoking.. . . Philip Morris and the
tobacco industry did so to give smokers a
reason to keep smoking (or, perhaps more
accurately, to undermine one of the main
incentives for smokers to stop smoking)....
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
At trial, the jury found in favor of plaintiff on
both the negligence and fraud claims, and it
awarded compensatory damages of
$821,485.50-$21,485.80 in economic
damages and $800,000 in noneconomic
damages.
As to the negligence claim, the jury found
Williams 50% responsible for the damages.
The jury declined to award any punitive
damages respecting that claim. As to the fraud
claim, however, the jury awarded punitive
damages of $79.5 million.
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The trial court significantly reduced the
amounts awarded to the plaintiff. The court
"capped" the noneconomic damages at
$500,000 pursuant to former ORS 18.560
(1999), renumbered as ORS 31.710 (2003),
thereby producing a total compensatory
damage award of $521,485.80. The court also
reduced the punitive damage award. The court
did conclude that $79.5 million "was within
the range a rational juror could assess based
on the record as a whole and applying the
Oregon common law and statutory factors."
Nevertheless, the court concluded, the $79.5
million punitive damage award "was
excessive under federal standards." The trial
court therefore reduced the punitive damage
award to $32 million.
Both plaintiff and Philip Morris appealed to
the Court of Appeals. In Williams I, the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court on
plaintiffs appeal and reinstated the $79.5
million punitive damage award. . . . It
affirmed on Philip Morris's cross-appeal ....
The court later adhered to its opinion on
reconsideration.. . . This court denied review.
The United States Supreme Court then
granted certiorari, vacated the Court of
Appeals' judgment, and remanded the case to
the Court of Appeals for that court to
reconsider the amount of the punitive
damages award in light of State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, .-. .. The
Court of Appeals did so in Williams II, again
reversing on plaintiffs appeal and affirming
on Philip Morris's cross-appeal. We allowed
review.
III. ISSUES ON REVIEW
The appeal remained alive only because of,
and to the extent that, the United States
Supreme Court later directed the Court of
Appeals to reconsider its decision respecting
the amount of punitive damages in light of
Campbell. The Court of Appeals performed
that limited function in Williams II, and we
allowed review of that decision.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Overview of State Farm v. Campbell
We begin by reviewing the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Campbell.
The punitive damage award at issue in
Campbell arose from an insured's action
against an insurer for bad faith, fraud, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress....
Campbell, the insured, had caused an
automobile accident that killed one person
and permanently disabled another. . . . When
Campbell was sued, Campbell's insurer, State
Farm, chose to contest liability.... It refused
settlement offers that were within policy
limits and took the case to trial despite the
advice of one of its own investigators, in the
process assuring Campbell and his wife that
they would face no personal liability. . . .
When the jury returned a verdict substantially
above the policy limits, State Farm initially
refused to cover the excess, telling the
Campbells to put "for sale" signs on their
property.... State Farm also refused to post
a supersedeas bond to appeal the verdict....
In their action against State Farm, the
Campbells introduced evidence that State
Farm's decision to try the case was part of a
nationwide effort to limit payouts on
insurance claims. . . . The evidence
"concerned State Farm's business practices
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for over 20 years in numerous States. Most of
these practices bore no relation to third-party
automobile insurance claims, the type of
claim underlying the Campbells' complaint
against the company." . . . The jury awarded
the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory
damages and $145 million in punitive
damages. . . . The trial court reduced the
compensatory damages to $1 million and the
punitive damages to $25 million. . . . On
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the
$145 million punitive damage award.... The
United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari....
The Court first noted that compensatory
damages are intended to compensate for a
loss, while punitive damages "are aimed at
deterrence and retribution." . . . However, the
Court noted, the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause prohibits imposing
"grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments"
on a tortfeasor. . . . A person must have fair
notice, not just that the state will punish
certain conduct, but also how severely it will
do so....
The Court identified two risks peculiar to
punitive damages. First, although punitive
damage awards are similar to criminal
sanctions, defendants do not receive the
procedural protections required of criminal
trials... . Second, vague jury instructions can
leave the jury with too much discretion in
choosing the amount of punitive damages,
allowing it to express preexisting biases or to
rely too much on tangential or inflammatory
evidence.... For those reasons, the Court had
directed "exacting appellate review" of a
jury's punitive damage award, considering
three "guideposts" identified in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, . . .:
"(1) the
reprehensibility
degree
of
of
the
defendant's misconduct; (2) the
disparity between the actual or
potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive
damages award; and (3) the
difference between the punitive
damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized
or imposed in comparable cases."
... The Court then applied those guideposts.
The first guidepost, the reprehensibility of
defendant's conduct, represents "'the most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a
punitive damages award."' . . .In analyzing
reprehensibility, courts should consider
whether
"the harm caused was physical as
opposed to economic; the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference
to or a reckless disregard of the
health or safety of others; the
target of the conduct had
financial vulnerability; the
conduct involved repeated
actions or was an isolated
incident; and the harm was the
result of intentional malice,
trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident."
... In analyzing that guidepost in Campbell,
however, the Court did not itself focus on
those five considerations. Instead, it
concentrated on how evidence of out-of-state
conduct and dissimilar conduct had skewed
the reprehensibility analysis against State
Farm. The state wrongly relied on such
conduct, the Court ruled, because a state
cannot punish a defendant for its lawful
conduct in another state, or for conduct that
"occurred outside [the state] to other
persons." . . . In Campbell, most of the out-of-
state conduct was lawful where it took place,
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and it was not connected to the harm to the
Campbells... . Furthermore, the Court held, a
state cannot punish a defendant for
"dissimilar acts": "A defendant should be
punished for the conduct that harmed the
plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual
or business." . . . In sum, the Court held that,
because the Campbells showed "no conduct
by State Farm similar to that which harmed
them, the conduct that harmed them is the
only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility
analysis." . . .
The second Gore guidepost examines the
ratio between the punitive damage award and
the actual or potential harm to the plaintiff..
. The ratio, however, is no mechanical
formula....
That said, the Court proceeded to give some
guidance regarding the second guidepost.
Twice in the past, the Court noted, it had
suggested that a punitive damage award more
than four times compensatory damages
"might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety." . . . The Court also had noted
previously that, for 700 years, legislatures had
authorized double, treble, or quadruple
damages as a sanction. . . . The Court
concluded that, "in practice, few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process."
... The Court did acknowledge, however, that
even those tentative ratios might be adjusted
up or down. A greater ratio might comport
with due process if "'a particularly egregious
act has resulted in only a small amount of
economic damages,"' if "'the injury is hard to
detect,"' or if "'the monetary value of
noneconomic harm might have been difficult
to determine."'. . . With a "substantial"
compensatory damage award, however, due
process might require "a lesser ratio, perhaps
only equal to compensatory damages." . . .
But "the precise award must be based upon
the facts and circumstances of the defendant's
conduct and the harm to the plaintiff." . . .
In applying the second Gore guidepost, the
Court stated that there is "a presumption
against an award that has a 145-to-I ratio." . .
. The Campbells had received a substantial
compensatory damage award; they were
injured economically, not physically; and
State Farm paid the excess verdict before the
Campbells sued them, so their economic
injuries were minor. . . . Additionally, the
outrage and humiliation that State Farm
caused the Campbells may have been
considered twice-once in the compensatory
damage award and again in the punitive
damage award. ...
The Court also rejected several other factors
that the Utah Supreme Court had identified in
support of the punitive damage award. For
example, the Utah Supreme Court had
pointed to State Farm's wealth. The Court
concluded that wealth should not have been
considered . . .
The third guidepost compares the punitive
damage award to comparable civil and
criminal penalties. . . . Criminal penalties,
however, do not help as much in determining
"the dollar amount of the award". . .
The comparable civil sanctions in Campbell
fell well below the punitive damage award.
The Court identified only one, a $10,000 fine
for fraud. . . . The Utah Supreme Court had
306
pointed to other, more substantive penalties,
but they were all based on evidence of out-of-
state and dissimilar conduct....
In all, the Court in Campbell found the case
"neither close nor difficult," . . . and
concluded that $145 million in punitive
damages violated due process ..... The Court
suggested that the guideposts,
"especially in light of the
substantial compensatory
damages awarded (a portion of
which contained a punitive
element), likely would justify a
punitive damages award at or
near the amount of compensatory
damages."
... However, the Court concluded, Utah state
courts should calculate punitive damages in
the first instance....
With the foregoing principles in mind, we
turn to the questions presented on review.
B. The Trial Court's Refusal to Give Philip
Morris's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 34
Philip Morris first argues that the trial court
erred in refusing to give its proposed jury
instruction number 34. That instruction stated,
in part:
"The size of any punishment
should bear a reasonable
relationship to the harm caused to
Jesse Williams by the
defendant's punishable
misconduct. Although you may
consider the extent of harm
suffered by others in determining
what that reasonable relationship
is, you are not to punish the
defendant for the impact of its
alleged misconduct on other
persons, who may bring lawsuits
of their own in which other juries
can resolve their claims and
award punitive damages for those
harms, as such other juries see
fit."
In Williams 1, the Court of Appeals concluded
that instruction was incorrect under state law.
. . . We agree. . . . That is, the jury could
consider whether Williams and his misfortune
were merely exemplars of the harm that Philip
Morris was prepared to inflict on the smoking
public at large.
Philip Morris, however, contends that
Campbell overrules state rules like the one set
out in Parrott. Specifically, Philip Morris
asserts that Campbell prohibits the state,
acting through a civil jury, from using
punitive damages to punish a defendant for
harm to nonparties. In support of that
argument, Philip Morris quotes the following
from Campbell:
"Due process does not permit
courts, in the calculation of
punitive damages, to adjudicate
the merits of other parties'
hypothetical claims against a
defendant under the guise of the
reprehensibility analysis * * *. *
* * Punishment on these bases
creates the possibility of multiple
punitive damages awards for the
same conduct; for in the usual
case nonparties are not bound by
the judgment some other plaintiff
obtains. Gore, supra, [517 US at
593] (Breyer, J., concurring)
('Larger damages might also
"double count" by including in
the punitive damages award some
of the compensatory, or punitive,
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damages that subsequent
plaintiffs would also recover')."
. .. [W]e conclude that evidence of similar
conduct against other parties may be relevant
to a punitive damage award. The Court
criticized the Utah courts only for allowing in
evidence of dissimilar conduct ...
Philip Morris's proposed jury instruction
would have prohibited the jury from
"punishing the defendant for the impact of its
alleged misconduct on other persons," even if
those other persons were Oregonians who
were harmed by the same conduct that had
harmed Williams, and in the same way. As
we noted, that is not correct as an independent
matter of Oregon law respecting the conduct
of jury trials and instructions that are given to
juries. Neither, as we read in Campbell, does
it correctly state federal due process law.
Because the proposed jury instruction did not
accurately reflect the law, the trial court did
not commit reversible error when it refused to
give it....
Philip Morris also claims that the trial court
committed reversible error because the jury
instructions that were given did not accurately
reflect some aspects of Campbell's holding.
But Philip Morris did not preserve that
argument before the Court of Appeals. . . .
Fairly read, Philip Morris's assignment of
error in the Court of Appeals claimed only
that the trial court erred in refusing to give
requested instruction number 34. That narrow
assignment of error did not give the Court of
Appeals notice that it needed to consider any
challenge to the instructions actually given.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm
the Court of Appeals on the first issue.
C. The Punitive Damage Award and Federal
Due Process
On review of a punitive damage award under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a court must determine whether
the punitive damage award is "'grossly
excessive'" . . . Whether the verdict exceeds
the gross excessiveness standard is a
question of law....
In Parrott, this court identified five factors to
be considered to determine whether a punitive
damage award is grossly excessive:
"The range that a rational juror
would be entitled to award
depends on the following: (1) the
statutory and common-law
factors that allow an award of
punitive damages for the specific
kind of claim at issue; (2) the
state interests that a punitive
damages award is designed to
serve; (3) the degree of
reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct; (4) the
disparity between the punitive
damages award and the actual or
potential harm inflicted; and (5)
the civil and criminal sanctions
provided for comparable
misconduct."
... Parrott has been superseded somewhat by
Campbell, but the last three Parrott factors
are, of course, the Gore guideposts as they
have been further elucidated by Campbell.
We consider only those guideposts in the
following analysis.
The first guidepost directs us to consider,
based on the facts contained in the record,
how reprehensible Philip Morris's conduct
was. As noted, we consider whether:
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"the harm caused was physical as
opposed to economic; the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference
to or a reckless disregard of the
health or safety of others; the
target of the conduct had
financial vulnerability; the
conduct involved repeated
actions or was an isolated
incident; and the harm was the
result of intentional malice,
trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident."
. . . And, as we have explained, the jury, in
assessing the reprehensibility of Philip
Morris's actions, could consider evidence of
similar harm to other Oregonians caused (or
threatened) by the same conduct.
Again, we construe all facts in favor of
plaintiff, the party in whose favor the jury
ruled. Doing so, there can be no dispute that
Philip Morris's conduct was extraordinarily
reprehensible. Philip Morris knew that
smoking caused serious and sometimes fatal
disease, but it nevertheless spread false or
misleading information to suggest to the
public that doubts remained about that issue.
It deliberately did so to keep smokers
smoking, knowing that it was putting the
smokers' health and lives at risk, and it
continued to do so for nearly half a century.
Philip Morris's fraudulent scheme would have
kept many Oregonians smoking past the point
when they would otherwise have quit. Some
of those smokers would eventually become
ill; some would die. Philip Morris's deceit
thus would, naturally and inevitably, lead to
significant injury or death.
Although it weighs less in our analysis, we
also note that Philip Morris harmed a much
broader class of Oregonians. Every smoker
tricked by its scheme, even those who never
got ill, kept buying cigarettes-taking money
out of their pockets and putting it into the
hands of Philip Morris and other tobacco
companies. And every one of those smokers
risked serious illness or death for as long as
they remained deceived.
Of the five reprehensibility factors listed in
Gore and recited-if not precisely used-in
Campbell, four certainly are met here. The
harm to Williams was physical-lung cancer
cost Williams his life. Philip Morris showed
indifference to and reckless disregard for the
safety not just of Williams, but of countless
other Oregonians, when it knowingly spread
false or misleading information to keep
smokers smoking. Philip Morris's actions
were no isolated incident, but a carefully
calculated program spanning decades. And
Philip Morris's wrongdoing certainly
involved trickery and deceit. We conclude,
then, that the first Gore guidepost favors a
very significant punitive damage award.
We also conclude that the third Gore
guidepost-comparable civil or criminal
sanctions-favors plaintiff. In examining that
guidepost, however, we believe that it is
important to correct two errors that the Court
of Appeals committed in applying it.
In Williams I, the Court of Appeals suggested
that, because the comparable sanctions
guidepost was about notice to a prospective
defendant, "the established Oregon law of
punitive damages, including ORS 30.925(2),"
gave Philip Morris adequate notice here....
That was not correct.
Courts consider comparable sanctions for two
reasons. First, comparable sanctions suggest a
legislative determination about what
constitutes an appropriate sanction for the
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conduct, a determination that is entitled to
"substantial deference." . . . Second,
comparable sanctions may give a defendant
fair notice of the penalties that the conduct
may carry....
Those reasons explain why we conclude that
the Court of Appeals misunderstood the
guidepost. Neither Oregon law generally, nor
ORS 30.925(2) specifically, suggest how
severely the state may chose to punish Philip
Morris's conduct. Thus, they do not
independently provide a legislative standard
entitled to substantial deference. If the Court
of Appeals' analysis were correct, then the
third Gore guidepost would always support
any punitive damage award, i.e., the mere
existence of the award would justify itself
automatically, regardless of the amount
awarded. That reasoning is circular, and we
reject it.
In Williams I, the Court of Appeals also
suggested that the comparable sanctions
guidepost does not "play[] a major role one
way or the other," because it concluded that
there were no comparable civil penalties and
that criminal penalties were not truly
comparable.. . . Although it is not clear to us
that the foregoing statement correctly
interprets and applies the law as Campbell
now explicates that law, we need not pursue
that issue definitively here. That is true,
because applying the comparable sanctions
guidepost involves more than just asking
whether the dollar amount of the sanction
equals or exceeds the punitive damage award.
Campbell proves that. There, the most
relevant civil sanction was $10,000; the Court
found that civil sanction was "dwarfed" by
the $145 million punitive damage award. . ..
Yet the Court approved a punitive damage
award "at or near the amount of compensatory
damages," . . . i.e., an award somewhere
around $1 million. And a $1 million punitive
damage award was still 100 times the
comparable sanction.
So far as we can discern from Campbell, then,
the "comparable sanctions" guidepost
requires three steps. First, courts must identify
comparable civil or criminal sanctions.
Second, courts must consider how serious the
comparable sanctions are, relative to the
universe of sanctions that the legislature
authorizes to punish inappropriate conduct.
Third, courts must then evaluate the punitive
damage award in light of the relative severity
of the comparable sanctions. The guidepost
may militate against a significant punitive
damage award if the state's comparable
sanctions are mild, trivial, or nonexistent.
However, the guidepost will support a more
significant punitive damage award when the
state's comparable sanctions are severe.
We turn, then, to consider the facts of this
case, in light of the guideposts and the
Fourteenth Amendment. If there are
comparable civil sanctions, the parties did not
cite them to us and we have not found them
by independent investigation.
There are what we consider to be comparable
criminal sanctions, but we must exercise care
when relying on them. As the Court took
pains to caution in Campbell:
"The existence of a criminal
penalty does have [a] bearing on
the seriousness with which a
State views the wrongful action.
When used to determine the
dollar amount of the award,
however, the criminal penalty has
less utility. Great care must be
taken to avoid use of the civil
process to assess criminal
penalties that can be imposed
only after the heightened
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protections of a criminal trial
have been observed, including, of
course, its higher standards of
proof. Punitive damages are not a
substitute for the criminal
process, and the remote
possibility of a criminal sanction
does not automatically sustain a
punitive damages award."
... That admonition is important, of course.
But the basis for holding that Philip Morris's
actions in this case compare to a familiar
crime is not speculative or remote. Viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, Philip Morris's actions, under the
criminal statutes in place at the beginning of
its scheme in 1954, would have constituted
manslaughter. Today, its actions would
constitute at least second-degree
manslaughter, a Class B felony. . . .
Individuals who commit Class B felonies may
face up to 10 years in prison and a fine of up
to $250,000. . . . Corporations that commit a
felony of any class may be fined up to
$50,000, or required to pay up to twice the
amount that the corporation gained by
committing the offense. . . . Thus, the
possibility of severe criminal sanctions, both
for any individual who participated and for
the corporation generally, put Philip Morris
on notice that Oregon would take such
conduct very seriously. We conclude that
the third guidepost, like the first, supports a
very significant punitive damage award.
The same cannot be said of the second Gore
guidepost. As noted, that guidepost considers
the ratio between the punitive damage award
and the compensatory damage award. The
numerator of the ratio is fixed by the punitive
damage award: $79.5 million.
To determine the denominator of the ratio, we
consider not only the harm actually suffered
by plaintiff, but also the potential harm to
plaintiff.... Plaintiff suffered relatively small
economic damages for Williams's wrongful
death-less than $25,000. However, that low
figure occurred only because Williams died
shortly after being diagnosed with cancer. If
Williams had lived long enough to incur
substantial medical bills, for example,
economic damages could easily have been 10
or more times the amount awarded here. Only
chance saved Philip Morris from a much
higher compensatory damage award.
In analyzing the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages, the Court of Appeals
also added to the compensatory damages
calculus the estimated harm to others....
Using harm to others as part of the ratio may
have been correct under the plurality opinion
in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp ...... However, it no longer
appears to be permissible (if it ever was) to
factor in that consideration. Although
Campbell held that similar acts could bear on
reprehensibility, it now appears that harm to
others should not be considered as part of the
ratio guidepost. . . . From the foregoing, we
conclude that the ratio guidepost considers
only harm to the plaintiff....
There also is some imprecision regarding
what amount we should use for noneconomic
damages-is it the $800,000 awarded by the
jury, or the $500,000 awarded by the trial
court after applying the statutory cap? We
need not decide between the "capped" or
"uncapped" figure, however, because it makes
no difference here. Either way, the second
Gore guidepost is not met. All arguable
versions of the ratios substantially exceed the
single-digit ratio (9:1) that the Court has said
ordinarily will apply in the usual case....
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In Williams II, the Court of Appeals also
relied on Philip Morris's wealth to conclude
that the jury's punitive damage award did not
violate due process. . . . Philip Morris objects
that Campbell prohibits using wealth in that
way. We agree. Wealth "cannot justify an
otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages
award." . . . If a punitive damage award is
grossly excessive under Gore and Campbell,
then the defendant's wealth will not make it
constitutional. In short, wealth is not a fourth
Gore guidepost.
However, Campbell did not otherwise remove
wealth from the punitive damage equation, as
Philip Morris asserts. A jury still may levy a
higher punitive damage award against a
wealthy defendant, as long as the final
punitive damage award does not exceed the
constitutional limits established by the three
Gore guideposts. . . . Consistently with the
foregoing, Oregon law specifically permits a
jury to consider a defendant's financial
condition when it imposes a punitive damage
award....
Of the three Gore guideposts, then, two
support a very significant punitive damage
award. One guidepost-the ratio-cuts the
other way. In the end, we are left to use those
competitive tools to assess whether the jury's
punitive damage award was not "grossly
excessive" and therefore should be reinstated.
The Gore guideposts are not bright-line tests.
. . . In other words, the guideposts are only
that-guideposts. Gore also referred to them
as indicia. . . . Campbell specifically
contemplated that some awards exceeding
single-digit ratios would satisfy due process. .
. . Single-digit ratios may mark the boundary
in ordinary cases, but the absence of bright-
line rules necessarily suggests that the other
two guideposts-reprehensibility and
comparable sanctions-can provide a basis
for overriding the concern that may arise from
a double-digit ratio.
And this is by no means an ordinary case.
Philip Morris's conduct here was
extraordinarily reprehensible, by any measure
of which we are aware. It put a significant
number of victims at profound risk for an
extended period of time. The State of Oregon
treats such conduct as grounds for a severe
criminal sanction, but even that did not
dissuade Philip Morris from pursuing its
scheme.
In summary, Philip Morris, with others,
engaged in a massive, continuous, near-half-
century scheme to defraud the plaintiff and
many others, even when Philip Morris always
had reason to suspect-and for two or more
decades absolutely knew-that the scheme
was damaging the health of a very large group
of Oregonians-the smoking public-and
was killing a number of that group. Under
such extreme and outrageous circumstances,
we conclude that the jury's $79.5 million
punitive damage award against Philip Morris
comported with due process, as we
understand that standard to relate to punitive
damage awards. It follows that the Court of
Appeals correctly held that the trial court
should have entered judgment against Philip
Morris for the full amount of the jury's
punitive damage award.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
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"Supreme Court to Weigh Award in a Smoker's Death"
The New York Times
May 31, 2006
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court, opening a new chapter
in its effort to establish constitutional
boundaries for punitive damages, agreed on
Tuesday to hear a cigarette maker's appeal
of a $79.5 million punitive damage award.
The amount was 97 times greater than the
compensatory damages that an Oregon jury
awarded in the case to the widow of a
smoker who died of lung cancer.
As in earlier punitive damages cases, the
question for the justices is whether the
award was so disproportionate to the injury
as to violate the constitutional guarantee of
due process. The Supreme Court has been
closely divided in these cases, and with two
new justices, the court may have decided
that the time was right for a fresh look.
When the justices take up the case in their
next term, they will hardly be writing on a
clean slate. In an important victory for
corporate defendants, the court three years
ago overturned an award of $145 million in
punitive damages against the State Farm
insurance company and set out some
guidelines.
In the State Farm case, a Utah jury had
assessed compensatory damages of $1
million, meaning that there was a 145:1 ratio
of punitive damages to compensatory.
Finding the punitive award "neither
reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong
committed," Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
wrote for the majority that "few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process."
The vote in that case was 6 to 3; two
members of the majority, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, are no longer on the court.
Not only for that reason, the outcome in the
new case, Philip Morris USA v. Williams,
No. 05-1296, is far from certain.
Punitive damages decisions have not
followed the court's typical liberal-
conservative ideological alignments. Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg were the dissenters last
time, with Justice Ginsburg complaining that
the majority was "boldly out of order" to
invade the province of state legislatures and
state courts in placing limits on punitive
damages.
Further, the court's major punitive damages
rulings have come in cases in which the
injury that led to the lawsuit was economic
rather than physical. The State Farm case
began as a suit over the insurance
company's initial refusal to settle a claim for
a policyholder. Another important
precedent, a 1996 decision that overturned a
$2 million punitive damage award against
the BMW automobile company, began as a
complaint that cars were being sold as new
without informing buyers that the paint had
been touched up.
In his opinion in the State Farm case, Justice
Kennedy noted that the case involved "no
physical injuries." While he did not
elaborate, the suggestion was that other
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considerations might apply had the harm to
the plaintiffs consisted of more than "only
minor economic injuries."
The plaintiff in the new case, Mayola
Williams, was married to a man who began
smoking while serving in the United States
Army in Korea in 1950 and who went on to
smoke three packs of Marlboro cigarettes a
day for decades. In 1996, lung cancer was
diagnosed in the man, Jesse Williams, and
he died the next year.
Mrs. Williams's lawsuit asserted that the
maker of Marlboro, Philip Morris, which
with its various brands accounts for about
half the cigarette sales in the United States,
had perpetrated a 50-year fraud to conceal
the health effects of smoking. Her lawyer
asked the jury to consider "how many other
Jesse Williamses in the last 40 years in the
state of Oregon there have been."
The company's Supreme Court appeal
argues that it violates due process to punish
a defendant "for the effects of its conduct on
nonparties," that is, on other smokers whose
cases were not before the jury.
Rejecting that argument in its opinion in
February of this year, the Oregon Supreme
Court said that Philip Morris "engaged in a
massive, continuous, near half-century
scheme to defraud the plain-tiff and many
others" by concealing the truth and inducing
its customers to keep smoking. The state
court called the company's conduct
"extraordinarily reprehensible, by any
measure of which we are aware."
The Supreme Court's precedents have
referred to "reprehensibility" as a factor to
consider in evaluating a punitive damages
award. In this case, Philip Morris argues in
its appeal, the Oregon court improperly
permitted its conclusion on reprehensibility
to "override the constitutional requirement
that punitive damages be reasonably related
to the plaintiffs harm."
The company's appeal was supported by
briefs filed by the United States Chamber of
Commerce and the Product Liability
Advisory Council, a coalition of 133
manufacturers. The case will be argued in
November or December.
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"Court Affirms Tobacco Award"
The Oregonian
February 3, 2006
Ashbel S. Green
The Oregon Supreme Court on Thursday
upheld a $79.5 million punitive damage
award against cigarette maker Philip Morris.
The U.S. Supreme Court in 2003 ordered a
review of the award for excessiveness, but
nearly three years later Oregon's top court
said Philip Morris' bad behavior justified a
large verdict.
"Philip Morris's conduct here was
extraordinarily reprehensible, by any
measure of which we are aware," wrote
Justice Michael Gillette for a unanimous
court. "It put a significant number of victims
at profound risk for an extended period of
time. The State of Oregon treats such
conduct as grounds for a severe criminal
sanction, but even that did not dissuade
Philip Morris from pursuing its scheme."
Mayola Williams, who filed the suit on
behalf of her deceased husband, Jesse,
praised the ruling.
"I put Jesse in the place of David against the
great giant, and he came out pretty good so
far," she said. "The justice system has done
us fairly."
Philip Morris officials said the decision
violated U.S. Supreme Court rulings.
"Philip Morris USA will once again seek
review of this case by the U.S. Supreme
Court," said William S. Ohlemeyer, Philip
Morris USA vice president and associate
general counsel.
Oregon and the U.S. Supreme Court have
tussled over the size of punitive damage
awards for more than a decade. Since 1994,
the nation's highest court has sent at least
five punitive damage awards back to the
state for review.
Oregon has complied with the orders to
reconsider, but the Philip Morris case marks
at least the second time the state Supreme
Court has concluded that a large punitive
damage award was appropriate.
"The Oregon supremes' response to this has
always been somewhat grudging," said
Thomas W. Sondag, a Portland attorney who
has argued against large punitive damage
awards in several Oregon cases.
David F. Sugerman, a Portland attorney on
the other side of the debate, said Oregon was
one of several states that have had punitive
awards sent back by the U.S. Supreme
Court. "It's not defiance. It's that we have a
system here, and when the two collide,
there's going to be some tension," Sugerman
said.
Jesse D. Williams, 67, a former Portland
janitor and longtime smoker, died of lung
cancer in 1997. During the 1999 trial in
Multnomah County, lawyers for his family
argued that a large punitive damages award
was justified because Philip Morris officials
had known for more than half a century that
smoking was deadly, had consistently
downplayed the health risks and had
manipulated the levels of nicotine to keep
smokers addicted.
In addition to the $79.5 million punitive
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damages award, the jury awarded $821,485
in compensatory damages. At the time, it
was the largest individual smoking-death
verdict in the country.
Philip Morris attorneys asked the judge to
reduce the punitive damage award, arguing
that the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that
such verdicts generally should be less than
10 times compensatory damages.
The judge reduced the punitive damages to
$32 million.
Both sides appealed. The Oregon Court of
Appeals reinstated the $79.5 million
punitive damages award. The Oregon
Supreme Court declined to review the case,
but the U.S. Supreme Court took it on
appeal.
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned
a $145 million punitive damages award out
of Utah. The court said the amount was
excessive in violation of the 14th
Amendment due process clause. The court
spelled out a series of rules for evaluating
punitive damages.
The court then told Oregon to reconsider
three punitive damages awards, including
the Williams verdict, in light of the Utah
case.
A decade earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court
overturned a $5 million punitive damages
award in an all-terrain vehicle rollover case
because the Oregon Supreme Court had
declined to review the size of the verdict.
In 1995, the Oregon Supreme Court
acquiesced and reviewed the verdict, but
decided it was not excessive.
The U.S. Supreme Court let that decision
stand.
When the Williams case went back to
Oregon, the Court of Appeals got the first
look. And in 2004, the court said the award
was justified.
Next stop was the Oregon Supreme Court,
which said the ratio of compensatory
damages to punitive damages in the case-
the two sides do the math differently-was
by any calculation higher than is generally
allowed. But the ratio was just one part of
the analysis, and in this case the company's
egregious conduct outweighed it, the court
said.
"In summary, Philip Morris, with others,
engaged in a massive, continuous, near-half-
century scheme to defraud the plaintiff and
many others, even when Philip Morris
always had reason to suspect-and for two
or more decades absolutely knew-that the
scheme was damaging the health of a very
large group of Oregonians-the smoking
public-and was killing a number of that
group," Gillette wrote. "Under such extreme
and outrageous circumstances, we conclude
that the jury's $79.5 million punitive
damage award against Philip Morris
comported with due process."
Under Oregon law, 60 percent of punitive
damages awards go to the state crime
victims' compensation fund.
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"Court Upholds $79.5 Million Punitive Damages Award Against Tobacco Company."
Health Law Week
July 9, 2004
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated a
jury's award of $79.5 million against a
tobacco company.
The appeals court had previously reversed a
trial court's reduction of the jury's $79.5
million award on Mayola Williams' fraud
claim against Philip Morris Inc., and
remanded the case with instructions to enter
judgment on the verdict. The appeals court
affirmed on Philip Morris' cross-appeal (see
11 HLawWk 542, Aug. 30, 2002).
Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted
Philip Morris' petition for a writ of
certiorari, vacated the appeals court's
decision, and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of the Court's
decision in State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
On remand, the appeals court reached the
same result that it reached in its previous
decision. First, it found the holding in State
Farm did not affect its previous conclusion
that "the potential injury to past, present, and
future consumers as the result of a routine
business practice is an appropriate
consideration in determining the amount of
punitive damages."
The appeals court then turned to the primary
issue before it, whether the jury's award was
consistent with the guidelines as the
Supreme Court refined them in State Farm.
As an initial matter, the court noted the state
of Oregon had a legitimate interest in
punishing Philip Morris and deterring it
from further misconduct.
After analyzing the guidelines, the appeals
court concluded that an award of punitive
damages in the amount of $79.5 million did
not violate the Due Process Clause under the
guidelines provided by State Farm.
According to the court, the amount of the
award was reasonable and proportionate to
the wrong inflicted on decedent and the
public of the state of Oregon. Thus, after
reconsidering its previous opinion in light of
State Farm, the appeals court believed its
original decision was correct.
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"High Court Sends Back Tobacco Case Award;
Verdict Against Philip Morris Exceeded Limits Set in April, Justices Say. Daimler Also
Wins."
Los Angeles Times
October 7, 2003
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court tossed out a large
punitive damage verdict against cigarette
maker Philip Morris on Monday, telling
lower court judges to reevaluate the size of
the award.
The court set aside a $79.5-million award
that was designed to punish the tobacco firm
for the lung cancer death of an Oregon
janitor. In another personal injury case, it set
aside a $3-million verdict in which jurors
sought to punish DaimlerChrysler for the
death of a Kentucky man who was ejected
from his Dodge Ram pickup in a crash.
The court's one-line orders Monday
followed a major ruling in April that sharply
limited the power of juries to punish
companies with huge punitive damage
awards. The justices stressed that civil
lawsuits are intended to compensate
plaintiffs for their losses if they were injured
and wronged by another. It is not a system
for punishing unpopular industries and
"unsavory businesses," the court said.
Since the 1970s, an increasing number of
lawsuits filed by injured individuals have
resulted in multimillion-dollar verdicts
against corporations. Typically, the jurors
are asked to award actual damages to cover
the victim's losses and then award a second,
larger amount to punish the company for its
wrongdoing.
In its April decision in State Farm vs.
Campbell, the high court warned judges that
they must rein in punitive damage verdicts
that greatly exceed the actual losses of the
victims who brought the lawsuit.
In that case, a Utah jury had ruled against
the auto insurer with $145 million in
punitive damages for having refused to pay
the full verdict against a man who caused an
accident that killed another driver.
Ordinarily, after handing down such a
ruling, the justices act on a series of pending
appeals in related cases and send them back
to lower courts to be reevaluated.
They did just that in May when they
reversed two large verdicts against Ford
Motor Co., including a $290-million
punitive verdict in California. In that case, a
Stanislaus County jury had awarded more
than $6 million to a family that suffered
injuries and a death when its Bronco rolled
over, plus $290 million to punish Ford for
what it said was gross wrongdoing in
manufacturing a defective vehicle.
In Monday's action involving Philip Morris
and DaimlerChrysler, the high court did not
rule out the possibility of punitive damages.
Its order told lower courts that the amount of
these damages should be in line with the
actual losses of the victim.
Only in the rarest circumstance can the
punitive verdict "exceed a single-digit ratio"
compared with the actual damages, said
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. For example,
if a jury awards $1 million to a plaintiff for
actual losses, the punitive damages should
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not exceed $9 million, he said.
In the Oregon case, lawyers for Philip
Morris had appealed, saying "the 97-1 ratio
of punitive-to-compensatory damages in this
case cannot stand constitutional scrutiny."
Jesse Williams started smoking during the
1950s and continued a three-pack-a-day
habit for four decades. He died of lung
cancer in 1997. His family sued Philip
Morris and won $521,000 in compensatory
damages. The jury tacked on $79.5 million
in punitive damages. The verdict was upheld
last year by the Oregon Supreme Court.
On Monday, the court granted an appeal by
Philip Morris, vacated the lower court ruling
and sent the case back to Oregon "for further
consideration in light of State Farm vs.
Campbell."
The tobacco industry has several other large
punitive damage awards on appeal,
including four in California.
Last month, a state appeals court in San
Francisco reduced the punitive damages
awarded to a former smoker with lung
cancer to $9 million from $25 million. But
the court refused Philip Morris' request to
toss out the award entirely, saying $9
million was "permissible and appropriate"
because Philip Morris had "touted to
children what it knew to be a cumulatively
toxic substance."
Two other cases in California that resulted in
punitive damages of $28 billion and $3
billion were later reduced to $28 million and
$100 million, respectively.
Shares of Philip Morris parent Altria Group
Inc. rose 34 cents Monday to $45.03.
Daimler-Chrysler gained 36 cents to $35.94.
Both trade on the New York Stock
Exchange.
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"Jury Awards $81 Million to Oregon Smoker's Family"
The New York Times
March 31, 1999
Barry Meier
A state jury in Portland, Ore., yesterday
ordered the largest award in a smoking-
related lawsuit, deciding that the Philip
Morris Companies must pay $81 million to
the family of a man who smoked Marlboro
cigarettes for four decades before he died.
The verdict, coming just a month after a San
Francisco jury awarded $51 million in
another case brought by an individual
smoker against Philip Morris, could indicate
that the tobacco industry's legal fortunes
may have shifted, analysts said. In recent
years, the public has witnessed a constant
drumbeat of documents damaging to
cigarette makers, which industry analysts
say may be a factor in the jury decisions.
For example, in both cases involving Philip
Morris, the juries called for large punitive
damages, which are meant to punish a
company for its behavior. In yesterday's
decision, the jury awarded $79.5 million in
punitive damages and $1.6 million in
compensatory damages to the family of
Jesse Williams, who died in 1997, five
months after lung cancer was diagnosed. In
the San Francisco case, the jury awarded
$50 million in punitive damages.
Yesterday Mr. Williams's wife, Mayola,
said he had had a dying wish. "He wanted to
make cigarette companies stop lying about
the health problems of smokers," she told
The Associated Press. "This jury agreed
with his goals."
Philip Morris, which is appealing the
California verdict, said yesterday that it
would also appeal the Oregon verdict.
Higher courts have thrown out the few
previous victories by smokers in cigarette-
related lawsuits, often on procedural
grounds.
"No verdict has ever withstood an appeal,
and we don't believe this will be a first one,"
said Gregory Little, the associate general
counsel for Philip Morris, which is the
country's biggest cigarette maker.
But tobacco industry analysts said
yesterday's decision was a particular setback
for cigarette makers because state product
liability laws in Oregon are far tougher than
those in California or Florida, the other
states in which producers have suffered legal
losses.
In Oregon, a smoker is barred from
receiving an award if a jury determines that
he or she bore more than 50 percent liability
for the problem over which a suit was
brought.
Cigarette company lawyers argued that Mr.
Williams was aware of the health risk when
he decided to continue smoking. The jury
determined that Mr. Williams and Philip
Morris equally shared liability.
William A. Gaylord,
Williams family,
acknowledged that Mr.
responsible for his deatt
a lawyer for the
said they had
Williams was partly
"The problem has been that Philip Morris
and other cigarette companies have never
accepted an ounce of responsibility," Mr.
Gaylord said. "They deny everything. They
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essentially say to their very best customers
that you get what's coming to you for
believing us."
Gary Black, a tobacco industry analyst with
Sanford C. Bernstein & Company in New
York, said that added to the California
decision, yesterday's verdict suggested that
the industry's $206 billion settlement last
year with 46 states had failed to put its legal
troubles to rest.
Under that agreement, which resolved
lawsuits brought by the states to recover
health care expenses related to smoking,
individual smokers and groups of them can
still sue. Four states had earlier settled their
claims in deals with the industry.
"I think the industry has got to get its head
out of the sand and stop believing that the
settlement got them closure," Mr. Black
said. "With all the documents and whistle-
blowers out there, juries are increasingly
going to award damages."
In trading after the verdict, Philip Morris
stock fell $3.4375 a share to close at $37.75
a share.
In the California case last month, the jury
ordered Philip Morris to pay $51.5 million
to Patricia Henley, who said her lung cancer
had been caused by more than 35 years of
smoking. That verdict was the largest award
of its kind until yesterday.
Cigarette industry officials have portrayed
that case as an aberration, pointing to a
number of recent legal victories. Earlier this
month, a Federal jury in Akron, Ohio, ruled
that tobacco companies did not have to
repay the costs of treating smoking-related
illnesses to dozens of union health and
benefit plans in Ohio.
But analysts said the back-to-back losses by
Philip Morris in individual cases suggested
that cigarette makers were likely to see more
defeats and escalating awards.
"It does seem to appear in the last two cases
that the juries wanted to punish Philip
Morris and the industry," said Bonnie
Zoller, an analyst with Credit Suisse First
Boston Corporation in New York.
The Oregon lawsuit was brought by the wife
and children of Mr. Williams, a former
janitor in the Portland school system who
was 67 when he died. It charged that Philip
Morris knew cigarettes caused cancer and
misrepresented that information.
In making its finding, the Oregon jury also
had to conclude that the misrepresentations
took place over the past decade because state
law limits the time in which plaintiffs can
seek damages.
There are more than 500 smoking-related
lawsuits pending against Philip Morris.
President Clinton also announced this year
that he had directed the Justice Department
to begin preparing a lawsuit against cigarette
makers to recover Medicare and other
Federal money spent treating illnesses
related to smoking.
Mr. Black said a Federal lawsuit could be in
the industry's interest because it might
provide a way to resolve individual cases as
well.
"The industry has got to make a decision,"
he said. "They have to recognize that the
tide has turned and decide they have to get
some type of settlement. Either that or they
have to build in the anticipated price of
litigation in the cost of cigarettes."
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"Addiction Overturned;
Until Recently, the Odds of Recovering a Legal Settlement Against Big Tobacco Were Less
Than Those of Winning the Illinois Lottery"
Chicago Tribune
April 5, 1999
Douglas W. Kmiec
Last week a jury ordered the giant tobacco
firm Philip Morris to pay a record $81
million to the Jesse Williams family of
Portland, Ore. Jesse Williams smoked three
packs of Marlboros a day for more than 40
years before succumbing to lung cancer in
1997. Two months earlier in San Francisco,
another Marlboro smoker with inoperable
lung cancer got an award of $51.5 million.
Death and legal appeals aside, it looks like it
is beginning to pay to be (or at least to have
been) a Marlboro man. This was seldom true
in the past. Until recently, the odds of
recovering a legal settlement against Big
Tobacco were less than those of winning the
Illinois lottery. Only in three other cases had
a tobacco-maker been found liable to an
individual, and each was overturned on
appeal.
Yes, yes, 46 states did indeed squeeze $206
billion out of the tobacco firms last year to
recoup the cost of medical care. Four states
settled separately for another $40 billion, but
these cases were decidedly different.
Reimbursing states for tobacco-related
health-care costs indemnifies innocent
taxpayers, but can the same be said of
individuals who consumed a product known,
in the words of the ubiquitous federal label,
"to be hazardous to your health"?
Jesse Williams' family claims he picked up
his unhealthy habit a decade before the
imposition of the 1966 federal warning
label. But as early as 1952, Reader's Digest
ran a nationally circulated, easily
understandable series titled "Cancer by the
Carton." A couple of years later legendary
journalist Edward R. Murrow devoted his
popular program "See It Now" to detailing
the health risks of smoking.
The industry, of course, hotly contested back
then that a causal linkage exists between
smoking and lung cancer. But you'd have to
have been living in a cave to be caught by
surprise that the risk existed. In 1954, there
already were 25,000 lung cancer deaths with
more than 60 percent of those deaths among
males attributable to smoking.
This is not to say that cigarette smoking
wasn't fashionable when Williams lit up in
the '50s. Celebrities were all over radio,
television and the silver screen doing the
same. But as far as anyone could tell it was
all voluntary stupidity. You might as well
sue Lauren Bacall for her corrupting
influence in asking Humphrey Bogart for a
match in "To Have and Have Not," as to sue
R.J. Reynolds.
And for a good long while the tobacco folks
kept the courthouse doors closed with just
this argument. Surely a remarkable feat
given that much of what lawyers call tort
law today is little more than a hunt for a
deep pocket, and there are few deeper than
tobacco. Yet jury after jury would find no
liability because frankly, the injured parties
had enough knowledge to know and assume
the risks.
What changed? In a ground-breaking article
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in 1980, Don Garner, now a visiting law
professor at Pepperdine University, made a
modest proposal in academic writing-
namely that the addictive character of
tobacco be relied upon to deny the
voluntariness of intense smoking habits like
those of the late Jesse Williams.
Garner's able work, however, yielded less in
immediate courtroom triumph than it
otherwise might. In part, this was because
addiction experts were seldom in a position
to talk knowledgeably and specifically about
the often deceased smoker as opposed to
abstract or generalized data.
And of course, the tobacco industry made
much of the fact that close to one-half of
long-term smokers have managed to quit-
albeit often with considerable difficulty.
But that was then. Litigation since 1994 has
unearthed a wealth of previously
undisclosed internal memoranda
demonstrating that cigarette manufacturers
have been covertly manipulating the nicotine
levels of their products to "hook" Jesse
Williams and millions of others, no matter
how many admonishing stories Reader's
Digest or anyone else released. Twenty-five
years before the U.S. surgeon general would
even officially list nicotine as possibly
addictive, a confidential manufacturer memo
observed: ". . . (N)icotine is addictive. We
are, then, in the business of selling nicotine,
an addictive drug . . ."
True, Jesse Williams and smokers like him
made that fatally unwise choice to smoke,
and this misstep may properly reduce his
family's compensation. Yet, as the medieval
philosopher Thomas Aquinas resolved, a
continued action is only worthy of praise or
blame if it remains within the power or
dominion of one's reason. In context, a
knowledge of a cancer risk is hardly
equivalent to an understanding that one is
becoming physically dependent on a drug.
The manufacturers of nicotine-laced tobacco
made a choice to deny Jesse Williams' his
ability to freely choose. In so doing it is hard
to think of them as any different than
common purveyors of other addictive drugs,
like say, heroin. Except heroin is illegal and
doesn't kill 400,000 Americans a year-
more than the combined number of people
who die of illegal drug use, AIDS, car
accidents, alcohol abuse, murders, suicides,
plane crashes and fires.
Eighty-one million dollars suddenly seems
far too little.
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"Jurors Vent Outrage at Industry; Verdicts Against Tobacco, Gun Firms Stake Out New
Legal Territory"
The Washington Post
August 30, 1999
Joan Biskupic
Tony Vaccaro thought it was time for "the
little people" to send a message-the
"average citizens," as he put it, "who usually
don't have a voice."
The message was this: Tobacco companies
have spent decades deceiving the public
about the effects of their cigarettes, and they
should be made to pay for it.
But the message wasn't just from Vaccaro, a
28-year-old financial services worker in San
Francisco. It was the verdict of a 12-person
jury on which he served in February. Its $51
million judgment against Philip Morris-
one of four verdicts against tobacco since
last summer-was part of a populist trend of
jurors around the country exacting
punishment on disfavored industries.
Tobacco hasn't been the only business
newly buffeted by this wave of juror
outrage. In February, for the first time, a jury
decided to hold gun manufacturers
responsible for the criminal use of their
products. Again, some jurors said the
industry had it coming.
Lawsuits condemning cigarettes and guns
are nothing new. Advocacy groups have
campaigned for years against the tobacco
and firearms industries, using the courts as a
weapon. What is new is that juries are
listening.
These verdicts coincide with a national trend
of juries assessing harsher and harsher
damages against corporate defendants, such
as the $4.9 billion verdict returned last
month against General Motors Corp. for six
people whose car exploded-and reduced on
appeal last week to about $1 billion. But
they add a new element.
Jurors in these cases were staking out new
territory in American law, asserting their
interest in issues broader than the behavior
of a single corporate defendant. Unlike past
product liability verdicts, such as those
against the Ford Pinto or the Dalkon shield,
where a single company was targeted, juries
are focusing on broad social problems-
smoking-related disease, gun violence-that
traditionally have been addressed through
legislation.
"Jurors are ready to believe that they are the
public avengers. Because the governor
won't do it, the state legislature won't do it,
the jurors are the only ones who will do it,"
said Victor Schwartz, a liability law expert
who opposes the trend.
The recent verdicts are part of a pattern of
juror activism across the country that also
includes so-called juror nullification, in
which juries have let criminal defendants go
free, despite the weight of the evidence
against them, in protest of particular laws. In
the current product liability disputes, jurors
say their verdicts are based on the evidence
in the case. But, as with nullification, they
also appear to be giving freer rein to their
own sense of justice.
"There is a lot of anger out there," said
Stanford University law professor Robert
Rabin, "and it's getting translated into jury
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verdicts."
This increased willingness to find against
the tobacco and gun industries has released a
torrent of new litigation and could have wide
repercussions for other businesses and
people who claim they have been hurt by
their products. Smokers and their families
have filed hundreds of individual law-suits
across the country; numerous class action
efforts are also pending. And since the
groundbreaking Brooklyn gun verdict in
February, the firearms industry has faced an
onslaught of lawsuits. A total of 27 cities
and the NAACP are now suing firearms
companies.
"All these cases have a snowball effect,"
Rabin added, "as potential jurors read . . .
about an industry that appears to have been
involved in some coverup and then gets
nailed. They feel empowered to act
likewise."
Some lawyers argue that these verdicts
poach on the government's role in regulating
tobacco and guns, determining, for example,
what constitutes deceptive cigarette
advertising or the negligent marketing of
firearms.
This trend of jury verdicts-in essence,
steering national policy on tobacco and
guns-raises important questions. Can a
single corporate defendant in a court case
receive a fair trial if the jury seeks to punish
an entire industry? Can a scattered set of
verdicts add up to a coherent national
policy? And if this tendency continues, what
other unpopular industries might feel
themselves targeted by jurors: Health
maintenance organizations? The
entertainment industry? The media?
Expanding Public Scorn
It may have been inevitable that public scorn
for cigarette and gun manufacturers
ultimately would find its way into the jury
box. A new Washington Post survey found
that 59 percent of Americans think the
tobacco industry has not behaved
responsibly in selling its products and about
half feel that way about gun manufacturers.
But at the same time, the public has watched
state legislatures and Congress struggle with
how to regulate these controversial but legal
industries.
Last year a proposed settlement that would
have further regulated the sale of cigarettes
collapsed in Congress after the tobacco
companies withdrew their support and
lobbied hard against it. (A subsequent
settlement between the states and companies
involved smaller sums and little regulation.)
And despite a series of high-profile
shootings that have strengthened public
support for gun control, Congress remains at
an impasse. Competing Senate and House
versions of a juvenile justice bill-one with
modest gun control measures, one with
none-are expected to be debated in
conference when Congress returns from its
recess.
The legislative vacuum on tobacco and guns
is increasingly being filled by litigation
brought by individuals, organizations, states
and the federal government. And that
litigation is increasingly finding sympathetic
juries.
"In the jury room generally, it is now seen as
very acceptable to take a stand against an
industry," said David S. Davis, senior vice
president of the national jury research firm
DecisionQuest. "It used to be that jurors
who spoke about individual responsibility
would get the applause."
325
The Post poll shows that a majority of those
questioned-55 percent-are suspicious of
jurors' taking on a more important role in
punishing companies for their legal but
dangerous products.
But a substantial minority-35 percent-
believe it's a good thing if juries take the
lead against harmful products when
legislatures have failed to act. Experts found
this percentage significant, given that juries
traditionally have confined themselves to
deciding the facts of a single case. They also
noted the potential importance of this
minority, because one or two forceful
opinions on a jury can affect the outcome of
a case.
"The growing body of evidence suggests
some jurors are turning mass tort litigation
into a vehicle for the moral condemnation of
corporate behavior thought to be
irresponsible or malevolent," said University
of Georgia law professor Richard Nagareda.
Jurors' New Confidence
To be sure, some of the recent cigarette and
gun liability lawsuits have ended in the
industries' favor, including a verdict against
the family of a longtime smoker in Baton
Rouge, La., last month. But even in cases
where the industry ultimately wins, juries
are conscious of appearing pro-tobacco.
"People said we weren't sending the right
message," said Rodney Marchand, foreman
of a Memphis jury that returned verdicts for
three cigarette companies in May. "They
said we are 'letting the tobacco companies
off.'
This attitude on the part of jurors is a recent
development. In four decades of litigation by
smokers and their survivors against cigarette
companies, there were only two verdicts
ordering companies to pay damages to
smokers before last summer. The earliest
victory for a smoker came in 1988, when a
divided jury said Liggett Group was
responsible for the death of Rose Cipollone,
a New Jersey woman who smoked
Chesterfields and died of lung cancer in
1984.
But the second thoughts of the Cipollone
jurors were revealing. Many of them told
reporters at the time that they were worried
that they had done the wrong thing. Some
cried about having given in to more
dominant jurors. Not until 1996 did a jury
again decide in favor of a smoker, and this
verdict, like the Cipollone case, was
overturned.
Today, after years of allegations of the
industry manipulating nicotine levels and
concealing the health risks associated with
smoking, jurors express no such
tentativeness. In recent interviews, juror
after juror spoke confidently about the desire
to punish the industry, citing its alleged
history of misbehaviors and its perceived
ability to use large profits to beat the system.
"It was the whole lay of the land," said April
Dewees, a 30-year-old schoolteacher on the
Port-land, Ore., jury that awarded a record $
80 million to the family of a man who used
to smoke three packs of Marlboros a day.
"All the ways they played down the dangers
of it. Someone said to me afterward, 'Well,
all businesses lie.' Well, they shouldn't lie.
There are repercussions. They profited from
their misrepresentations. They did need to be
punished."
John Bowman, a 53-year-old businessman
who was on a 1998 Jacksonville, Fla., jury
that ordered Brown & Williamson to pay $1
million for the death of a Lucky Strike
smoker, including the first punitive damages
ever in such a case, said that verdict was an
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indictment of the whole industry: "We felt
that all tobacco products are dangerous."
Fellow juror Nicole Boyer, 36, a
homemaker, said she believed "all the
companies were in on it together, trying to
get people hooked on nicotine."
Tony Vaccaro, of the San Francisco jury,
added, "We thought it was important to send
a message because of the stonewalling they
had done for all those decades."
Gary Doski, a 49-year-old electronics
technician and the foreman on the 1998
Jacksonville jury, summed up the contrast
between his jury and the 1988 Cipollone
panel: "Afterward, the lawyers were all
surprised at how happy all of us seemed."
Discord on Gun Verdict
In contrast, the watershed verdict in
February against gun makers was marked by
the kind of discord and angst that the
Cipollone jurors felt a decade ago. At one
point, the Brooklyn jurors sent the judge a
note asking for help: "We are all very upset.
We are starting to fight. We cannot reach a
decision. . . . Please, please, give us more
direction!"
One juror expressed some reservations,
saying a verdict against the gun
manufacturers would "open the floodgate of
lawsuits across the country." Other jurors
wept. At one point, a note pleaded, "One of
the jurors doesn't feel well. Is there any way
we can get some Pepto Bismol?"
The Brooklyn jury's discomfort reflected a
broader public ambivalence. The Post poll
found that 70 percent of those questioned
said they disapproved of holding gun
manufacturers responsible for shooting
deaths and other illegal uses of their
weapons. But the respondents were evenly
divided-46 percent to 45 percent--on the
question of whether gun manufacturers have
behaved irresponsibly or responsibly in
advertising and selling their products.
Even this ambivalence represents a change
in the social and legal context of firearms
violence. Shooting victims have been suing
gun manufacturers for putting the weapons
on the streets for years. But no such lawsuit
had ever reached trial until last year when a
jury decided, also in a Brooklyn case, in
favor of a gun company after about six hours
of deliberation.
This year's Brooklyn jury deliberated for six
days before ultimately deciding to hold 15
manufacturers responsible for the negligent
marketing of handguns in three of the seven
shootings covered by the lawsuits. But they
awarded damages in only one of the cases,
to 19-year-old Steven Fox of Queens, who
survived a bullet to the brain.
"The Rubicon has been crossed," said Elisa
Barnes, a lawyer for the victims.
A Corrective or Bad Policy?
Some legal experts argue
increased willingness to
controversial industries is
democratic corrective to
corporate power.
that juries'
take on
a necessary,
unchecked
"What is happening now is that jurors are
more angry and aware," said John Banzhaf,
a George Washington University law
professor active in anti-tobacco litigation.
"For years, tobacco companies could say
addiction and deaths weren't their
responsibility. But the social climate has
changed. And this is why we have juries."
"Jurors feel empowered within the system
and against an industry that has flagrantly
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not done the right thing," added Stephanie
Hartley, a Florida lawyer who represents
smokers.
But defense lawyers argue that juries are
unsuited to the broader role they are
beginning to embrace. They say jurors who
are eager to use their position to send a
message to an industry may find it hard to
render a fair verdict on whether a specific
defendant caused a single victim's cancer or
other injury.
Critics also point out the uneven policy
likely to result from a patchwork of verdicts
that inevitably depend on the predilections
of the jurors and the quality of the case
mounted by each side's attorneys. Unlike
legislators, who typically hold hearings on a
subject and seek out information from a
multitude of competing interests, jurors are
told only what the two sides of a case want
them to know.
"Juries aren't equipped to decide social
policy," said Anne Kimball, a Chicago
lawyer who rep-resented gun makers in the
recent Brooklyn case. "To the extent that we
give a jury the power to effectively legislate
... we are doing damage to the underlying
principles of our government."
Meanwhile, industry analysts worry that the
negative revelations from the recent cases
will only produce more lawsuits, and say
unpopular industries must change the way
they handle litigation. Corporate defense
lawyers say they are now warier about
letting cases get to trial, more careful in
choosing jurors and, if a trial is inevitable,
intent on communicating their own message
about the limits of a company's
responsibility.
And those on both sides of the debate
wonder what industries might be next. Some
believe they already have seen signs of
incipient jury backlash against media
excesses in a verdict against the "Jenny
Jones Show" in May.
The talk show was on trial over a killing that
arose from a 1995 episode called "Secret
Same-Sex Crushes." On the program, Scott
Amedure told his friend Jonathan Schmitz
that he had a crush on him; three days later,
Schmitz gunned down Amedure. The
victim's family lodged a wrongful death suit
against the show for "ambushing" Schmitz
with news of the crush. The jury deliberated
about six hours before finding against the
"Jenny Jones Show" and awarding the
Amedure family $ 25 million in damages.
Geoffrey Fieger, the lawyer for the victim's
family, said the jury was sending a message
to the talk show industry: "That type of
human exploitation needs to be corralled."
"In the future, defendants that make
products that create perceived social costs
could all be at risk," said lawyer Schwartz,
suggesting as possibilities chemical
manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies
and liquor producers. "I have never bought
the idea that tobacco is unique. I say: No
way. This is the beginning."
Claudia Deane, assistant director ofpolling,
and Madonna Lebling, staff researcher,
contributed to this report.
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"Big Tobacco, in Court Again. But the Stock Is Still Up."
The New York Times
August 14, 2005
Michael Janofsky
On and on they go, mammoth lawsuits
against the nation's biggest tobacco
companies.
Just two weeks ago, Philip Morris USA and
five other cigarette makers were sued in a
federal court in Boston by a group seeking
to recover $60 billion for the government in
Medicare benefits for smoking-related
diseases. Lawyers for the group, the United
Seniors Association, said the law also
allowed the court to award an additional $60
billion to the plaintiff.
The lawsuit is just the latest in more than 50
years of legal challenges to the tobacco
industry. Hundreds of other cases are still
pending in this country and abroad,
including some that have been grinding on
for years, like the federal government's
effort to claim $280 billion in a racketeering
case.
As the nation's largest cigarette maker with
half the domestic market, Philip Morris,
alone, is currently a defendant in 454 cases;
it spent $933 million in legal costs from
2002 to 2004, with lawyers billing $850 an
hour and, in rare cases, up to $1,000.
Are company officials concerned about the
Boston case? Are they concerned about any
case? To some extent, yes, they say. But this
is an industry that long ago accepted
litigation as a routine cost of business.
"Obviously, we take the litigation very
seriously," said Steven C. Parrish, a senior
vice president of the Altria Group, the parent
company of Philip Morris. Mr. Parrish
added, "We believe we have the appropriate
strategies and resources to successfully
manage the litigation."
Like other tobacco companies, Philip Morris
has a modest staff that oversees the
company's litigation and retains leading law
firms and specific lawyers on a case-by-case
basis.
For the trial in the government lawsuit,
which ended in June after nine months,
much of the courtroom work was handled by
two lawyers representing Philip Morris-
Dan K. Webb of Winston & Strawn in
Chicago and Theodore V. Wells Jr. of Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison in New
York-along with David M. Bernick of
Kirkland & Ellis in Chicago, who
represented the Brown & Williamson
tobacco company.
Mr. Webb is a former United States attorney
in Illinois who has represented Microsoft,
General Electric and the New York Stock
Exchange. Mr. Wells has defended civil and
white-collar criminal defendants, including
former Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy,
former Senator Robert G. Torricelli of New
Jersey and the financier Michael Milken.
Mr. Bernick, who has defended chemical
and asbestos companies, specializes in
complex corporate cases and has been
retained by Philip Morris for a class-action
tobacco case in New York.
With such legal power, the tobacco
companies have enjoyed a reasonable
measure of success in court.
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Since 1998, when the major tobacco
companies settled lawsuits with the states
for $246 billion over health care costs
related to smoking, domestic cases involving
Philip Morris as a defendant, alone or with
other companies, have ended with 27
verdicts in favor of the defendants and 16 in
favor of the plaintiffs, with potential
combined awards of $948 million.
But the company has appealed 13 of those
cases. Of the remaining three, Philip Morris
paid plaintiffs in two, for a total of $20.3
million. The other case was dismissed.
Over the same period, Philip Morris's
leading competitor, Reynolds American,
which merged last year with Brown &
Williamson and now has 30 percent of the
domestic market, has been a defendant in 50
cases and has paid once, for $5 million.
In the same years, the stock prices of Philip
Morris and Reynolds American have more
than doubled.
"Tobacco companies have an excellent,
excellent track record in litigation," said
Christine Farkas, an equities analyst for
Merrill Lynch who follows the industry. "Is
it disruptive to business? Yes. But if they
lose at trial, they typically win on appeal."
The biggest lawsuit facing the industry is the
government's racketeering case, which now
hinges on a federal judge's ruling on liability
and the Supreme Court's decision on
whether to consider an appeal to sustain a
request for $280 billion in damages that a
lower court denied.
If the Supreme Court decides not to hear the
government's appeal, the companies are
facing a potential $14 billion judgment, an
amount the government is seeking from the
companies to finance a national stop-
smoking campaign.
The government case is one of nine pending
actions against Philip Morris as sole
defendant or co-defendant in class-action
lawsuits over health-related claims or a case
involving multiple claims. The other Philip
Morris cases involve plaintiffs seeking the
recovery of health care costs, as well as
tobacco prices and cigarette contraband.
In addition, Philip Morris is a defendant in
151 cases in other countries.
Among the unresolved cases, stock analysts
and lawyers who monitor tobacco litigation
identify three cases as most threatening to
the industry and especially to Altria, which
is waiting for litigation to diminish before
splitting off its food company, Kraft.
They are the federal government's case and
two class-action suits-one in Florida that
could cost Philip Morris $74 million and
other companies $69 million, and the other
in Illinois, where Philip Morris is the lone
defendant, facing a lower court verdict of
$10.1 billion.
"Whatever spin the companies give you,
they are still under a serious threat from all
three of these cases," said Richard A.
Daynard, associate dean at Northeastern
University School of Law in Boston and
chairman of its Tobacco Products Liability
Project. "There's a reasonable likelihood
they could get a bad result in any or all of
them."
The government case involves the largest
amount of money and the most sweeping
charges. The companies are accused of
misleading the public about addiction,
nicotine content, secondhand smoke,
scientific evidence and marketing practices.
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The Florida suit poses a considerable threat
as well. It started 11 years ago, when
lawyers sued Philip Morris, Reynolds and
six other tobacco companies on behalf of all
"addicted" smokers in the United States who
contended that their illnesses derived from
cigarettes. After the class was narrowed to
smokers in Florida, a two-year jury trial
ended in 2000 with the largest judgment
ever against the tobacco industry, $145
billion.
Three years later, an appeals court reversed
the decision. After the full appeals court
refused to reconsider, the plaintiffs appealed
to the Florida Supreme Court, which agreed
to hear the case. Oral arguments were heard
last November.
If the State Supreme Court rules against
them, the companies say they intend to take
the case to the United States Supreme Court.
Stanley M. Rosenblatt, the Miami lawyer
who represents the plaintiffs, declined to
discuss the case, saying it was "too
sensitive" with the decision expected at any
time.
The Illinois case is one of several in which
plaintiffs are accusing the companies of
fraud over the use of terms like "light,"
"lites" and "low-tar" to describe their
products.
The case is directed only at Philip Morris,
with accusations that the company defrauded
smokers by using words that suggest
Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights
cigarettes may be less hazardous than the so-
called full flavor brands.
In 2003, a state judge ruled for the plaintiffs,
awarding $7.1 billion in compensatory
damages and $3 billion in punitive damages.
The Illinois State Supreme Court agreed to
hear an appeal, and oral arguments were
made in November.
Matthew L. Myers, the president of the
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, who has
been fighting the cigarette companies for
years, said any substantial financial
judgment against the industry had the
potential to shake investor confidence
despite a history that shows tobacco
companies to be resilient in the face of their
legal problems.
As an example, Mr. Myers said, a victory for
the plaintiffs in the Illinois case may
influence court decisions in some of the
other "lights" cases.
"I think they understate the risk," he said of
corporate officials. "Since Wall Street
operates on psychological impact, tobacco
companies have done a brilliant job since
they settled the lawsuits with the states,
telling people there's nothing out there that
could rattle their economic stability in a
fundamental way. I just don't believe that's
true."
But Ms. Farkas, the analyst, said two
developments convince her that the
companies can probably withstand current
and future legal attacks.
Courts have shown a growing reluctance to
certify large groups as a "class" plaintiff,
and a Supreme Court ruling in a 2003 case
involving State Farm Insurance limited the
amount of punitive damages a plaintiff could
seek.
"If tobacco companies lose in one court,
they simply move to the next," Ms. Farkas
said. "In general, the litigation environment
has gotten better for them, and their stock
prices reflect it."
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Massachusetts v. E.P.A.
(05-1120)
Ruling Below: (Massachusetts v. EPA 367 U.S. App. D.C. 282; 415 F.3d 50; (D.C. 2005)., cert
granted 126 S. Ct. 2960; 74 U.S.L.W. 3720 [2006]).
In 1999, several states and environmental groups petitioned the E.P.A. to regulate carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gasses in new motor vehicles. Four years later, under President Bush, the
E.P.A. rejected the petitions stating that it did not have the statutory authority to act. The groups
that had petitioned the E.P.A. brought this suit, seeking to force the E.P.A. to promulgate CO 2
regulations for cars under the Clean Air Act. A divided 3-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit held
that the E.P.A.'s rejection of the petitions was within the agency's discretion. One judge
concurred in the result, but would have held that the petitioners lacked standing in the suit. The
dissenting judge would have held that the E.P.A. was compelled by the Clean Air Act to
promulgate regulations upon finding that greenhouse gasses threatened public health, a
conclusion he said was unavoidable given the available evidence.
Questions Presented: 1. Whether the EPA Administrator may decline to issue emission
standards for motor vehicles based on policy considerations not enumerated in section 202(a)(1).
2. Whether the EPA Administrator has authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other air
pollutants associated with climate change under section 202(a)(1).
Commonwealth Of MASSACHUSETTS, Et Al., Petitioners,
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent, Alliance Of Automobile
Manufacturers, Et Al., Intervenors.
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
Decided July 15, 2005
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge:
Petitioners are twelve states, three cities, an
American territory, and numerous
environmental organizations. They are
opposed by the Environmental Protection
Agency as respondent, and ten states and
several trade associations as intervenors.
The controversy is about EPA's denial of a
petition asking it to regulate carbon dioxide
(C0 2) and other greenhouse gas emissions
from new motor vehicles under § 202(a)(1)
of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(1). EPA concluded that it did not
have statutory authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles and that, even if it did, it would not
exercise the authority at this time. . . .
I.
[The Court reviews statutory and
jurisdictional issues under the Clean Air Act
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presented by this suit and concludes that,
because the E.P.A.'s denial of the petitions
for rulemaking constitutes a "final action,"
the Court has exclusive jurisdiction. With
regard to the plaintiffs' Article III standing,
the Court decided to proceed to consider the
merits of the case without making a specific
standing determination, recognizing that the
merits inquiry and standing inquiry often
overlap in ways that are difficult to
distinguish.]
.. .We will therefore assume arguendo that
EPA has statutory authority to regulate
greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles.
The question we address is whether EPA
properly declined to exercise that authority.
II.
Greenhouse gases trap energy, much like the
glass panels of a greenhouse. The earth's
surface is warmed by absorbing solar energy
(visible light). The earth, in turn, radiates
infrared energy (heat) back into space. A
portion of the infrared radiation is trapped
by greenhouse gas molecules, resulting in
additional warming of the lower atmosphere
and the earth's surface. This "greenhouse
effect" is a natural phenomenon, without
which the planet would be significantly
colder and life as we know it would not be
possible. ...
Petitioners sought to have EPA regulate,
under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act,
carbon dioxide (C0 2), and three other
greenhouse gases: methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N20), and hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs). In response to EPA's request for
public comments on the 1999 petition for
rulemaking, the agency received nearly
50,000 submissions. . . . Most were short
expressions of support for the petition; many
were nearly identical. . . . The comment
period closed in May 2001. In the same
month, the White House requested the
National Academy of Sciences to assist the
Administration in its review of climate
change policy. The Academy "is a private,
nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of
distinguished scholars engaged in scientific
and engineering research... ..... . Under its
congressional charter, issued in 1863, the
Academy has a mandate to advise the
federal government on scientific and
technical matters when requested. The
Academy's principal operating agency for
providing such advice is its National
Research Council....
In denying the rulemaking petition, EPA
found that the scientific comments
petitioners and others submitted rested on
information already in the public domain
and did not add significantly to the body of
knowledge available to the National
Research Council when it prepared the
report cited above. Since none of the
comments caused EPA to question the
Council's report, EPA decided to rely on the
Council's "objective and independent
assessment of the relevant science." . . .
[The Court discusses uncertainty in the
debate over global warming. In particular,
the Court emphasizes that the National
Research Council could not unequivocally
establish a causal connection between
greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming. The Court also highlights a
statistic that global temperatures decreased
from 1946 to 1975 despite increasing carbon
dioxide levels.]
Relying on Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, . .
petitioners challenge EPA's decision to
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forego rulemaking "until more is understood
about the causes, extent and significance of
climate change and the potential options for
addressing it." . . . In our view Ethyl
supports EPA, not petitioners. Section
202(a)(1) directs the Administrator to
regulate emissions that "in his judgment"
"may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare." Section 202(a)(1)
was not at issue in Ethyl; . . . [b]ut what the
court had to say about § 202(a)(1) is
instructive. In requiring the EPA
Administrator to make a threshold
"judgment" about whether to regulate, §
202(a)(1) gives the Administrator
considerable discretion. . . . Congress does
not require the Administrator to exercise his
discretion solely on the basis of his
assessment of scientific evidence. . . . What
the Ethyl court called "policy judgments"
also may be taken into account. By this the
court meant the sort of policy judgments
Congress makes when it decides whether to
enact legislation regulating a particular area.
... In addition to the scientific uncertainty
about the causal effects of greenhouse gases
on the future climate of the earth, the
Administrator relied upon many "policy"
considerations that, in his judgment,
warranted regulatory forbearance at this
time.. . . New motor vehicles are but one of
many sources of greenhouse gas emissions;
promulgating regulations under § 202 would
"result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach
to the climate change issue." . . . The
Administrator expressed concern that
unilateral regulation of U.S. motor vehicle
emissions could weaken efforts to persuade
developing countries to reduce the intensity
of greenhouse gases thrown off by their
economies. . . . Ongoing research into
scientific uncertainties and the
Administration's programs to address
climate change including voluntary emission
reduction programs and initiatives with
private entities to develop new technology
also played a role in the Administrator's
decision not to regulate. . . . The
Administrator pointed to efforts to promote
"fuel cell and hybrid vehicles" and ongoing
efforts to develop "hydrogen as a primary
fuel for cars and trucks." . . . The
Administrator also addressed the matter of
remedies. Petitioners offered two ways to
reduce CO 2 from new motor vehicles:
reduce gasoline consumption and improve
tire performance. As to the first, the
Department of Transportation the agency in
charge of fuel efficiency standards-
recently issued new standards requiring
greater fuel economy, as a result of which
millions of metric tons of CO 2 will never
reach the stratosphere. . . . As to tire
efficiency, EPA doubted its authority to
regulate this subject as an "emission" of an
air pollutant. . . . "With respect to the other
[greenhouse gases]-CIH4, N20, and HFCs-
petitioners make no suggestion as to how
those emissions might be reduced from
motor vehicles.". . .
It is therefore not accurate to say, as
petitioners do, that the EPA Administrator's
refusal to regulate rested entirely on
scientific uncertainty, or that EPA's decision
represented an "open-ended invocation of
scientific uncertainty to justify refusing to
regulate,". . . . A "determination of
endangerment to public health," the court
said in Ethyl, "is necessarily a question of
policy that is to be based on an assessment
of risks and that should not be bound by
either the procedural or the substantive rigor
proper for questions of fact." . . . And as we
have held, a reviewing court "will uphold
agency conclusions based on policy
judgments" "when an agency must resolve
issues 'on the frontiers of scientific
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knowledge."' . . .
We thus hold that the EPA Administrator
properly exercised his discretion under §
202(a)(1) in denying the petition for
rulemaking. The petitions for review in Nos.
03-1365, 03-1366, 03-1367, and 03-1368 are
dismissed, and the petitions for review in
Nos. 03-1361, 03-1362, 03-1363, and 03-
1364 are denied.
So ordered.
CONCURBY: SENTELLE (In Part)
DISSENTBY: SENTELLE (In Part);
TATEL
DISSENT:
SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in
part and concurring in the judgment:
As the majority's opinion observes, courts
of the United States must resolve
jurisdictional questions, including "Article
III standing questions, before proceeding to
the merits of a case." . . . As the majority
further observes, "standing exists only if the
complainant has suffered an injury in fact,
fairly traceable to the challenged action, and
likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." . . . While I respect the majority's
thorough and accurate history of the
precedents on the standing question, after
consulting the same authorities I have come
to a different conclusion. I conclude that
EPA is correct in its assertion that the
petitioners have not demonstrated the
element of injury necessary to establish
standing under Article III....
[The concurrence argues that the petitioners
failed to establish a particularized injury
sufficient to establish Article m standing. At
most, the petitioners established that global
warming may affect all of humanity and
therefore may affect the petitioners. This
harm is precisely the type of general harm
that has historically been held insufficient
for adjudication by the Supreme Court and
lower courts. After reaching this
conclusion, the concurrence goes on to
accept the majority decision as dictating the
law of the case because the result most
nearly matches the result favored by the
concurrence.]
TATEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting in Nos.
03-1361, 03-1362, 03-1363, and 03-1364:
Petitioners claim that motor vehicle
emissions of greenhouse gases contribute to
global warming and that global warming in
turn is causing a host of serious problems,
likely including increased flash flood
potential in the Appalachians, degraded
water quality and reduced water supply in
the Great Lakes, sea-ice melting and
permafrost thawing in Alaska, reduced
summer snow-pack runoff in the Rockies,
extreme water resource fluctuations in
Hawaii, and rising sea levels combined with
higher storm surges along the coasts of
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and some
eastern states. . . . Concerned about such
problems, petitioners asked EPA to regulate
these emissions under Clean Air Act section
202(a)(1), which provides: "The
Administrator shall by regulation prescribe .
. . standards applicable to the emission of
any air pollutant from . . . new motor
vehicles .. . which in his judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare." . . . EPA denied the
petition on two grounds-that it lacked
statutory authority to regulate such
emissions and that even given such authority
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it would not exercise it-and petitioners
sought review in this court.
My colleagues agree that the petitions for
review should not be granted, but they do so
for quite different reasons. Judge Sentelle
thinks that petitioners lack standing and
would dismiss the petitions for that reason.
Judge Randolph does not resolve whether
petitioners have standing and would deny
the petitions based on one of EPA's two
given reasons.
I have yet a different view. Unlike Judge
Sentelle, I think at least one petitioner has
standing, as I explain in Part II. Unlike
Judge Randolph, I think EPA's order cannot
be sustained on the merits. EPA's first given
reason-that it lacks statutory authority to
regulate emissions based on their
contribution to welfare-endangering climate
change . . .- fails, as I explain in Part III,
because the statute clearly gives EPA
authority to regulate "any air pollutant" that
may endanger welfare, . . . with "air
pollutant" defined elsewhere in the statute as
"including any physical, chemical,
biological, radioactive . . . substance or
matter which is emitted into or otherwise
enters the ambient air," . . . . EPA's second
given reason-the one accepted by Judge
Randolph-is that even if it has statutory
authority, it nonetheless "believes" that "it is
inappropriate to regulate [greenhouse gas]
emissions from motor vehicles" due to
various policy reasons. As I explain in Part
IV, however, none of these policy reasons
relates to the statutory standard-"cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare," . . .- and the Clean Air
Act gives the Administrator no discretion to
withhold regulation for such reasons.
In short, EPA has failed to offer a lawful
explanation for its decision. I would
accordingly grant the petitions for review
and send the matter back to EPA either to
make an endangerment finding or to come
up with a reasoned basis for refusing to do
so in light of the statutory standard.
I.
[The dissent reviews the evidence in support
of global warming. Relying largely on the
same National Research Council report used
by the majority, the dissent comes to
different conclusions-namely that there is
likely a causal linkage between greenhouse
gas emissions and global warming and that
the uncertainties surrounding global
warming are generally about its scope, not
its existence.]
II.
[The dissent argues that the petitioners have
sufficient statutory and Article III standing.
Noting that the court needs only determine
that one petitioner has standing to reach the
merits of the case, the dissent reviews the
potential injuries claimed by Massachusetts,
such as permanent loss of coastal land.
When combined with evidence that global
warming is responsible for rising sea levels,
the dissent concludes that the injuries
asserted by Massachusetts are sufficiently
individualized to establish standing.]
III.
As to the merits, the threshold question is
this: does the Clean Air Act authorize EPA
to regulate emissions based on their effects
on global climate? Taking a constricted
view, EPA insists it has no authority to
regulate GHG emissions even if they
contribute to substantial and harmful global
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warming. By contrast, petitioners claim that
Congress has plainly given EPA the
authority it says it lacks.
. . . CAA section 202(a)(1), added by
Congress in 1965 and amended in 1970 and
1977, provides,
The Administrator shall by
regulation prescribe . . standards
applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of
new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines which in his
judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare.
. . . This language plainly authorizes
regulation of (1) any air pollutants emitted
from motor vehicles that (2) in the
Administrator's judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare. EPA's claimed lack of
authority relates to the first of these two
elements. According to EPA, GHGs like
C0 2 , CH 4, N20, and hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs) "are not air pollutants.". . .
Congress, however, left EPA little discretion
in determining what are "air pollutants."
Added in 1970 and amended in 1977, CAA
section 302(g) defines the term as follows:
The term 'air pollutant' means any
air pollution agent or combination of
such agents, including any physical,
chemical, biological, radioactive ...
substance or matter which is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient
air.
... This exceedingly broad language plainly
covers GHGs emitted from motor vehicles:
they are "physical [and] chemical . . .
substances or matter . .. emitted into .. . the
ambient air.". . .
Unswayed by what it calls "narrow semantic
analyses," . . .- but what courts typically
call Chevron step one-EPA claims that a
"more holistic analysis . . . [of] the text,
structure, and history of the CAA as a
whole, as well as the context provided by
other legislation that is specific to climate
change," justifies its conclusion that it
cannot regulate GHGs like CO2 for their
effects on climate change ..... To disregard
the Act's plain text in this way, EPA needs
an "extraordinarily convincing justification."
EPA offers four reasons for abandoning the
Act's text. First, it suggests that since the
1965, 1970, and 1977 Congresses were not
specifically concerned with global warming,
the Act cannot apply to GHGs. Second, it
claims that for both practical and policy
reasons, global pollution should be tackled
through specific statutory provisions rather
than general ones. Third, relying on FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., . . ., it
argues that Congress's passage of legislation
calling for study of climate change, along
with Congress's failure to pass any
provisions tailored solely to regulating
GHGs, demonstrates that the CAA cannot
apply to GHGs. Finally, EPA suggests that
Congress couldn't have intended the
definition of "air pollutant" to cover C0 2,
since EPA regulation of CO 2 emissions from
automobiles would overlap with Department
of Transportation (DOT) authority over fuel
economy standards under a different act.
None of these reasons provides a convincing
justification-let alone an "extraordinarily
convincing" one-for EPA's counter-textual
position....
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EPA first suggests that because the 1965,
1970, and 1977 Congresses showed little
concern about the specific problem of global
warming, reading the CAA's language to
cover such problems would be like finding
"an elephant in a mousehole." . . . Hardly a
mousehole, the definition of "air
pollutants"-"including any physical,
chemical, biological, radioactive . . .
substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters the ambient air"--enables
the Act to apply to new air pollution
problems as well as existing ones....
EPA's second reason for its interpretation-
that for practical and policy reasons global
warming should be dealt with through
specifically tailored statutes-likewise fails
to trump Congress's plain language. It may
well be that a statute aimed solely at global
warming would deal with the problem more
effectively than one aimed generally at air
pollution. But an agency may not "avoid the
Congressional intent clearly expressed in the
[statutory] text simply by asserting that its
preferred approach would be better policy."
EPA also attempts an unworkability
argument. Its argument goes like this:
another part of the CAA provides that the
Administrator shall maintain a list of air
pollutants that, among other things, "in [the
Administrator's] judgment, cause or
contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare." ... Once pollutants go on
this list, the Administrator must set national
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for
them, i.e., ambient air concentration levels
that, in the Administrator's judgment, "are
requisite to protect the public health" and in
some areas are "requisite to protect the
public welfare." ... States must submit plans
explaining how they will achieve these
NAAQS.... According to EPA, these
provisions would be unworkable if applied
to C0 2: because CO 2 disperses relatively
evenly throughout the lower atmosphere,
states would have only minimal control over
their atmospheric CO2 concentrations and
thus over whether they meet the CO2
NAAQS. EPA then concludes that because
CO 2 regulation would be unworkable in the
NAAQS context, no general CAA
provisions, including section 202(a)(1),
authorize it to regulate any GHGs.
This unwieldy argument fails. Even
assuming that states' limited ability to meet
CO 2 NAAQS renders these provisions
unworkable as to C0 2, ... the absurd-results
canon would justify at most an exception
limited to the particular unworkable
provision, i.e., the NAAQS provision.... As
EPA acknowledges, regulating CO 2
emissions from automobiles is perfectly
feasible....
In support of its third justification for
abandoning the plain text of sections
202(a)(1) and 302(g), EPA relies on later
congressional action (and inaction). . . .But
relying almost exclusively on Brown &
Williamson, ... EPA claims that together
these facts indicate that the CAA's general
provisions do not cover GHGs. EPA also
asserts that, as in Brown & Williamson, the
"extraordinary" political and economic
significance of the regulation requested casts
doubt on the agency's authority to undertake
it....
EPA's reliance on Brown & Williamson is
misplaced. To begin with, I am unconvinced
by EPA's contention that its jurisdiction
over GHG emissions would be as significant
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as FDA jurisdiction over tobacco. . . . But
even assuming the implications are equally
significant, this is not an "extraordinary"
case where "common sense," ... calls into
question whether Congress has delegated
EPA authority to regulate GHGs. Congress
gave EPA broad authority to regulate all
harmful pollutants, as section 202(a)(1)'s
text makes clear. Congress did so
intentionally, deeming it "not appropriate to
exempt certain pollutants" from the Act's
"comprehensive protections." ... And, as I
explain below, no subsequent statutory
indicia comparable to those relied on by the
Court in Brown & Williamson justify a
different conclusion.
Perhaps most significantly, no conflict exists
between EPA's section 202(a)(1) authority
to regulate GHGs and subsequent global
warming legislation. Whereas an FDA ban
on tobacco would have directly conflicted
with congressional intent that tobacco
remain on the market, EPA regulation of
GHGs would be fully compatible with
statutes proposing additional research and
other nonregulatory approaches to climate
change....
Furthermore, and unlike subsequent tobacco
legislation that "effectively ratified the
FDA's previous position," ... this
subsequent global-warming-related
legislation passed without any assurance
from EPA that the agency lacked authority
to regulate GHGs. Quite to the contrary, at
the time of the two appropriations riders
relied on by EPA, ... EPA was taking the
position that it possessed general authority
to regulate GHG emissions under section
202(a)(1). ... Finally, the fact that later
Congresses failed to pass bills specifically
tailored to regulating global warming hardly
provides a basis for inferring that earlier
Congresses meant to exclude climate-
endangering pollutants from the coverage of
the CAA's general provisions...
EPA has one last argument, applicable to
CO 2 emissions alone, for claiming it lacks
the authority the language of sections
202(a)(1) and 302(g) expressly bestow upon
it. According to EPA, the only practical way
to regulate CO2 emissions from motor
vehicles is to require increased fuel
economy, since CO2 is a byproduct of fuel
combustion and "no technology currently
exists or is under development that can
capture and destroy or reduce" CO 2
"emissions from motor vehicle tailpipes." ...
Such regulation, EPA reasons, would
overlap substantially with DOT's authority
under the 1975 Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA) to set average
fuel economy standards for certain classes of
motor vehicles....
EPA may well be correct that setting
standards for fuel economy (rather than for
capturing tailpipe emissions) represents its
only currently practical option for regulating
CO 2 emissions. . . . But given that the two
regulatory regimes-one targeted at fuel
conservation and the other at pollution
prevention-are overlapping, not
incompatible, there is no reason to assume
that Congress exempted CO2 from the
meaning of "air pollutant" within the CAA,
particularly since section 103(g) explicitly
calls CO 2 an "air pollutant." . . . Moreover,
Congress acknowledged, indeed accepted,
the possibility of regulatory overlap. Not
only does the current EPCA recognize the
relevance of "the effect of other motor
vehicle standards of the Government on fuel
economy,". . . but in passing the 1977 CAA
amendments Congress emphasized that EPA
regulation under the CAA should go forward
even where it overlaps with responsibilities
given to other agencies under other acts, ...
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In sum, GHGs plainly fall within the
meaning of "air pollutant" in section 302(g)
and therefore in section 202(a)(1). If "in [the
Administrator's] judgment" they "cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare," . . . then EPA has
authority-indeed, the obligation-to
regulate their emissions from motor
vehicles.
IV.
EPA's second reason for refusing to act-
what EPA's counsel termed "the fallback
argument," . . .- is that even if GHGs are air
pollutants, the agency gave appropriate
reasons and acted within its discretion in
denying the petition for rulemaking. EPA
stresses that our "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review is particularly deferential
in reviewing an agency refusal to institute
rulemaking. . . . This is certainly true, but
this court must nonetheless "consider
whether the agency's decisionmaking was
reasoned," and we will not permit the
agency to make "plain errors of law." . . .
Indeed, "the agency has the heaviest of
obligations to explain and expose every step
of its reasoning," so that we can "exercise
our responsibility to determine whether [its]
decision is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."' . .
In my view, EPA has failed to satisfy this
standard. Indeed, reading the relevant
sections of EPA's petition denial-one titled
"No Mandatory Duty," another "Different
Policy Approach," and a third
"Administration Global Climate Change
Policy," . . -- I find it difficult even to grasp
the basis for EPA's action....
EPA's Discretion to Make an Endangerment
Finding
In the petition denial, EPA states:
The CAA provision authorizing
regulation of motor vehicle
emissions does not impose a
mandatory duty on the Administrator
to exercise her judgment. Instead,
section 202(a)(1) provides the
Administrator with discretionary
authority to address emissions ....
While section 202(a)(1) uses the
word 'shall,' it does not require the
Administrator to act by a specified
deadline and it conditions authority
to act on a discretionary exercise of
the Administrator's judgment
regarding whether motor vehicle
emissions cause or contribute to air
pollution that may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare.
... Expounding on this passage, EPA argues
in its brief that "the ICTA Petition Denial
reflects EPA's decision not to make any
endangerment finding-either affirmative or
negative-under section 202(a)(1)." . . . In
EPA's view, "the Agency's authority to
make the threshold finding is discretionary"
and petitioners err in suggesting that "if the
statutory test for making the finding is met,
EPA has no choice but to set standards." . . .
EPA's brief also turns several policy
concerns raised in other portions of its
petition denial into rationales for holding off
examining endangerment....
EPA's reasoning is simply wrong. In effect,
EPA has transformed the limited discretion
given to the Administrator under section
202-the discretion to determine whether or
not an air pollutant causes or contributes to
pollution which may reasonably be
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anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare-into the discretion to withhold
regulation because it thinks such regulation
bad policy. But Congress did not give EPA
this broader authority, and the agency may
not usurp it.
But section 202(a)(1) plainly limits the
Administrator's discretion-his judgment-
to determining whether the statutory
standard for endangerment has been met.
The Administrator has no discretion either to
base that judgment on reasons unrelated to
this standard or to withhold judgment for
such reasons. In claiming otherwise, EPA
not only ignores the statute's language, but
also fails to reckon with this circuit's related
precedent.
Our en banc decision in Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, . . . makes
clear that the Administrator may only
exercise "judgment" in evaluating whether
the statutory standard has been met. There,
considering a CAA provision authorizing
the Administrator to set emission standards
"at the level which in his judgment provides
an ample margin of safety to protect the
public health," . . . we held that the
Administrator had to base his determination
on what level would "provide an 'ample
margin of safety."' . . . We struck down his
proposed standards because he failed to
ground them in the statute....
Similarly, in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, . . . we
considered whether EPA appropriately
linked its policy analysis to the statutory
standard... . Siding with EPA, we held that
the agency had discretion in determining
what level of harm-or risk of harm-
constitutes endangerment. . . . We indicated
that such determinations involve policy
issues, but-as Judge Randolph neglects to
mention, . . .- these policy issues all related
to whether the statutory standard had been
met, i.e., to whether lead in gasoline
endangered public health. . . . Indeed, Ethyl
makes quite clear that the Administrator's
policy-based discretion is limited to the
terms of the statute....
In short, EPA may withhold an
endangerment finding only if it needs more
information to determine whether the
statutory standard has been met. Similarly,
for EPA to find no endangerment (as Judge
Randolph, going beyond the agency's own
arguments, appears to claim happened here .
. .), it must ground that conclusion in the
statutory standard and may not rely on
unrelated policy considerations.
The statutory standard, moreover, is
precautionary. At the time we decided Ethyl,
section 202(a)(1) and similar CAA
provisions either authorized or required the
Administrator to act on finding that
emissions led to "air pollution which
endangers the public health or welfare ...
After Ethyl found that "the statutes and
common sense demand regulatory action to
prevent harm, even if the regulator is less
than certain that harm is otherwise
inevitable," . . . the 1977 Congress not only
approved of this conclusion, . . . but also
wrote it into the CAA. Section 202(a)(1)
(along with other provisions, see H.R. Rep.
No. 95-294, at 50) now requires regulation
to precede certainty. It requires regulation
where, in the Administrator's judgment,
emissions "contribute to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare." . . .
Given this framework, it is obvious that
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none of EPA's proffered policy reasons
justifies its refusal to find that GHG
emissions "contribute to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare." . . . Instead, as in
Natural Resources Defense Council (where
we found EPA to have acted arbitrarily and
capriciously), EPA has "ventured into a
zone of impermissible action" by "simply
substituting" freestanding policy concerns
for the sort of evaluation required by the
statute.... A look at these policy concerns
proves the point.
First, EPA claims that global warming still
has many scientific uncertainties associated
with it.... But the CAA nowhere calls for
proof. It nowhere calls for "unequivocal"
evidence. Instead, it calls for the
Administrator to determine whether GHGs
"contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger"
welfare. EPA never suggests that the
uncertainties identified by the NRC Report
prevent it from determining that GHGs
"may reasonably be anticipated to endanger"
welfare. ...
EPA's silence on this point is telling.
Indeed, looking at the NRC Report as a
whole, I doubt EPA could credibly conclude
that it needs more research to determine
whether GHG-caused global warming "may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger"
welfare. Though not offering certainty, the
report demonstrates that matters are well
within the "frontiers of scientific
knowledge," . . .. The report also indicates
that the projected consequences of global
warming are serious.
effects of global warming.]
... I have grave difficulty seeing how EPA,
while treating the NRC Report as an
"objective and independent assessment of
the relevant science," . . . could possibly fail
to conclude that global warming "may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare," . . . with effects on
welfare including "effects on soil, water,
crops, vegetation, manmade materials,
animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and
climate, damage to and deterioration of
property, and hazards to transportation, as
well as effects on economic values and on
personal comfort and well-being," . . .. It
thus comes as no surprise that EPA's
petition denial not only undertakes none of
the risk assessments described in Ethyl, . . .
but also utterly ignores the statutory
standard.
EPA similarly fails to link its second policy
justification-that setting fuel economy
standards represents the only currently
available way to regulate CO 2 emissions and
petitioners "make no suggestions" for how
to reduce CH4, N20, and HFC emissions, . .
.- with the statutory standard. As discussed
earlier, . . . the fact that DOT sets fuel
economy standards pursuant to the EPCA in
no way prevents EPA from setting standards
pursuant to the CAA.. . .
As to EPA's point about other GHGs, it may
well be that no current technologies exist for
reducing their emissions. But once again,
this has nothing at all to do with the
statutory endangerment standard. Indeed, in
section 202(a)(2), Congress has made it
crystal clear that endangerment findings
must not wait on technology.
[The dissent quotes from the National
Research Council report on the potential
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. . . As the Senate Report explained, EPA "is
expected to press for the development and
application of improved technology rather
than be limited by that which exists." . . . In
refusing to make an endangerment finding
because it lacks currently available
technology for controlling these emissions,
EPA goes well beyond the bounds of its
statutory discretion.
EPA's final policy reasons likewise fail.
Because other domestic and foreign sources
contribute to atmospheric GHG
concentrations, GHG regulation might well
"result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach
to addressing the climate change issue," . . . .
But again, Congress has expressly
demanded such an approach. Section
202(a)(1) requires EPA to regulate if it
judges that U.S. motor vehicle emissions
"cause, or contribute to, air pollution," . . .
Similarly, EPA's concern that regulation
could weaken U.S. negotiating power with
other nations has nothing at all to do with
whether GHGs contribute to welfare-
endangering air pollution. Finally, while
EPA obviously prefers nonregulatory
approaches to regulatory ones . . . Congress
gave the Administrator discretion only in
assessing whether global warming "may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger"
welfare, not "freedom to set policy on his
own terms," .. . .
In short, EPA has utterly failed to relate its
policy reasons to section 202(a)(1)'s
standard. . . . EPA apparently dislikes the
fact that section 202(a)(1) says the
Administrator "shall" regulate-rather than
"may" regulate-on making an
endangerment finding. But EPA cannot duck
Congress's express directive by declining to
evaluate endangerment on the basis of
policy reasons unrelated to the statutory
standard. Although EPA is free to take its
policy concerns to Congress
change in the Clean Air Act,
the law in the meantime.
and seek a
it must obey
EPA's Discretion After Making an
Endangerment Finding
Alternatively, EPA may have believed that
even if it made an endangerment finding, it
had no obligation to regulate GHG
emissions. The petition denial states,
EPA also disagrees with the premise
of the petitioners' claim-that if the
Administrator were to find that
GHGs, in general, may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare, she must
necessarily regulate GHG emissions
from motor vehicles. Depending on
the particular problem, motor
vehicles may contribute more or less
or not at all. An important issue
before the Administrator is whether,
given motor vehicles' relative
contribution to a problem, it makes
sense to regulate them. . . . The
discretionary nature of the
Administrator's section 202(a)(1)
authority allows her to consider these
important policy issues and decide to
regulate motor vehicle emissions as
appropriate to the air pollution
problem being addressed.
Accordingly, even were the
Administrator to make a formal
finding regarding the potential health
and welfare effects of GHGs in
general, section 202(a)(1) would not
require her to regulate GHG
emission from motor vehicles.
... This passage is puzzling. Motor vehicles
emit GHGs in significant quantities . . . a
point EPA nowhere contests. The statute
clearly states that the Administrator "shall
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by regulation prescribe . . . standards"
governing the emissions of air pollutants
from motor vehicles if the Administrator
makes an endangerment finding regarding
these pollutants. . . . Refusing to regulate
following an endangerment finding would
violate the law. Indeed, EPA appears to have
abandoned this argument....
V.
Although this case comes to us in the
context of a highly controversial question-
global warming-it actually presents a quite
traditional legal issue: has the
Environmental Protection Agency complied
with the Clean Air Act? For the reasons
given above, I believe that EPA has both
misinterpreted the scope of its statutory
authority and failed to provide a statutorily
based justification for refusing to make an
endangerment finding. I would thus grant
the petitions for review.
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"Justices Take Up Climate Debate;
Environmentalists and 12 States, Including California, Hope the High Court Will Order
New Emission Rules to Fight Global Warming."
Los Angeles Times
June 27, 2006
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court entered the debate over
global warming Monday, agreeing at the
urging of environmentalists to rule on
whether emissions from new cars, trucks
and power plants must be further regulated
to slow climate change.
The court's action gave a surprising, if
tentative, boost to 12 states, including
California, and a coalition of
environmentalists who say the federal
government must restrict the exhaust fumes
that contribute to global warming. Their
appeal accused the Environmental
Protection Agency of having "squandered
nearly a decade" by failing to act.
The high court voted to take up the issue
over the objection of the Bush
administration. Its lawyers questioned
whether the government could and should
"embark on the extraordinarily complex and
scientifically uncertain task of addressing
the global issue of greenhouse gas
emissions" by regulating motor vehicles
sold in the United States.
The case, to be heard in the fall, could be
one of the most important environmental
disputes to come before the court.
Environmental advocates said automakers
could be forced to produce a fleet of
vehicles that pollute less.
The outcome also could determine the fate
of California's effort to adopt its own rules
designed to limit greenhouse gases from cars
and trucks. Those rules, set to go into effect
in 2009, require EPA approval.
"Everything now hinges on what the
Supreme Court does," said David
Bookbinder, a lawyer for the Sierra Club,
one of the environmental groups that pressed
the issue.
Until now, the threat of global warming has
prompted little government action.
The legal dispute turns on standards set
during the 1970s when Congress passed the
Clear Air Act. One provision requires the
government to regulate "any air pollutant"
from motor vehicles or power plants that
may well "endanger public health or
welfare"-including by affecting the
"weather" or "climate."
In 1999, a group of environmental scientists
pointed to this legal standard and petitioned
the EPA to set new regulations to confront
the problem of global warming. They said
the evidence showed that pollutants from
cars, trucks and power plants were
endangering the public welfare by changing
the climate.
They called upon the EPA to restrict
emissions of carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons.
Four years later, the EPA under the Bush
administration rejected the petition. It
questioned the link between auto emissions
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and global warming and concluded that new
regulations were not required.
Last year, that conclusion was upheld in a 2-
1 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.
Usually, federal agencies are given broad
leeway to interpret the laws they are
supposed to administer. In this case,
however, California and the other states
joined with environmentalists and went to
court to challenge the EPA's decision. In
their appeal to the Supreme Court, they
argued that the Clean Air Act required
regulation of greenhouse gases and that the
EPA was defying this requirement.
The other states are Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maine, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont and Washington. Three cities-
New York, Baltimore and Washington-
also joined the appeal.
At least four of the nine justices must vote to
grant an appeal, and on Monday, the high
court issued a one-line order saying it had
agreed to hear the case of Massachusetts vs.
EPA.
The Supreme Court has been closely divided
along ideological lines on issues of
environmental regulations. Last week, the
justices were split on whether the
government still had broad authority to
regulate wetlands.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a pivotal
opinion that fell in between the views of the
high court's four conservatives and four
liberals, preserving most of the
government's authority to protect wetlands.
His vote will probably be crucial as well on
the issue of greenhouse gases.
Environmentalists hailed
decision to hear the case.
the court's
"The Bush administration has continually
tried to say that it's not their job to fight
global warming," Bookbinder said. "In fact,
they have both the legal and moral
responsibility to tackle global warming
pollution."
California Atty. Gen. Bill Lockyer said he
was confident the Supreme Court "will
make history by striking down the Bush
administration's stance" against regulating
greenhouse gases.
"Science overwhelmingly documents the
certainty of global warming, and we must
act now," Lockyer said.
But a spokeswoman for the EPA said the
agency had made the right decision by
relying on voluntary moves by
manufacturers.
"The Bush administration has an
unparalleled financial, international and
domestic commitment to reducing green-
house gases," said Jennifer Wood, an agency
spokeswoman.
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"High Court to Hear Greenhouse Gas Case;
States, Groups Push for Regulation"
The Washington Post
June 27, 2006
Juliet Eilperin
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to hear
arguments on whether the federal
government must regulate carbon dioxide as
a pollutant, a case that could have broad
implications for utilities, auto manufacturers
and other industries across the country.
The decision to take up Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency-a
lawsuit that pits 12 states, 13 environmental
groups, two cities and American Samoa
against the federal government-could
break the political impasse that has stymied
regulation by the United States on global
warming for more than a decade.
Environmentalists and state and local
officials argue that President Bush has the
legal authority to regulate carbon dioxide
under the 36-year-old Clean Air Act because
it is linked to climate change and poses a
threat to the environment. While the Clinton
administration endorsed this reasoning, it
did not issue rules on carbon dioxide
emissions. The Bush administration, which
rejects this theory, must convince the
Supreme Court that it has no legal obligation
to restrict greenhouse gases.
"The court's decision to hear the case is
momentous," said New Mexico Gov. Bill
Richardson (D), whose state is suing the
administration along with 11 others. "I am
confident the court will rule in the states'
favor. This issue is not a matter of if, but
when."
The EPA, which successfully defended its
position before the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit last year, issued a
statement yesterday saying that it is
"confident in its decision" not to regulate
carbon dioxide. The administration's
voluntary efforts to cut emissions, it added,
"are helping achieve reductions now while
saving millions of dollars, as well as
providing clean, affordable energy."
Bush told reporters during his regular
question-and-answer session yesterday that
he has devised a plan focused on
technological solutions "to be able to deal
with greenhouse gases." He added that he
considers global warming "a serious
problem. There's a debate over whether it's
man-made or naturally caused; we ought to
get beyond that debate" and use technology
such as nuclear power to meet the nation's
energy needs.
The Supreme Court ruling is likely to come
next year. Should it rule in favor of the
plaintiffs, the opinion would be significant
because, beyond forcing the administration's
hand, it could have a profound effect on
global warming-related lawsuits nationwide.
In California, for example, a coalition of
automakers is challenging California's
decision and that of 10 other states to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions from cars
and trucks.
"This is highly significant because there are
a whole set of global warming cases that are
working their way through the courts," said
David Doniger, climate center policy
director at the advocacy group Natural
Resources Defense Council. "We may need
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new legislation" to regulate carbon dioxide,
"but it really matters what the existing law
says."
Environmental advocates have been pressing
this point on a number of fronts. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit heard
oral arguments this month in a case in which
eight states, New York City, three state land
trusts and several environmental groups are
suing five major utilities on grounds that
their greenhouse gas pollution amounts to a
public nuisance that crosses state lines.
"Now that we have so much damage locked
into the system, groups of individuals and
communities across the country and
elsewhere are seeking compensation because
of the injuries they're experiencing," said
Matthew F. Pawa, one of the lead attorneys
in the public nuisance case.
Many opponents of greenhouse gas curbs
also welcomed the Supreme Court's
announcement, saying it will settle the
question of regulation once and for all.
William O'Keefe, who lobbies for Exxon
Mobil and heads the George C. Marshall
Institute, a Washington think tank, said he
hopes the court will apply the rigorous
scientific standards it has required in cases
since the early 1990s.
"If they apply that to this filing, they will
reject it," he said. "They'll say the agency is
well within its rights" to not regulate carbon
dioxide.
But a coalition of indigenous Alaskan tribes
that filed a friend-of-the-court brief urging
the court to consider the suit said evidence is
mounting that more needs to be done to curb
global warming. Faith Gemmill of the
Fairbanks-based Resisting Environmental
Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL)
said tribes across Alaska must deal with a
shortened hunting season, widespread forest
fires and other effects of climate change.
"Our entire ecosystem is changing due to
global warming," Gemmill said. "Our very
existence is at threat."
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"Court Says E.P.A. Can Limit Its Regulation of Emissions"
The New York Times
July 16, 2005
Anthony DePalma
A federal appeals court rejected on Friday
an effort by a dozen states and cities, along
with environmental groups, to have the Bush
administration regulate greenhouse gases
that spill out of the tailpipes of new cars and
trucks.
A three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit found that the federal
Environmental Protection Agency had the
administrative discretion to decide, in 2003,
not to order reductions in carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases from new motor
vehicles, as the states sought.
The decision-the most authoritative court
ruling on the issue so far-lessens the
likelihood that there will be any national
programs to control greenhouse gas
emissions anytime soon. However, Judge A.
Raymond Randolph, writing for the panel,
and Judge David B. Sentelle, who disagreed
with Judge Randolph on some of the issues
in the case, did not directly address the
agency's contention that it had not been
given authority under the federal Clean Air
Act to regulate greenhouse gases.
That omission led environmental groups to
claim that the decision leaves the door open
for the agency to regulate greenhouse gases
in the future, if it chooses to do so.
The ruling appears to leave unchecked the
authority of some states, such as California
and New York, to continue their programs to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles or power plants.
But it was clearly a setback for the states
that had sought federal involvement in
controlling greenhouse gases.
James R. Milkey, chief of the environmental
protection division in the Massachusetts
attorney general's office, called the ruling "a
deeply fractured set of opinions" that was
both disappointing and heartening.
"The two judges in the majority just
assumed that E.P.A. had the authority to
regulate emissions without dealing directly
with the question," Mr. Milkey said.
Only Judge David S. Tatel, who wrote a
pointed dissenting opinion, touched the
central issue, Mr. Milkey said, and he
"firmly rejected each and every argument
that E.P.A. made trying to hide behind the
claim that it lacked authority."
Mr. Milkey said the strong dissent could
strengthen the case for a rehearing before
the full 11-member Court of Appeals. The
case could also be taken to the Supreme
Court.
Eryn Witcher, the press secretary for the
Environmental Protection Agency, called
the court decision a welcome win.
"We are pleased with this ruling and glad
the court supported our decision," Ms.
Witcher said. She said voluntary programs
were better ways to reduce carbon and
greenhouse gases than "mandatory
regulations and litigation that don't promote
economic growth."
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The agency was joined in the case by the
attorneys general of 11 states that oppose
carbon dioxide regulation and a coalition of
trade groups, including the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers.
Because of the fractured decision, the case
did not turn out to be quite the showdown
over global warming that was expected.
Neither did it settle the question about how
much authority the federal agency has to
take action on emissions that some believe
contribute to the heating of the earth, but
that others do not think has any direct
relation to climate change on such a large
scale.
The emissions case dates to 1999, when
several states and environmental groups
formally petitioned the Environmental
Protection Agency to regulate carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and
hydrofluorocarbons in new motor vehicles
to control greenhouse gas emissions.
In 2003, the federal agency rejected the
petition, arguing that it lacked the statutory
authority to act.
Several states, led by Massachusetts, argued
in federal court that the agency's decision
had been based on the conclusion that the
connection between greenhouses gas
emissions and global warming "cannot be
unequivocally established," which was the
finding of a report by the National Research
Council of the National Academy of
Sciences.
Massachusetts was joined by California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont and Washington, along
with the cities of Baltimore, New York and
Washington, D.C. and American Samoa.
The appeals court ruled that the agency's
decision did not rest "entirely on scientific
uncertainty," but was a justifiable "policy
judgment."
James T.B. Tripp, general counsel for the
group Environmental Defense, which
participated in the case on the side of the
plaintiff states, said that the majority opinion
does not deal expressly with the question of
the agency's statutory authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions. "But it implicitly
says the agency may have the discretionary
authority to do so," Mr. Tripp said.
The question of the government's authority
was handled forthrightly in the 38-page
dissent of Judge Tatel, who rejected most of
the arguments the agency made to defend its
decision not to regulate the gases.
Judge Tatel said he had "grave difficulty"
seeing how the agency had not concluded
that global warming was a serious threat to
public health. And in his most strongly
worded conclusion, Judge Tatel said the
Environmental Protection Agency "has
authority-indeed the obligation" to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles.
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"2 Sides Do Battle in Court on Whether E.P.A. Should Regulate Carbon Dioxide"
The New York Times
April 9, 2005
Michael Janofsky
A federal appeals court heard arguments on
Friday in a five-year battle over whether the
Environmental Protection Agency has the
authority to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions from motor vehicles.
In arguments on a suit that consolidates a
number of legal actions, opposing lawyers
cited the same words of the Clean Air Act
and drew entirely different conclusions.
The plaintiffs are 12 states, a territory, 3
cities and 13 nongovernment organizations,
most of them environmental groups.
They have been seeking to have the E.P.A.
explain why the Clean Air Act does not
empower the agency to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions for global climate
considerations. That position of the Bush
administration is a reversal of Clinton
administration policy.
Joining the government's side in the case are
11 states that oppose carbon dioxide
regulation and 19 industry groups, including
those representing car makers, refiners and
chemical companies.
The arguments Friday, before a three-judge
panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit,
reflected a major fault line in current
environmental battles: the extent to which
carbon dioxide can be linked to global
warming.
The Bush administration has taken a
skeptical view of global warming and its
effect. It has resisted international treaties,
like Kyoto, that govern some polluting
countries and not others, and has worked to
protect industries that would be adversely
affected if carbon dioxide were regulated.
Exchanges between the judges and the
lawyers focused on whether Congress
intended for the agency to regulate carbon
dioxide even if its link to global warming is
uncertain and adverse effects on humans
cannot be accurately predicted.
In effect, the arguments came down to
Congress's meaning when it wrote into
Section 202 of the act that the E.P.A.
administrator "shall" regulate any air
pollutant from any new vehicles that "may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare."
"You don't have to look far to find the
authority that the E.P.A. says is missing,"
said the plaintiffs' lead lawyer, James R.
Milkey, an assistant attorney general of
Massachusetts. Ignoring a broad reading of
the act, Mr. Milkey said, "is like saying a
stop sign is not specific enough."
But the section makes no specific mention
of carbon dioxide as a pollutant. Jeffrey
Clark of the Justice Department argued that
if Congress had intended for the agency to
regulate tailpipe emissions-a quantum shift
in policy that would have an enormous
economic effect-the lawmakers would
have used language more comprehensive.
Judge A. Raymond Randolph, whose
questions suggested that he did not believe a
clear link had been established between
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carbon dioxide and global warming, cited
another section of the Clean Air Act that
says the language referring to effects on
public health includes "climate." Judge
Randolph told Mr. Clark, "I can't imagine
anything turns" on a single word.
"We agree," Mr. Clark responded.
Mr. Clark compared the current case to an
effort by the Food and Drug Administration
under President Bill Clinton to regulate
tobacco as a drug. That effort was resolved
when in 1997 the Supreme Court upheld the
tobacco industry's opposition, ruling that
Congress had never intended for tobacco to
be considered a drug.
But Mr. Milkey called the comparison
erroneous, declaring that if tobacco came
under F.D.A. jurisdiction, "it would be
banned, and here nobody is banning
anything."
All three judges engaged in aggressive
questioning of the lawyers, although it was
difficult to determine how the panel might
ultimately vote. While Judge Randolph
seemed rough on Mr. Milkey, Judge David
S. Tatel was equally hard on Mr. Clark. The
third judge, David B. Sentelle, was skeptical
of assertions from both sides, leading
lawyers for the environmental groups to
wonder after the arguments if he could be
the swing vote.
Regulation of carbon dioxide emissions has
been a major national environmental issue
since President Bush first won election.
Despite a campaign promise in 2000 to
include carbon dioxide as an air pollutant
that should be regulated, the administration
has resisted regulations on such emissions
from mobile as well as stationary sources.
Conflict over carbon dioxide is one major
reason Congress has not passed new
antipollution legislation for power plants.
Motor vehicles account for about a quarter
of the nation's carbon dioxide emissions.
Yet automakers have fought efforts to force
them to build more efficient engines,
pointing to the extraordinary costs of
altering their factories to meet any new
standards. The courtroom audience Friday
included lobbyists from leading car
manufacturers.
The judges are expected to take as long as
six months to issue an opinion, after which
an appeal is almost certain.
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"EPA Won't Regulate 'Greenhouse Gases';
Environmental Groups' Bid for the Agency to Cut New-Vehicle Emissions Is Denied.
California May Sue, Saying the Decision Threatens State Efforts."
Los Angeles Times
August 29, 2003
Aaron Zitner, Gary Polakovic and Elizabeth Shogren
The Environmental Protection Agency said
Thursday it would not force automakers, oil
companies or others to reduce "greenhouse
gas" emissions from automobiles, a decision
that may complicate efforts by California
and other states to limit the release of carbon
dioxide.
The EPA denied a 1999 petition from
environmental groups, which had asked the
agency to use its powers under the Clean Air
Act to regulate carbon dioxide and other
emissions from new vehicles.
Burning oil and other fossil fuels produces
gases that can rapidly concentrate in the
atmosphere and cause temperatures to rise, a
condition known as the greenhouse effect.
This global warming, the environmental
groups contend, will cause increases in
infectious disease, skin cancer, water quality
problems and other threats to public health.
But the EPA said that Congress had not
sorted out federal policy on climate change,
and that lawmakers had not authorized the
agency to use the Clean Air Act to stop
global warming.
"This is an issue that needs to be addressed
first by Congress.... It was quite clear
Congress had no intention of giving us the
authority to regulate global climate change,"
said Jeffrey Holmstead, the EPA's assistant
administrator for air programs.
"This is a sound decision that puts the issue
directly where it belongs-back
Congress," said William Kovacs,
president of environmental policy at the
Chamber of Commerce.
in
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The announcement came as little surprise.
Early in his term, President Bush reversed a
campaign promise to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions from power plants, and
the administration has favored voluntary
efforts rather than mandates to industry to
control greenhouse gases.
David Doniger of the Natural Resources
Defense Council, a New York-based
environmental group, called the decision
"another big favor for big-polluter campaign
contributors" to the Bush administration.
The International Center for Technology
Assessment, a Washington-based
technology policy organization that filed the
1999 petition along with Greenpeace and the
Sierra Club, said it would challenge the
EPA's decision in court.
In California, an air-quality official also
promised to sue the EPA, saying the federal
agency's decision threatened state efforts to
control greenhouse gases.
Under a law signed last year by Gov. Gray
Davis, California became the first state to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
vehicle tailpipes. The law requires
automakers to reduce emissions as much as
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possible according to rules the California
Air Resources Board is scheduled to release
in 2005. The rules would take effect in 2009.
Catherine Witherspoon, the board's
executive officer, said her agency would sue
the EPA to force it to identify carbon
dioxide as an air pollutant.
"The EPA not only rejected the petition but
made a decision that could limit individual
states trying to regulate greenhouse gas
pollutants," Witherspoon said. "We
fundamentally disagree. We have to stand
up and litigate for ourselves over whether
greenhouse gases are pollutants."
Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and
North Carolina are also considering laws or
regulations to require industries-mainly
power plants-to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions.
"The states have demonstrated very
successfully over the years that when the
federal government does not act, the states
will step in and fill that void," said S.
William Becker, executive director of the
Assn. of Local Air Pollution Control
Officials.
The EPA's action came one day after
another controversial agency announcement.
On Wednesday, environmental groups
protested as the EPA unveiled revisions to
the Clean Air Act that allow power plants
and factories to upgrade without installing
antipollution devices.
The Thursday decision on vehicle emissions
also drew complaints from environmental
groups. They noted that during the Clinton
administration, two successive EPA general
counsels had concluded that the agency did
in fact have authority under the Clean Air
Act to regulate carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases.
The EPA on Thursday formally withdrew a
legal memorandum laying out that opinion.
EPA critics ridiculed the agency's
reasoning, under which it concluded that
carbon dioxide, hydrofluorocarbons and
other emissions did not meet the legal
definition of "air pollutants" under the Clean
Air Act.
"Refusing to call these gases 'pollutants' is
like refusing to say that smoking causes lung
cancer," said Melissa Carey of
Environmental Defense, a New York-based
policy group. "There are things we have to
come to terms with: The Earth is round,
Elvis is dead and climate change is really
happening."
With the EPA limiting its role
warming, new attention will
regulatory efforts in Congress.
in global
fall on
In the Senate, Republican leaders have
promised a vote this fall on legislation from
Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Joe
Lieberman (D-Conn.) that would attempt to
reduce gases believed to contribute to global
warming. Lieberman is a candidate for his
party's presidential nomination.
Carbon dioxide and other emissions from
vehicles account for at least 18% of U.S.
greenhouse gas production, environmental
groups said.
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"Bush Defends Emissions Stance"
The New York Times
March 15, 2001
Douglas Jehl
Defending his reversal of a campaign
pledge, President Bush said today that "an
energy crisis" that threatened the nation's
economic health caused him to decide not to
try to regulate power plants' emissions of
carbon dioxide.
"I was responding to realities, and the reality
is our nation has a real problem when it
comes to energy," Mr. Bush told reporters in
New Jersey today.
White House officials said any plan to limit
emissions of the gas, widely seen as a
contributor to global warming, would have
pushed electricity prices up, and could have
compounded energy shortages like those
being felt in California. They said Mr. Bush
decided on Monday, hours before the White
House announced the move, after
concluding a week ago that the promise he
had made in the campaign was "an error."
But many of Mr. Bush's supporters outside
the White House said they had little doubt
that the president's move also reflected the
power of a last-minute pressure campaign
from Congressional Republicans and
industry leaders. Among the top corporate
officials said by Washington lobbyists to
have been in direct contact with either the
president or Vice President Dick Cheney to
win the turnabout was Tom Kuhn, a close
friend of Mr. Bush's who is president of the
Edison Electric Institute, the power plants'
main lobbying organization.
"We had been convinced that we were done
for," a top industry lobbyist said today of
what he said was widespread resignation
that Mr. Bush would honor his campaign
promise, which called for mandatory
reductions in power plants' emissions of the
gas. Characterizing the lobbying of the last
several weeks, this industry official said,
"The very top people on our side were
talking to the very highest levels of the
administration."
Among people critical of Mr. Bush's move,
several suggested in particular today that his
diagnosis of "energy crisis" was overstated
and was being offered at least in part as a
cover for a decision driven by a desire to
satisfy the oil and coal industries, the biggest
beneficiaries of his decision, as well as to
preserve good ties with their supporters on
Capitol Hill.
"In every energy decision, politics plays a
big role," said Bill Richardson, who was the
Clinton administration's last energy
secretary. "But the emissions decision is a
particularly unfortunate one because it
basically says we're for coal and not for any
alternative, including natural gas, which
should be our future source of energy in this
country."
A decision to regulate power plants'
emissions of carbon dioxide would have
been felt most heavily by coal- and oil-
burning plants, which are the largest
emitters of the gas among the electric
utilities. The adoption of the standards
would have almost certainly resulted in a
shift toward more widespread use of natural
gas, a cleaner fuel, in power generation.
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White House officials said today that such a
shift would have taken place too quickly for
the natural gas industry to come up with the
supplies necessary to meet the new demand,
and that higher prices would have resulted.
But Skip Horvath, president of the Natural
Gas Supply Association, said his industry
regarded Mr. Bush's decision as a mistake.
"The policy seems to view a shift toward
natural gas use as some kind of problem,
and it seems to us that natural gas is the
solution," Mr. Horvath said.
The energy problems now facing California
have little to do with oil and coal because
most of the state's electricity is generated
from hydropower, nuclear power and
natural-gas fired plants. But White House
officials said Mr. Bush's comments about
"an energy crisis" reflected a broader
concern about the need to expand the
domestic energy supply, by increasing
production and use of all possible sources.
Mr. Bush's decision was warmly welcomed
today by spokesmen for the oil and gas
industries, as well as by a top official of the
United States Chamber of Commerce, which
had warned that any regulation of carbon
dioxide emissions could have hurt the
economy.
"It's very positive in that they've balanced
environmental needs against our needs for
energy security, and the decision is going to
mean that we can both protect and begin
increasing our domestic energy supplies,"
said the official, William L. Kovacs, the
industry group's vice president for
environment, technology and regulatory
affairs.
The pressure on the White House to reverse
Mr. Bush's decision began early this month,
after Christie Whitman, the new
administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, began publicly to
describe the president's campaign pledge as
if it were already policy.
Four Republican senators strongly opposed
to regulation of carbon dioxide emissions,
led by Chuck Hagel, Republican of
Nebraska, then sent Mr. Bush a letter asking
that he clarify his position. That set in
motion an internal White House review and
the furious lobbying effort that culminated
in the policy shift on Tuesday, White House
and industry officials said.
"It was very good that they made a swift
decision here, rather than let this issue fester
and fester," said John Grasser, a spokesman
for the National Mining Association, the
coal industry's main representative.
Environmentalists have been sharply critical
of Mr. Bush's move, and some elaborated
on their criticisms today, saying that the
president had passed up an important chance
to address the most dire problem facing the
environment.
"The energy crisis we have is a short-term
phenomenon, but the global warming
phenomenon is a long-term issue, and
what's important is to begin to put in place a
solution that will reduce our consumption of
fossil fuels and cut our emissions of carbon
dioxide," said Michael Oppenheimer, chief
scientist for Environmental Defense, a New
York-based environmental group.
A former Clinton administration official
who was one of the chief State Department
negotiators in recent talks aimed at
completing a global warming treaty, the
Kyoto Protocol, said today that Mr. Bush's
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decision would undercut efforts to find a
solution to the problem.
"The only silver lining I can see here is that
it makes things so stark and clear," said the
official, David B. Sandalow. "There's not
ambiguity, no attempt to greenwash this.
He's just going back on his promise."
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Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.
(05-848)
Ruling Below: (U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005)., cert granted 126 S.
Ct. 2019; 74 U.S.L.W. 3639 [2006]).
During the mid-1990's, the Environmental Protection Agency began efforts to crack down on
power plants grandfathered by the Clean Air Act that sought to expand their operations and
increase their output without installing modem anti-pollution equipment. Such plants do not need
to meet modem pollution standards unless they seek to modernize or expand their operations to
produce "new sources" of pollution. Duke Energy undertook to extend the life of eight plants by
replacing components that would allow the plant to operate longer hours. The Clinton
Administration sued as part of its anti-pollution crackdown and the Bush Administration
continued the suit while simultaneously seeking to change regulations to make similar suits more
difficult to bring in the future. The Fourth Circuit sided with Duke Energy, finding that it was not
required to meet modem pollution standards under the Clean Air Act because of its
improvements. Several lower courts have sided with the government.
Questions Presented: 1) Whether the Fourth Circuit's decision violated Section 307(b) of the
Act, which provides that national Clean Air Act regulations are subject to challenge "only" in the
D.C. Circuit by petition for review filed within 60 days of their promulgation, and "shall not be
subject to judicial review" in enforcement proceedings, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b); and 2) whether the
Act's definition of "modification," which turns on whether there is an "increase" in emissions
and which applies to both the NSPS and PSD programs, rendered unlawful EPA's longstanding
regulatory test defining PSD "increases" by reference to actual, annual emissions.
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, et al. Intervenors/Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
Decided June 15, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge: states. The United States maintains that
Duke Energy on numerous occasions
The United States brought this enforcement modified these plants without first obtaining
action against Duke Energy Corporation, appropriate permits in violation of the Clean
which provides North Carolina and South Air Act. . . . The district court granted
Carolina with electricity generated from summary judgment to Duke Energy.... We
eight plants located throughout the two affirm, albeit for somewhat different reasons
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than those relied on by the district court.
I.
The Clean Air Act is a complex statute
supported by an elaborate regulatory
scheme; both have a complicated history.
This case involves two different, but
complementary provisions of the Act: the
New Source Performance Standards
("NSPS") provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 7411, and
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
("PSD") provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 7470-92.
In order to "protect and enhance the quality
of the Nation's air resources" and "promote
the public health and welfare," 42 U.S.C. §
7401(b)(1), the Clean Air Amendments of
1970 directed the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to devise National
Ambient Air Quality Standards establishing
the maximum concentrations of certain air
pollutants allowable in each region of the
United States. . . . The Act then directed
each State to design a State Implementation
Plan to effect compliance with its air quality
standards....
To help attain and thereafter maintain these
air quality standards, the 1970 amendments
enacted the NSPS provisions, which
required the EPA to promulgate standards
regulating emissions from both newly
constructed and modified sources of
pollution at power plants. . . . Congress
defined "modification" in the NSPS
provisions as "any physical change in, or
change in the method of operation of, a
stationary source which increases the
amount of any air pollutant emitted by such
source or which results in the emission of
any air pollutant not previously emitted." . . .
Since 1971, the EPA has promulgated NSPS
regulations that define "modification" in
virtually the same words as the statute....
In 1975, the EPA added a regulation
elaborating on this definition and further
defining "modification" by reference to an
increase in the hourly emission rate: a
modification includes "any physical or
operational change to an existing facility
which results in an increase in the emission
rate to the atmosphere of any [regulated]
pollutant," measured not in tons per year,
but in kilograms per hour. . . . Modified
equipment becomes subject to the NSPS's
"technology-based" standards . . . which
mandate the installation of the "best
demonstrated pollution control technology."
The NSPS program was not entirely
successful. . . . In 1972, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia
issued a preliminary injunction directing the
EPA to promulgate regulations to
supplement the NSPS program and protect
air quality from deterioration in areas that
had met or exceeded the relevant ambient
standards. . . . The EPA duly disseminated
the first PSD regulations in 1974. . . .
Congress thereafter enacted a PSD program
in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. .
As originally enacted, the PSD permit
provisions in the Clean Air Act applied only
to the "construction" of major emitting
facilities. . . . However, in November 1977,
a few months after the original enactment
became effective, Congress passed the
"Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming
Amendments." . . . These amendments
added to the "Definitions" section of the
PSD provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 7479 a
subparagraph that provides: "The term
'construction' when used in connection with
any source or facility, includes the
modification (as defined in [section
7411(a)]) of any source or facility." . . . This
359
amendment thus incorporated the NSPS
statutory definition of "modification," §
7411 (a)(4), into § 7479 of the PSD statute.
The PSD program imposes, inter alia, pre-
construction review and permit requirements
on new or modified sources in areas that
have attained or exceeded their air quality
standards... . Unlike the NSPS program, the
PSD program does not focus primarily on
technology-based controls, but on the "net
emissions from an entire plant resulting
from construction or modification of one or
more emitting sources within the plant." . . .
And so, while NSPS centers on
technological controls at an individual
pollution-emitting apparatus, PSD fixes on
the actual emissions from a site....
The EPA promulgated regulations under the
PSD provisions of the statute in 1978 . . .
and amended them in 1980 . . . . Under the
1980 PSD regulations, a plant cannot engage
in a "major modification" of equipment
without first undergoing the EPA's permit
process and acquiring a permit. . . . The
EPA's PSD regulations define a "major
modification" as "any physical change in or
change in the method of operation of a
major stationary source that would result in
a significant net emissions increase of any
pollutant subject to regulation under the
Act." . . . A "net emissions increase" is "any
increase in actual emissions from a
particular physical change or change in the
method of operation" of a unit. The PSD
regulations measure emissions increases
relative to a baseline calculation of "actual
emissions," i.e., "the average rate, in tons
per year, at which the unit actually emitted"
the regulated pollutant for, usually, the two
years prior to date of measurement, "using
the unit's actual operating hours, production
rates, and types of materials processed,
stored, or combusted during the selected
time period.". . .
II.
A.
Duke Energy's eight plants in the Carolinas
include thirty coal-fired generating units that
were placed in service between 1940 and
1975. Each unit contains, as one of its three
major components, a boiler, which is a large
structure from six-to twenty-stories tall
containing thousands of steel tubes. The
tubes are arranged into sets of tube
assemblies, including economizer tubes, in
which water is initially heated; furnace
waterwall tubes, in which water evaporates
to steam; superheater tubes, in which the
temperature of the steam is raised before
being released into a turbine; and reheater
tubes, in which steam released from the
turbine is reheated and returned to the
turbine.
Between 1988 and 2000, as part of a plant
modernization program, Duke Energy
engaged in twenty-nine projects on the coal-
fired generating units, most of which
consisted of replacing and/or redesigning
one or more of the boiler tube assemblies.
These projects would both extend the life of
the generating units and allow the units to
increase their daily hours of operation. Duke
Energy did not apply for or acquire new
permits from the EPA for these projects,
some of which, according to the
Government, cost "more than seven times
the original cost of the unit." . . .
In December 2000, at the direction of the
Administrator of the EPA, the Attorney
General brought this enforcement action
against Duke Energy, alleging that the life-
extension projects violated, inter alia, the
Clean Air Act's PSD provisions. In
September 2001, the district court granted
Environmental Defense, the North Carolina
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Sierra Club, and the North Carolina Public
Interest Research Group Citizen
Lobby/Education Fund leave to intervene as
plaintiffs, and these groups filed a com-
plaint against Duke Energy alleging similar
violations.
The EPA and the Intervenors maintain that
these life-extension projects constitute
"major modifications" of Duke Energy's
furnaces as defined in the PSD statutory and
regulatory provisions-that is, physical
changes leading to a significant net
emissions increase-and thus Duke Energy
was required to obtain permits for them. The
EPA does not contend that the post-project
hourly rate of emissions increased. Rather, it
argues that the PSD requires measurement
of the net emissions increase by using an
"actual-to-projected-actual" test, comparing
the actual pre-project emissions from a unit
to the projected post-project emissions,
which takes into account a unit's ability to
operate for more hours. Because the Duke
Energy projects enable the units to operate
for more hours each day, they will lead to an
increase in actual yearly emissions.
Duke Energy counters that its projects do
not constitute modifications subject to PSD
because they did not increase the units'
levels of emissions. The company maintains
that, under the PSD program, a net
emissions increase will result only if there is
an increase in the hourly rate of emissions.
Because none of its projects increased a
unit's hourly capacity to emit pollution (but
increased only the number of hours the unit
could operate), the projects did not increase
emissions from pre-project levels, and so,
according to Duke Energy, it did not have to
obtain permits.
B.
The district court agreed with Duke Energy.
It held that a modification subject to PSD
exists only if there is a post-project increase
in the hourly rate of emissions from a unit.
Duke Energy Corp. . . .. In reaching this
conclusion, the district court relied on the
language of the PSD regulations,
"contemporaneous interpretations" of the
regulations by the EPA, and "the statutory
language incorporating the NSPS concept of
modification into PSD." . . .
One regulation promulgated by the EPA
pursuant to the PSD statute, 40 C.F.R. §
51.166(b)(2)(i), characterizes a "major
modification" as "any physical change in or
change in the method of operation . . . that
would result in a significant net emissions
increase"; another, 40 C.F.R. §
51.166(b)(2)(iii)(f), excludes "an increase in
the hours of operation or in the production
rate" from the definition of "physical change
or change in the method of operation."
Reading these two provisions in
conjunction, the district court determined
that an emissions increase traceable to
increased hours of operation cannot trigger
the PSD provisions because an increase in
hours is not a physical change. Put another
way, because increased hours are not a
physical change under the PSD regulations,
calculation of post-project net emissions
cannot take into account increased hours of
operation, but rather must be based on pre-
project hours of operation and rates of
production. Therefore, the court concluded,
only if the hourly rate of emissions increases
can there be a net emissions increase under
the PSD regulations....
The district court recognized that the EPA
interpreted its PSD regulations differently,
excluding a much smaller group of projects
from the definition of "major modification."
The EPA would exclude only those projects
that increase hours of operation and involve
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no construction. . . . According to the
interpretation pressed by the EPA, whenever
there is an increase "in utilization coupled
with a physical change, any increase in
hours of operation ... may be considered in
the emissions calculus." . . . The district
court concluded that it could not defer to the
EPA's interpretation because in addition to
being, in the court's view, belied by the
plain language of the PSD regulations, the
present EPA interpretation was "clearly
contrary to earlier [EPA] interpretations" of
the regulations. . . . Specifically, the court
noted that "immediately after the
promulgation of the PSD regulations in
1980, the EPA's Director of the Division of
Stationary Source Enforcement . . ., Edward
E. Reich, confirmed in two separate
applicability determinations that the
requirements of PSD would be implicated
only by an increase in the hourly rate of
emissions.". . .
Finally, the court determined that its
interpretation of the PSD regulation was
"also consistent with the NSPS [statutory]
definition of 'modification' found in 42
U.S.C. § 7411(a), "which was incorporated
by explicit reference into PSD" in 42 U.S.C.
§ 7479(2)(C) (defining "construction" to
include "the modification (as defined in
section 7411(a) . . .) of any source or
facility"). . . . The interpretation of PSD
regulations urged by the EPA in this suit
would, the district court concluded, be
"inconsistent with the congressional design
of defining PSD construction in terms of
NSPS modification and should therefore be
accorded little deference." . . .
After resolution of this legal issue, the
parties stipulated that the Duke Energy
projects would not result in an increase in
the hourly rate of emissions. The court then
entered summary judgment for Duke
Energy.
III.
In cases in which an agency's interpretation
of its regulations are at issue, a court
engages in a modified Chevron analysis....
First, as in the usual Chevron analysis, a
court must determine "whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." . . . "The judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory construction"
and "if a court, employing traditional tools
of statutory construction, ascertains that
Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law
and must be given effect." . . . Only if the
statute is silent or ambiguous on the point is
Congress deemed to have delegated
authority to the agency to clarify the point in
its regulations. . . . Thus, only in such cases
does a court examine the regulation itself,
determining its legitimate meaning, asking
whether the regulation is based on a
permissible construction of the statute, and,
if so, deferring to it....
The EPA and the Intervenors expressly
acknowledge that these principles govern
our review in the case at hand. . . . They fail
to understand, however, that straightforward
application of these principles can lead to
only one conclusion: affirmance of the
judgment of the district court.
This is so because Congress has indeed
"directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." . . . As the EPA itself concedes, the
critical first "question at issue" here is
whether the EPA "can interpret the statutory
term 'modification' under PSD differently
from how EPA interpreted that term" in the
NSPS. . . . Congress expressly defined
"modification" in the NSPS provisions of
the Clean Air Act . . . and then expressly
directed that the PSD provisions of the Act
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employ this same definition. . . . When
Congress mandates that two provisions of a
single statutory scheme define a term
identically, the agency charged with
administering the statutory scheme cannot
interpret these identical definitions
differently. Thus, because Congress
mandated that the PSD definition of
"modification" be identical to the NSPS
definition of "modification," the EPA cannot
interpret "modification" under the PSD
inconsistently with the way it interprets that
term under the NSPS.
Common sense would seem to dictate this
result. Supreme Court precedent certainly
does. . . . In Rowan, the Court faced a
situation strikingly similar to the one at
hand, and held that when Congress itself
provided "substantially identical" statutory
definitions of a term in different statutes, the
agency charged with enforcing the statutes
could not interpret the statutory definitions
"differently.". . .
The question presented in Rowan was
whether the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service could interpret the
statutory term "wages" differently for, on
the one hand, the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act ("FICA") and the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA"), and, on
the other, the statute governing income-tax
withholding. . . . Congress had defined the
term "wages" in these statutes in
substantially the same language: for both
FICA and FUTA, "wages" were defined as
"all remuneration for employment, including
the cash value of all remuneration paid in
any medium other than cash"; for income
tax withholding, "wages" were defined as
"all remuneration (other than fees paid to a
public official) for services performed by an
employee for his employer, including the
cash value of all remuneration paid in any
medium other than cash." . . . The
Commissioner, however, issued regulations
interpreting "wages" under FICA and FUTA
to include the value of meals and lodging
provided to employees for the convenience
of the employer, and "wages" under the
income-tax withholding statute to exclude
this value....
In holding the Commissioner's
interpretation impermissible, the Court
relied on the plain language of the statutes
and their legislative history. First, the Court
noted that when Congress enacted the
precursors to FICA and FUTA as part of the
Social Security Act of 1935, it chose
"wages" as the basis for employer taxation
and then statutorily defined the term. . . .
Similarly, seven years later, when Congress
enacted the original income-tax withholding
statute, it chose "wages" as the basis for
taxation and statutorily defined the term "in
substantially the same language that it used
in FICA and FUTA." . . . The Rowan Court
held that, "in view of this sequence of
consistency, the plain language of the statute
is strong evidence that Congress intended
'wages' to mean the same thing under FICA,
FUTA, and income-tax withholding." . . .
The Court then examined the statutes'
history, finding indications that Congress
intended to "coordinate the income-tax
withholding system with FICA and FUTA . .
. to promote simplicity and ease of
administration," and concluding that
"contradictory interpretations of
substantially identical definitions do not
serve that interest." . . .
The plain language of the Clean Air Act
provides even stronger evidence that
Congress intended the statutory definitions
of "modification" in the PSD and NSPS
provisions to be interpreted identically.
While Congress used only "substantially the
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same language" in the statutory definitions
at issue in Rowan . . . here Congress
mandated that the definition of
"modification" in the PSD provisions
precisely mirror the definition of
"modification" in the NSPS provision.
Congress did this by directly incorporating
the NSPS definition, which it had enacted in
1970, into the PSD provisions, which it
enacted seven years later....
Moreover, as in Rowan, the legislative
history of the statutes at issue here does not
in any way suggest that Congress intended
these identical statutory definitions to
receive different interpretations.
Notwithstanding the EPA's contentions to
the contrary, the fact that the PSD definition
of modification became part of the statute
through "Technical and Conforming
Amendments" does not change the fact that
the definition is a statutory enactment,
entitled to be treated as such. . . . Indeed, the
expressed intent in the congressional
summary of the legislative amendments to
"conform" the definition of modification in
the PSD provisions "to usage in other parts
of the Act," . . . indicates congressional
concern with the same sort of simplicity and
consistency that the Rowan Court discerned
from the legislative history examined there.
As the Court explained in Rowan, "it would
be extraordinary for a Congress pursuing
this interest to intend, without ever saying
so, for identical definitions to be interpreted
differently." . . .
The EPA points to Senator Muskie's
statement that it was "not the purpose of
these amendments to re-open substantive
issues" in the Act . . . as evidence that
Congress was merely using an expedient
method to correct the inadvertent omission
of the word "modification" from the PSD
provisions. To the extent that Senator
Muskie's remarks demonstrate Congress'
intent, . . . they do not support the EPA's
position. The assertion that the Technical
and Conforming Amendments were not
"designed to resolve issues that were not
resolved" in the debate and passage of the
Act . . . says nothing about whether
Congress had previously resolved the issue
of whether the interpretation of
"modification" was to be congruent under
the PSD and NSPS statutory provisions.
The EPA and Intervenors also emphasize the
"vital differences" between PSD and NSPS.
. . . We do not ignore or minimize those
differences. Although both statutes are part
of the Clean Air Act and designed to serve
its purpose "to protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation's air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare and
the productive capacity of its population," . .
. they address somewhat different problems.
PSD exists primarily to prevent significant
deterioration of ambient air quality in areas
meeting clean air standards . . . while NSPS
requires new sources to implement particular
technologies to limit their own emissions...
. These differences have led us and other
courts to approve different regulatory
definitions for an identical statutory term in
the two statutes. In PEPCo, for example, we
held that "significant differences between
the PSD and NSPS programs" justified a
different interpretation of the statutory term
"stationary source." . . . But in PEPCo,
although Congress had defined the term
"stationary source" in the NSPS provisions .
. . it had not defined that term in the PSD
provisions. Thus, while in PEPCo both
statutes contained the same term, the statutes
did not define that term in the same manner;
nor was the use of the term in the PSD
provisions linked to the statutory definition
of the term in the NSPS provisions.
Similarly, in Northern Plains Resource
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Council, the Ninth Circuit allowed the EPA
to interpret the statutory term "commenced"
differently in the NSPS and PSD
regulations. . . . But again, although one
statute-there the PSD provisions-defined
the term . . . the other-the NSPS
provisions-did not. And, Congress had not
linked the PSD definition of the term to its
use in the NSPS provisions of the statute.
PEPCo and Northern Plains Resource
Council illustrate the principle that the same
word or phrase will generally be presumed
to have the same meaning when used in
different parts of the statute, but this
"presumption of the uniform usage . . .
relents" when there is "a variation in the
connection in which the words are used as
reasonably to warrant the conclusion that
they were employed in different parts of the
act with different intent." . . . Thus, in
PEPCo and Northern Plains Resource
Council, the difference in purpose between
the NSPS and PSD programs justified the
conclusion that the same words had different
meanings in the two sections of the statute. .
In the case before us, however, the
presumption of uniform usage has become
effectively irrebutable because Congress'
decision to create identical statutory
definitions of the term "modification" has
affirmatively mandated that this term be
interpreted identically in the two pro-grams.
The different purposes of the NSPS and
PSD programs cannot override that mandate.
Neither the United States nor the Intervenors
have cited a single case in which any court
has held that identical statutory definitions
can be interpreted differently by the agency
charged with enforcement of the statute.
Moreover, in Rowan the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the argument, which was
successful in the Fifth Circuit, that the
different purposes of FICA/FUTA and
income-tax withholding justified the
different regulatory interpretations of the
same statutory definition. . . . The Rowan
Court concluded that to permit the
Commissioner to interpret the same statutory
terms differently would "fail to implement
the congressional mandate in a consistent
and reasonable manner." .
So it is here. Congress mandated that the
PSD statute incorporate the NSPS statutory
definition of "modification." No one
disputes that prior to enactment of the PSD
statute, the EPA promulgated NSPS
regulations that define the term
"modification" so that only a project that
increases a plant's hourly rate of emissions
constitutes a "modification." The EPA must,
therefore, interpret its PSD regulations
defining "modification" congruently. Of
course, this does not mean that this
regulatory interpretation must be retained
indefinitely. The EPA retains its authority to
amend and revise this and other regulations
"through exercise of appropriate rulemaking
powers." . . . Indeed, the parties point out
that the EPA has already amended some of
the regulations at issue here. . . . As long as
Congress mandates that "modification" be
defined identically in the NSPS and PSD
statutes, however, EPA must interpret that
term in a consistent manner in the NSPS and
PSD regulations.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of
the district court is AFFIRMED.
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"Justices to Hear Environmental Appeal on EPA Emissions Rule"
The Washington Post
May 16, 2006
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court announced yesterday
that it will review a controversial federal
court ruling that environmentalists had said
would weaken pollution-control
requirements for aging power stations across
the country.
In a one-line order, the justices said they
will hear Environmental Defense's appeal of
a June 2005 ruling by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 4th Circuit, based in
Richmond, which said that Duke Energy
Corp., a North Carolina utility, could
operate refurbished power plants even
though their total annual emissions would go
up.
The court's decision injects the justices into
a half-decade-old battle between
environmentalists and the Bush
administration, which has sought to ease
what it says is an excessive regulatory
burden on the nation's utilities.
Lightening the industry's environmental
load was a key component of the
administration policy adopted by Vice
President Cheney's energy task force in
2001.
In the case the court agreed to hear
yesterday, Environmental Defense v. Duke
Energy Corp., No. 05-848, the specific
question is how to measure utilities'
compliance with the Environmental
Protection Agency's "new source review"
rules, which govern emissions from plants
that have been modernized or expanded.
Environmental Defense says that about
17,000 facilities are covered by the rules,
and it cites studies that show 20,000
premature deaths per year traceable to
pollution from coal-fired plants.
The EPA's position traditionally has been
that the Clean Air Act requires modified
plants to reduce their total annual emissions,
and Environmental Defense says that
interpretation is correct.
But the 4th Circuit disagreed and said that
plants should only have to show a reduction
in their hourly rate of emissions. This was a
victory for utilities because they could run
their updated plants for many more hours
than previously.
The case against Duke Energy was one of
many initiated by the EPA across the
country in the waning days of the Clinton
administration.
The Clinton crackdown was bitterly opposed
by utilities, and the Bush administration
promised to change EPA enforcement
policy.
But the EPA continued to press cases that
were already pending when the
administration took office in 2001, so the
Bush EPA and Environmental Defense had
been on the same side of the Duke Energy
case until the 4th Circuit's ruling.
After the 4th Circuit ruled,
administration proposed new clean
regulations that incorporated the
the
air
4th
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Circuit's decision and would have applied it
across the country.
Then the administration asked the Supreme
Court not to intervene in the case. The
court's decision to take the case over the
administration's objection was a surprise;
since the adoption of modem environmental
legislation in 1970, the court had agreed to
hear just two previous cases in which an
environmental group was the petitioner.
"The court's decision to grant review despite
the administration's request that review be
denied constitutes a significant rebuff and
places the administration in an awkward
position before the court," said Richard
Lazarus, professor of environmental law at
Georgetown University Law Center.
Environmental Defense, backed by a friend-
of-the-court brief from the District,
Maryland and 13 other states, argued that
the 4th Circuit had acted outside its
jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act, and
that its ruling clashed with a 2005 decision
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, which said that
emissions had to be measured on an annual
basis.
Though the high court's decision to grant
review yesterday was a defeat for Duke
Energy, which had urged it to let the 4th
Circuit ruling stand, Scott Segal, director of
the Electric Reliability Coordinating
Council, said in a statement that industry
was looking forward to the case.
"Clarity regarding these concepts is essential
to improved efficiency, reduced emissions,
enhanced workplace safety, and electric
reliability," he said. "This Supreme Court
has a good track record in support of a
reasoned approach to administrative law.
We believe the makeup of the court is well
positioned to render judgment in a sensible
and fair way."
Oral argument will take place in the fall, and
a decision is expected by July 2007.
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"On Divided Court, Kennedy Emerges as Key in Future Environment Suits"
Defense Environment Alert
June 27, 2006
Dawn Reeves and Matt Shipman
The Supreme Court's divided ruling last
week on the scope of the Clean Water Act
(CWA) underscores sharp divisions among
the justices since President Bush's nominees
joined the court, a dynamic legal observers
say will almost certainly elevate Justice
Anthony Kennedy's role as the key swing
vote in future environmental cases.
Several observers believe that the divisions
are so sharp that the court may not be able to
reach consensus in environmental cases,
limiting prospects for regulatory certainty in
several future lawsuits involving EPA,
including a case the court has already agreed
to hear on the agency's new source review
(NSR) program and possible suits over
EPA's role in climate change and
endangered species decisions.
Some sources also said the ruling in
Rapanos et ux., et al. v. United States
suggests the court could take a more narrow
view of EPA and other agencies' authority
under environmental statutes.
In the June 19 ruling, Kennedy joined a
plurality decision written by Justice Antonin
Scalia to remand the case to a lower court,
but Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion that
took a significantly broader view of when
the law allows EPA and the Army Corps of
Engineers to regulate wetlands.
Scalia's plurality decision, which was
supported by Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito,
allows regulation of waters that are
"relatively permanent, standing or
continuously flowing." A dissent authored
by Justice John Paul Stevens and backed by
Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader
Ginsberg and David Souter, backed the
government's position of expansive
authority.
Kennedy's concurring opinion, which many
believe will hold sway with the lower courts,
struck a middle ground, saying there should
be limits on CWA protections for remote
waterbodies, but waterbodies with a
"significant nexus" to navigable waters
should still be protected. The decision is
available on InsideEPA.com.
"It is hard to imagine two conceptions of
environmental law that are more at odds
than the [Scalia] plurality and the [Stevens]
opinion. . . . It is equally true that the
dissenting opinion is unpalatable for the new
conservatives on the court . .. and I think at
least in the short term, Kennedy gets to be
the Supreme Court because he gets to have
the swing vote," says one environmental
attorney who has argued cases before the
high court.
"Neither side was able to figure out a way to
write an opinion consistent with their values
but that nonetheless attracts Kennedy. That
speaks volumes about just how splintered
the court is and how unlikely it is you will
find a working majority on the court for any
environmental issue."
The source adds that neither the Scalia nor
Stevens camps were able to lure Kennedy to
their side, despite discussions in the opinion
that suggest attempts to do so. "The court
understands the problems that stem from a
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court that can't produce a majority opinion,"
such as continuing uncertainty and weaker
legal precedent, the source says.
That is "a concern for people like me who
depend on the conservative five [justices]
sticking together," says an industry attorney
who practices before the court. The source
adds that Kennedy is now clearly in the
middle of the court and, "If you are in the
middle, and Scalia keeps bashing you, it
pushes you the other way."
An environmentalist agrees that the decision
has elevated Kennedy's role and says that
while the justice will moderate the views of
both sides, Rapanos is his "most favorable
environmental ruling" to date. But the
source also says it is a bad sign that Roberts
and Alito joined Scalia and Thomas.
Conversely, however, a second legal expert
says Kennedy has long been the swing vote
on environmental issues and downplays a
change in dynamics on the bench. The
source adds that because the case was so
specific to the water law, it does not provide
"much fodder for speculation" about how
the court will address other environmental
issues.
One law school academic notes that Scalia's
'antagonism toward environmental policies"
was the "most striking thing" about the
decision. An industry attorney following the
case agrees, saying the language in Scalia's
opinion smacks of the same "judicial
activism" that Scalia and other conservatives
have often decried.
Another law school academic says Rapanos
may not be the best test to predict the court's
future action on environmental issues
because of its long and complicated history,
and says a separate case the court has
already agreed to hear, Environmental
Defense, et al. v.
which concerns
program-might
bellwether.
Duke Energy
EPA's NSR
serve as a
Corp.-
permit
better
"The real question about both Roberts and
Alito is how much deference they will show
to regulatory agencies in an environmental
context, and I'm not sure this was a good
test," the source explains. That is because
the Corps has long been on notice that it
needed to revise its wetlands rule to bring it
up to date, particularly following the high
court's earlier ruling on the issue in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
(SWANCC) v. Army Corps ofEngineers.
"That makes it easier to say in this case that
the Corps' approach was more expansive
than the Clean Water Act and precedent. It
might be more difficult if the court is faced
with an agency's interpretation that is a
closer call. And NSR might be a better test."
But an industry source believes there could
be parallels between Rapanos and
Environmental Defense in terms of how the
court treats agency deference.
In the NSR case, EPA has changed its
position on how to interpret a key test for
triggering NSR-which generally requires
facilities to upgrade pollution controls when
undertaking major modifications-and the
court will decide whether a lower court's
backing of the new test, which was
originally sought by industry, passes both
jurisdictional and statutory muster.
The industry source says as in Rapanos, the
court in the pending NSR case "will look
rigorously at whether agency jurisdiction is
consistent with statutory authority, and this
court is not as inclined to give Chevron
deference to agency interpretation as some
previous courts." The Chevron test generally
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grants an agency the power to interpret a
statute absent explicit congressional
direction.
"What you saw in response to Rapanos and
what you might see in NSR is ... this court
taking a narrow view of what Congress may
do under the Commerce Clause [in granting
agencies broad powers] . . . and one might
predict a Roberts court would be severe in
its judgment about whether an agency stayed
within the confines of its authority," the
source says.
But several of the legal experts note that the
court may have agreed to hear
Environmental Defense not based on the
substantive issued presented but because of
the novel jurisdictional issue the case
presents. The plaintiffs are arguing that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit's
ruling was tantamount to a regulatory
review, in violation of the exclusive
jurisdiction granted to the District of
Columbia Circuit by the Clean Air Act.
"It is fair to say that neither new justice is
likely to be swayed by the unique
environmental nature of a given case," the
law school academic says.
The source adds that a better indication of
the court's environmental bent will come
through its decisions on whether to accept
future environmental cases. The court is
slated to respond imminently to a pending
petition to hear a high-profile case
challenging EPA's position that the Clean
Air Act bars it from regulating greenhouse
gas emissions. And EPA and homebuilders
are likely to petition the court to resolve
circuit court splits on whether the
Endangered Species Act requires EPA to
ensure its actions protect listed species.
Additionally, the source cautions against
reading too much into any single opinion,
noting that even perceived pro-environment
justices have ruled against environmental
groups in recent years, and vice versa. The
source cites the unanimous high court
rulings in Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance et al., and Department
of Transportation et al. v Public Citizen et
al., both of which overturned
environmentalist-supported lower court
rulings. Additionally, the source notes that
in 2001 Scalia wrote the majority 9-0
opinion in Whitman v. American Trucking
Association upholding EPA's ambient air
quality standards.
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"DOJ Tells Court Duke Decision is 'Fundamentally Flawed"'
Electric Power Daily
June 30, 2005
The Dept. of Justice told a federal court in
Ohio that the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
ruling on the Clean Air Act's new source
review program was "fundamentally
flawed." DOJ said that the court should rely
on the "plain language" of the regulation as
it considers a similar lawsuit against
American Electric Power.
In briefs filed late Tuesday, the DOJ and
lawyers representing AEP, at the invitation
of U.S. District Judge Edmund Sargus Jr.,
discussed the implications of the June 15 4th
Circuit decision in favor of Duke Energy on
the pending NSR case against the energy
giant. AEP's trial before Sargus in
Columbus begins July 6.
The 4th Circuit-the highest court to weigh in
on an NSR utility lawsuit-affirmed a lower
court ruling in favor of Duke Energy. The
court said that Congress mandated, in
amendments to the Clean Air Act, that the
prevention of significant deterioration
statute incorporate the new source
performance standards definition of
"modification" as when a coal-fired unit
undergoes a project that increases its hourly
rate of emissions.
But DOJ said in its brief to Sargus that the
4th Circuit decision was "fundamentally
flawed in its analysis of NSR and NSPS
statutes." Instead, the department,
representing EPA in its suit against the
utility, said that the court "should defer to
EPA's interpretation of the NSR statute and
the plain language of its regulations, and
hold that emission increases under the NSR
regulations will be determined by actual
annual tons of emissions."
Lawyers for AEP asked Sargus to consider
the 4th Circuit's decision and "apply the
single definition of 'modification' in the
Clean Air Act consistently, as Congress
intended-and enacted."
The 1999 suit filed against AEP claims that
the company violated NSR when it modified
units at 10 coal-fired power stations and
boosted their emissions of harmful air
pollutions without obtaining necessary
permits or installing pollution control
equipment. AEP has maintained it acted
within the law.
In 2003, Sargus found Ohio Edison liable in
a similar NSR lawsuit against Ohio Edison
for 11 upgrades at its 2,200-MW Sammis
plant. In his decision, the first at the time on
the eight pending federal NSR suits against
utilities, the judge concluded that by
"physically replacing aging or deficient
components, Ohio Edison intended and
achieved a significant increase in the
operation and output of the units. In turn, the
amount of emission of sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxides and particulate matter also
increased."
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"Duke Energy Did Not Break Law, Court Says"
Washington Post
June 16, 2005
Jerry Markon
A federal appeals court sided yesterday with
industry groups that have been fighting a
government crackdown on aging coal-fired
power plants, ruling that utility giant Duke
Energy did not break the law when it
modernized its facilities without obtaining a
permit.
The Richmond-based U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 4th Circuit said Duke did not violate
the Clean Air Act when it upgraded eight
plants that provide electricity in North
Carolina and South Carolina. The Clinton
administration had accused Duke and other
utilities of expanding their facilities without
adding modern antipollution devices to
combat dangerous emissions.
"Common sense would seem to dictate this
result. Supreme Court precedent certainly
does," a three-judge panel wrote in the
ruling, which upheld a lower court decision
that said Duke did not need a permit for the
upgrades because overall emission levels at
individual plants would not increase.
The enforcement policy in dispute was
developed by the Environmental Protection
Agency in the mid-1990s to crack down on
aging power plants and refineries that
enlarged their facilities and increased their
emissions without installing new
antipollution equipment. Under the Clean
Air Act, these older plants are exempted
from modern pollution standards unless they
modernize and expand their facilities and
generate "new sources" of emissions.
The ruling is another blow to an effort begun
late in the Clinton administration to crack
down on coal-fired plants that are the major
source of health-threatening pollutants and
green house gas emissions blamed for global
warming. The Clinton Justice Department
and states filed lawsuits against the parent
companies of dozens of older power plants
and refineries, and Charlotte-based Duke
was one of the largest companies sued.
While the Justice Department and EPA
have continued to pursue these cases, the
Bush administration responded to pressure
from the utility industry by attempting to
alter rules to make it far more difficult to
bring similar cases in the future.
Industry groups hailed yesterday's ruling as
a major victory, pointing out that the 4th
Circuit is the first appeals court in the nation
to pass legal judgment on the crackdown.
"The decision in Duke eviscerates the legal
basis for the lawsuits," Scott Segal, director
of the Electric Reliability Coordinating
Council, said in a statement. He said he
hopes the EPA will now "focus its resources
in more appropriate and less costly ways to
improve air quality."
Duke Energy, which is one of the nation's
largest electric utilities, said in a statement
that the ruling "further supports the fact that
our company has-for decades-understood
and lawfully complied with the requirements
of' the Clean Air Act.
Frank O'Donnell, president of Clean Air
Watch, called the decision "a very perverse
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reading of the law" and said it is a "setback
for clean air in areas covered by the 4th
Circuit." The 4th Circuit covers Virginia,
Maryland, West Virginia, North Carolina
and South Carolina.
But O'Donnell pointed out that some lower
courts in other states have issued rulings
against the industry and that some
companies that operate coal-fired plants
have settled the cases.
"It would be a tragedy for public health if
the government stopped enforcing the law
just because of this one case," he said.
An EPA spokesman, who spoke on the
condition of anonymity, said the government
is reviewing the ruling and will determine
"an appropriate course of action."
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"Appeals Court Affirms Lower Court's Decision to Grant Summary Judgement in EPA's
New Source Review Enforcement Action Against Duke Energy"
Foster Electric Report
June 22, 2005
On 6/15/05, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 4th Circuit affirmed a federal district
court's 2003 decision to summarily dismiss
the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) lawsuit alleging that Duke Energy
violated the Clean Air Act's (CAA's)
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD)
provisions.
While the EPA charged that Duke failed to
obtain preconstruction permits required by
the PSD program before undertaking certain
projects at its power plants, the court found
that the EPA improperly classified Duke's
projects as "modifications" subject to PSD
provisions.
Writing for the three-judge panel, Circuit
Judge Diana Motz said that the EPA has
attempted to interpret the statutory term
"modification" differently under its new
source performance standards (NSPS) and
its PSD provisions. The EPA has done so,
Motz continued, despite the fact that
Congress specifically defined the term when
it enacted NSPS, and then "expressly
directed that the PSD provisions of the Act
employ this same definition." Judge Motz
explained that "in the case before us, . . . the
presumption of uniform usage has become
effectively irrebutable because Congress'
decision to create identical statutory
definitions of the term 'modification' has
affirmatively mandated that this term be
interpreted identically in the two programs."
Accordingly, the court found that had the
EPA applied its earlier interpretation of the
term "modification" when considering
whether or not the Duke projects fall within
the purview of the PSD program, Duke
would not have been required to obtain the
preconstruction permits from the EPA.
Serving on the panel with Judge Motz was
4th Circuit Judge Michael Luttig and
Samuel Wilson, U.S. District Judge for the
Western District of Virginia, sitting by
designation. U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp. (No.
04-1763)
In 1970, Congress amended the CAA to
enact the NSPS, which required the EPA to
promulgate standards regulating emissions
from both newly constructed and modified
sources of pollution at power plants. Seven
years later, Congress enacted the PSD
program, which requires a utility to obtain
certain preconstruction permits before it
makes major modifications to a coal-fired
power plant located in areas considered by
the EPA to be in attainment with federal
clean air standards. Unlike the NSPS
program, which focuses primarily on
technology-based pollution controls, the
PSD program is more concerned about the
net emissions from the power plant
undergoing modification.
As part of its plant modernization program,
Duke Energy between 1988 and 2000
engaged in 29 projects-most of which
consisted of replacing and/or redesigning
one or more of the plants' boiler tube
assemblies-at its eight coal-fired North
Carolina and Southern Carolina power
plants in an effort to extend the life of the
generating units and to allow them to
increase their daily hours of operation. Duke
did not, however, apply for or acquire PSD
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permits from the EPA for any of the projects
at issue.
On behalf of the EPA, the Dept. of Justice
(DOJ) filed the underlying lawsuit (CA-00-
1262-1) in the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina in
December 2000, alleging that Duke's
projects violated the CAA's PSD provisions.
In particular, the DOJ/EPA, as well as
various environmentalists and other parties
who were later added to the suit as
intervenors, maintained that Duke's projects
constituted "major modifications"-i.e.
physical changes leading to a significant net
emissions increase-and Duke therefore
should have obtained preconstruction
permits from the EPA.
The DOJ/EPA reasoned that the "post-
project" units are able to operate for more
hours, and they therefore emit more
pollution on a yearly basis than they did
before the projects were undertaken. For its
part, Duke argued that the projects did not
constitute modifications subject to PSD
because they did not increase the units'
hourly rate of emissions.
In 2003, Judge Frank Bullock found, for
various reasons, that a modification subject
to PSD exists only if there is a post-project
increase in the hourly rate of emissions from
a unit. Since all involved parties agreed-
and stipulated to the fact-that Duke's
projects did not result in an increase in the
units' hourly emissions rates, Judge Bullock
summarily ruled on the issue in Duke's
favor.
The EPA/DOJ and intervenors subsequently
appealed Judge Bullock's finding to the
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit that,
through its instant order, affirmed the lower
court's ruling.
The question at issue, according to Judge
Motz, is whether or not the EPA can
interpret the term "modification" under PSD
differently than it interprets the same term
under NSPS.
When it enacted the NSPS program, Motz
recounted, Congress defined "modification"
to mean "any physical change in, or change
in the method of operation of, a statutory
source which increases the amount of any
air pollutant emitted by such source or
which results in the emission of any air
pollutant not previously emitted."
The EPA elaborated on this definition in
1975 by adding a regulation through which
it defined "modification," as it pertains to
the NSPS, to mean a change that results in
an increase in emissions-measured not in
tons per year, but in kilograms per hour. In
1980, however, the agency promulgated
regulations under the PSD specifying that a
"modification" is any change that increases
the amount of pollution a unit emits
annually.
Finding that the EPA had acted outside of its
authority in changing its interpretation of
"modification" in 1980, Judge Motz
explained that Congress specifically defined
the term when it passed the NSPS provisions
of the Clean Air Act, and it also expressly
directed that the PSD provisions use this
same definition. "When Congress mandates
that two provisions of a single statutory
scheme define a term identically, the agency
charged with administering the statutory
scheme cannot interpret these identical
definitions differently," the judge added.
All parties agree that, prior to enactment of
the PSD statute, the EPA defined the term
"modification" in the CAA as a project that
increases a plant's hourly rate of emissions,
Motz noted. Accordingly, the court
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concluded that "because Congress mandated
that the PSD definition of 'modification' be
identical to the NSPS definition," it stands to
reason that the EPA should be required to
interpret the term consistently.
"Common sense would seem to dictate this
result," Motz declared. "Supreme Court
precedent certainly does."
Still, the court acknowledged that the EPA
would be within its rights to revise its
regulatory interpretation of the term-it just
must do so "through exercise of appropriate
rulemaking powers."
Ruth Shaw, Duke Power's president and
chief executive officer, issued a prepared
statement on June 15 hailing the court's
ruling.
"Today's action from the 4th Circuit further
supports that fact that our company has-for
decades-understood and lawfully complied
with the requirements of the Clean Air Act's
new source review program," Shaw
declared. "We have vigorously defended our
rights in this case and we have prevailed."
According to the Electric Reliability
Coordinating Council (ERCC), the ruling in
the Duke case is significant because it is the
first time an appeals court has ruled on the
merits of any of the EPA's various "new
source review" (NSR) lawsuits. "When the
court's analysis was complete," the ERCC
declared, "it became inescapably clear that
the 1999 NSR enforcement initiative was
without legal merit."
The Edison Electric Institute expressed
similar sentiments by stating "there can be
little doubt-this is the beginning of the end
of an ill-conceived effort to use the NSR
program to leverage power sector emissions
reductions, potentially at the expense of
electric reliability and worker safety."
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
(05-1126)
Ruling Below: (Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005)., cert granted 126 S.
Ct. 2965; 74 U.S.L.W. 3720 [2006]).
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required the "Baby Bells" created by the breakup of
AT&T to open their networks to companies seeking to provide competing phone service. The
plaintiffs in this case allege that the Baby Bells resisted this mandate by conspiring with one
another to prevent such firms from successfully competing in the Baby Bells' respective
territories. Further, the plaintiffs allege that the Baby Bells conspired to restrain competition by
agreeing not to compete for one another's territory. The plaintiffs' claims rest on evidence of
parallel conduct alone. The district court granted the defendants' 12(b)(6), ruling that there was
insufficient evidence to sustain a conspiracy charge under the Sherman Act. On appeal, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the district court improperly applied a "plus one"
standard that required the plaintiffs to present at least one independent factor that tends to rule
out self-interested behavior as an explanation for the alleged conspiratorial behavior. The
Appeals Court held that there was no heightened pleading requirement under the Sherman Act
and that the plaintiffs' complaint was sufficient under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Question Presented: Whether a complaint states a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1, if it alleges that the defendants engaged in parallel conduct and adds a bald
assertion that the defendants were participants in a "conspiracy," without any allegations that, if
later proved true, would establish the existence of a conspiracy under the applicable legal
standard.
William TWOMBLY, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
BELL ATLANTIC CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Decided October 3, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
SACK, Circuit Judge: one another in their respective geographic
markets for local telephone and high-speed
In an amended complaint filed in the United Internet services, and to prevent competitors
States District Court for the Southern from entering those markets, in violation of
District of New York, the plaintiffs allege Section I of the Sherman Act. At the time
that the defendant telecommunications the complaint was filed, Section 1 provided:
providers conspired not to compete against
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Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if
a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
. . . The district court (Gerard E. Lynch,
Judge) concluded that the amended
complaint fails to allege sufficient facts from
which a conspiracy can be inferred and
therefore granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Because we disagree with the standard that
the district court applied in reviewing the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs' allegations, we
vacate its judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
This case arises in the wake of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of Titles 15 and 47 of the
United States Code) ("Telecommunications
Act" or the "Act"), which was designed to
promote competition in the market for local
telephone service. . . . The Act requires that
the defendants-so-called "Baby Bells" or
"Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers"
("ILECs"), which were created following
the 1984 breakup of the American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. ("AT&T")-
open their government-sanctioned regional
monopolies over local telephone service to
competition from so-called "Competitive
Local Exchange Carriers" ("CLECs"),
including by allowing CLECs to connect
their own telephone networks to those of the
ILECs, by providing the CLECs with access
to the ILECs' network elements for "just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" rates,
and by allowing the CLECs to purchase the
ILECs' telecommunications services at
wholesale rates for resale to subscribers....
In exchange, the Act permits the ILECs to
enter the market for long-distance service in
which they were prohibited from
participating since the breakup of AT&T...
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants,
motivated by the desire to protect their
respective geographic monopolies and
otherwise unsustainable profit margins, have
resisted the mandate of the 1996
Telecommunications Act by conspiring with
one another to keep CLECs from competing
successfully in the defendants' respective
territories.. . . The plaintiffs also allege that
the defendants, who among them control
more than ninety percent of the market for
local telephone service in the United States .
. . have agreed not to compete with one
another in their respective territories,.
According to the plaintiffs, the result of this
alleged conspiracy has been to drive CLECs
out of business, to restrain competition in
the market for local telephone and high-
speed Internet services, and to injure the
plaintiffs by forcing them, as consumers of
those services, to pay at rates higher than
they would otherwise pay in a competitive
environment. ...
The amended complaint alleges several
factual bases for its far-reaching claims of a
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two-pronged antitrust conspiracy.
Agreement Not to Compete
As an initial matter, the plaintiffs allege
"parallel conduct" on the part of the ILECs
in not competing with each other, which
they assert "would be anomalous in the
absence of an agreement . . . not to
compete." . . . Specifically, they allege that
for various historical reasons, the
defendants' respective service territories are
not entirely contiguous, with some of the
defendants serving pockets of territory that
are entirely surrounded by the territories of
their supposed competitors. . . . While the
plaintiffs contend that these geographic
anomalies should provide Verizon and
Qwest with "substantial competitive
advantages" in competing with SBC for
business in Connecticut, and California and
Nevada, respectively, and SBC with similar
advantages in competing with Verizon in the
west and midwest, none of those companies
has sought to compete with the others "in a
meaningful manner.. . . The plaintiffs deem
this to be a situation that would be
"unlikely" absent an agreement not to
compete.. . . They suggest that this result is
especially odd in that the defendants have
publicly complained that the
Telecommunications Act hurts their
businesses by forcing them to provide
CLECs with access to their networks at rates
that are below the cost of maintaining those
networks.... By this same economic logic,
the plaintiffs argue, the ILECs should be
scrambling to compete with one another as
CLECs, thereby benefitting from
inexpensive access to their competitors'
networks....
The plaintiffs also point to a statement
allegedly made by Richard Notebaert, the
current Chief Executive Officer of defendant
Qwest and the former Chief Executive
Officer of Ameritech Corp., which merged
with defendant SBC in 1999. . . . In a
newspaper article published in October
2002, Notebaert was quoted as saying that
for Qwest, competing in the territory of
SBC/Ameritech "might be a good way to
turn a quick dollar but that doesn't make it
right." . . . According to the plaintiffs, that
statement, coming at a time when Qwest's
revenues were declining and it was losing
money, constituted an admission of
collusive conduct among the ILECs....
And the plaintiffs point to a letter from two
members of the House of Representatives to
then-Attorney General John Ashcroft
requesting that the Department of Justice
investigate the extent to which the Baby
Bells' "very apparent non-competition
policy in each others' markets is
coordinated." . . .
In addition, the plaintiffs assert that the
defendants communicate frequently with
one another "through a myriad of
organizations," providing an opportunity for
a conspiracy to form and be conducted
without the likelihood of detection. . . . At
the same time, they assert that "the structure
of the market for local telephone services is
such as to make a market allocation
agreement feasible" even in the absence of
frequent communications, in part because "if
one of the defendants had broken ranks and
commenced competition in another's
territory the others would quickly have
discovered that fact."...
Agreement to Prevent CLECs from
Competing Successfully
The plaintiffs further allege that from the
day of the Telecommunications Act's
enactment until the present, the defendants
have sought to interfere with the ability of
CLECs to compete successfully, including
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by negotiating "unfair agreements" with
CLECs for access to the ILECs' telephone
networks, by providing CLECs with poor
quality connections to those networks, and
by interfering with the CLECs' relationships
with the CLECs' own customers, such as by
continuing to bill customers even after they
have entered agreements for services with
CLECs....
The plaintiffs cite a report by a consumer
group, the Consumer Federation of America
("CFA"), which suggested that the
defendants 'have refused to open their
markets by dragging their feet in allowing
competitors to interconnect, refusing to
negotiate in good faith, litigating every nook
and cranny of the law, and avoiding head-to-
head competition like the plague."'. . .
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants
share a common motivation for their
behavior in preventing the CLECs from
competing because, were any one of the
ILECs to allow meaningful competition in
the geographic area it controls, "the
resulting greater competitive inroads into
that defendant's territory would [reveal] the
degree to which competitive entry by
CLECs would [be] successful in the other
territories in the absence of such conduct." .
. . Moreover, they contend, "the greater
success of any CLEC that made substantial
competitive inroads into one defendant's
territory would [enhance] the likelihood that
such a CLEC might present a competitive
threat in other defendants' territories as
well." . . .
The District Court's Decision
In dismissing the plaintiffs' amended
complaint, the district court concluded that
the allegations of "conscious parallelism" of
the defendants' actions, taken by them-
selves, are not sufficiently probative, on a
motion to dismiss, of conspiratorial
intentions that would support a finding of
antitrust-law violations. . . . Instead,
applying this Circuit's case law with respect
to Sherman Act claims at the summary
judgment stage, the court required the
plaintiffs to "establish[] at least one 'plus
factor' that tends to exclude independent
self-interested conduct as an explanation for
defendants' parallel behavior." . . . Such a
factor, the court noted, could be, for
example, "evidence that the parallel
behavior would have been against individual
defendants' economic interests absent an
agreement, or that defendants possessed a
strong common motive to conspire." . . .
While acknowledging that applying this
standard in the context of a motion to
dismiss "is somewhat in tension with Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8, which requires only a 'short
and plain statement of the claim,"' . . . the
court concluded that such a standard is
nonetheless appropriate for two reasons.
First, it wrote, insofar as parallel behavior
by competing companies is not itself illegal
absent an agreement to restrain trade, "the
doctrine of conscious parallelism [would]
allow[] plaintiffs to state a claim by alleging
conduct that is, in itself, not prohibited by §
1 of the Sherman Act." . . . Accordingly, the
court concluded, "allowing simple
allegations of parallel conduct to entitle
plaintiffs to discovery circumvents both §
l's requirement of a conspiracy and Rule 8's
requirement that complaints state claims on
which relief can be granted.". . . Second, the
court continued, "allegations of plus factors
are necessary to give defendants notice of
plaintiffs theory of the conspiracy." . . .
"There is simply no way to defend against
such a claim without having some idea of
how and why the defendants are alleged to
have conspired." . . .
Applying that standard, the court concluded
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that the plaintiffs fail to allege facts
"suspicious enough to suggest that
defendants are acting pursuant to a mutual
agreement rather than their own individual
self-interest." . . . First, given the ILECs'
stated opposition to the pricing structure
imposed by the Telecommunications Act,
the court wrote, their "parallel action" to
"attempt to discourage CLECs from entering
the market and to render it difficult for them
to survive once they had entered . . . does
not naturally give rise to an inference of an
agreement, since the behavior of each ILEC
in resisting the incursion of CLECs is fully
explained by the ILEC's own interests in
defending its individual territory." . . .
Second, the district court also rejected the
plaintiffs' claim that the defendants
conspired not to compete against one
another in their respective markets even
though such behavior might have been
financially advantageous to them in the short
term. The court suggested that the plaintiffs'
theory of the case erroneously assumes that
operating a telephone business as an ILEC is
substantially similar to operating a telephone
business as a CLEC in territory controlled
by another company. . . . In fact, the court
wrote, the two businesses are "entirely
different"; while ILECs are "self-sufficient,"
CLECs are "completely dependent" on their
contractual relationships with the ILECs in
whose territories they operate. . . . As a
result, "an ILEC's market power in its home
territory does not translate into market
power as a CLEC in another ILEC's
territory," such that "ILECs acting as
CLECs are in much the same position as
other, smaller, CLECs." . . . Even brand
recognition and geographic proximity do not
help, the court wrote, because the ILEC
competing as a CLEC "is still dependent on
its relationship with the [local] ILEC for
survival." . . .
Moreover, the court noted, the plaintiffs'
own allegations of how difficult it is to
operate a successful CLEC cast doubt on
their assertion that ILECs should be
expected to attempt to compete with one
another as CLECs in their respective
territories. . . . "Plaintiffs' allegations raise
the inference that each ILEC is well aware
that becoming a CLEC in another market
would be extremely difficult in the face of
opposition from the local ILEC, because it is
using the same tactics against CLECs in its
market." . . . Accordingly, "there is no
apparent reason for an ILEC to attempt to
push out of its own territory and brave the
barriers thrown up by other ILECs."...
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that the statement by Qwest CEO
Notebaert in any way suggests collusion
among the defendants. . . . "Considered in
context," the court reasoned, "Notebaert's
statement[] suggested only that he did not
consider becoming a CLEC to be a sound
long-term business plan, because all of the
ILECs were challenging [47 U.S.C.] § 251
and its pricing structure through litigation,
and the legal landscape in which CLECs
operate could have changed at any time." . .
The district court therefore granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
complaint in its entirety. . . . The plaintiffs
appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue principally
that the district court erred by applying, on a
motion to dismiss, a heightened, "plus
factors" standard of pleading ordinarily
applicable as the standard of proof at the
summary judgment and trial stages. In
addition, the plaintiffs contend that even
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were there a "plus factors" pleading
requirement, the district court erred in
applying that standard by not accepting all
of the plaintiffs' allegations as true and by
not drawing all inferences in their favor.
Because we conclude that the district court
applied an incorrect standard for evaluating
the defendants' motion to dismiss, we need
not, and therefore do not, reach the
plaintiffs' second argument.
I. Standard of Review
We review de novo the dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim,
accepting as true all facts alleged in the
complaint and drawing all inferences in
favor of the plaintiff....
II. The Notice Pleading Standard
A. General Principles
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) provides:
By presenting to the court . . . a
pleading . . . an attorney . . . is
certifying that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,
[the pleading is presented for a
proper purpose, and]-
(2) the claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a
non-frivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law or the establishment
of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual
contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are
likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery ...
. . . At least in theory, then, when a
complaint is filed by counsel, it arrives at
the door of the district court with the warrant
of counsel that "allegations and other factual
contentions" contained in the complaint
"have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified"-presumably by being stated
as being "to the best of [his or her]
knowledge, information, and belief"-"are
likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery." . . .
As for the contents of the complaint, Rule
8(a) provides only that it "shall contain (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds
upon which the court's jurisdiction depends
. (2) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the
relief the pleader seeks." . . . As the
Supreme Court recognized nearly half a
century ago, the Rules thus set forth a
pleading standard under which plaintiffs are
required to "give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests." . . . "Fair notice" is "that
which will enable the adverse party to
answer and prepare for trial, allow the
application of res judicata, and identify the
nature of the case so that it may be assigned
the proper form of trial." . . . The complaint
thus need not "set out in detail the facts
upon which" the claim is based....
B. Heightened Pleading Standards
The Rules do establish more demanding
pleading requirements for certain kinds of
claims. . . . But as the language of Rule 9
makes clear, and as the Supreme Court has
recently confirmed, instances requiring such
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particularized pleading are narrowly
circumscribed by the Rules. . . . Antitrust
actions are not among those exceptions.
In Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court noted
that it had previously "declined to extend"
heightened pleading requirements to "other
contexts" beyond "fraud or mistake." . . .
The Swierkiewicz Court unanimously
reaffirmed that approach with respect to the
allegations of employment discrimination
before it. ...
Our recent opinion in Wynder v. McMahon,.
. . a race discrimination case, is instructive.
The district court had "imposed specific
conditions on the form and content of' a
complaint beyond those required by Rule
8(a). . . . We held that to have been
improper.
. . . We went on to conclude that the
plaintiffs pleading, however imperfect, had
satisfied the permissive standard of Rule 8,
rightly understood.
... We therefore vacated the district court's
dismissal and remanded for further
proceedings.
C. Heightened Pleading in Antitrust Cases
Antitrust claims are, for pleading purposes,
no different. We have consistently rejected
the argument-put forward by successive
generations of lawyers representing clients
defending against civil antitrust claims-that
antitrust complaints merit a more rigorous
pleading standard, whether because of their
typical complexity and sometimes
amorphous nature, or because of the related
extraordinary burdens that litigation beyond
the pleading stage may place on defendants
and the courts. . . . Indeed, it has been
argued from time to time that antitrust cases
are less suitable candidates for dismissal at
the pleading stage than some other kinds of
litigation because evidence of the claimed
illegality is likely to be in the exclusive
control of the defendants....
True, we have said that "although the
Federal Rules permit statement of ultimate
facts, a bare bones statement of conspiracy
or of injury under the antitrust laws without
any supporting facts permits dismissal."...
"Minimal requirements are not tantamount
to nonexistent requirements.". . .
In Klebanow, for example, we rejected as
insufficient a complaint that alleged simply
that the defendants had engaged "in an
illegal contract combination and conspiracy
with others, unknown to the plaintiffs, to
restrain and monopolize trade in, and to fix
the price of, cottonseed oil," causing
damages in excess of $11 million. . . . Judge
Friendly, writing for the Court, noted that
the complaint "furnished not the slightest
clue as to what conduct by the defendants is
claimed to constitute 'an illegal contract
combination and conspiracy."'. . .
But in United States v. Employing Plasterers
Ass'n, . . . the Supreme Court considered a
complaint in a civil action brought by the
federal government against a trade
association, a labor union, and the union's
president. Between them, the defendants
were responsible for some sixty percent of
the Chicago-area plastering contracting
market.... The government alleged that the
defendants had violated Section 1 by "acting
in concert to suppress competition among
local plastering contractors, . . . preventing
out-of-state contractors from doing any
business in the Chicago area and .. . barring
entry of new local contractors without
approval by a private examining board set
up by the union." . . . "The effect of all this,"
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according to the government, was "an
unlawful and unreasonable restraint of the
flow in interstate commerce of materials
used in the Chicago plastering industry. ....
The district court dismissed the complaint,
concluding "that there was no allegation of
fact which showed that these powerful local
restraints had a sufficiently adverse effect on
the flow of plastering materials into
Illinois." . . .
The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that
"the complaint alleged that continuously [for
more than a decade] a local group of people
were to a large extent able to dictate who
could and who could not buy plastering
materials that had to reach Illinois through
interstate trade if they reached there at all." .
The Court continued:
Under such circumstances it goes too
far to say that the Government could
not possibly produce enough
evidence to show that these local
restraints caused unreasonable
burdens on the free and
uninterrupted flow of plastering
materials into Illinois....
The Government's complaint may be
too long and too detailed in view of
the modem practice looking to
simplicity and reasonable brevity in
pleading. It does not charge too little.
It includes every essential to show a
violation of the Sherman Act. And
where a bona fide complaint is filed
that charges every element necessary
to recover, summary dismissal of a
civil case for failure to set out
evidential facts can seldom be
justified.
Three years later, the Court again
emphasized the limited factual proffer
required to satisfy the pleading requirement
in a Section I case. It noted in Radovich v.
National Football League ... that "the test
as to sufficiency laid down by Mr. Justice
Holmes . .. is whether 'the claim is wholly
frivolous," . . .
Less than eight months later, we cautioned
against extensive antitrust pleading in which
unnecessary details "double the bulk without
increasing enlightenment." . . . "Such
pleading of the evidence is surely not
required and is on the whole undesirable.". .
. "It is a matter for the discovery process,
not for allegations of detail in the
complaint.". . .
The factual predicate that is pleaded does
need to include conspiracy among the realm
of plausible possibilities. . . . If a pleaded
conspiracy is implausible on the basis of the
facts as pleaded-if the allegations amount
to no more than "unlikely speculations"-
the complaint will be dismissed. . . . But
short of the extremes of "bare bones" and
"implausibility," a complaint in an antitrust
case need only contain the "short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief' that Rule 8(a)
requires.
We tackled this issue in the Section I
context in Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp.
Our analysis of the complaint under review
began,
In this case, we believe that the
District Court may have been misled
by a poorly drafted complaint into
categorizing the arrangement as one
that is presumptively legal. Since the
complaint may properly be
understood to allege arrangements
that might be shown to be unlawful,
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we are obliged to reverse in part and
remand. We believe that the
complaint states a cause of action
under Section One of the Sherman
Act ....
We continued:
To state a claim under Section One
of the Sherman Act, [the plaintiff]
must allege (1) that the NYNEX
Defendants entered into a contract,
combination, or conspiracy, and (2)
that their agreement was in restraint
of trade. See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
. . . The Supreme Court reversed, NYNEX
Corp. v. Discon, Inc., . . . but on the grounds
that the legal theory underlying the asserted
cause of action was incorrect, not that the
factual allegations contained in the
complaint were otherwise insufficient.
While these decisions do not offer a bright-
line rule for identifying the factual
allegations required to state an antitrust
claim, they suggest that the burden is
relatively modest. The requirements of Rule
8 "notice pleading" as applied to claims
under Section I of the Sherman Act remain
relatively straightforward. Section I
proscribes "every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations." . . .
Interpreting this prohibition, the Supreme
Court "has long recognized that Congress
intended to outlaw only unreasonable
restraints." . . . As a general matter, then, a
Section 1 plaintiff must allege that (1) the
defendants were involved in a contract,
combination, or conspiracy that (2) operated
unreasonably to restrain interstate trade,
together with the factual predicate upon
which those assertions are made....
III. "Plus Factors" at the Pleading Stage
A. On Summary Judgment
A plaintiffs claim, under the ordinarily
applicable standard, will not survive a
defendant's motion for summary
judgment-a stage that this litigation has, of
course, yet to reach-"where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the [plaintiff on that
claim]." . . . In making this determination,
all "'inferences to be drawn from the
underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the [plaintiff].' . . .
In a case brought under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, however, "the range of
permissible inferences from ambiguous
evidence" is limited, . . . because antitrust
laws prohibit only contracts, combinations,
or conspiracies-and not independent
parallel conduct-that operate unreasonably
to restrain trade, . . .. Although "parallel
conduct can be probative evidence bearing
on the issue of whether there is an antitrust
conspiracy," . . . it may also, as the district
court in the instant case pointed out, "simply
[be] the result of similar decisions by
competitors who have the same information
and the same basic economic interests," . . .
Accordingly, in a Section I case where there
is no "direct, 'smoking gun' evidence,". . .
conduct as consistent with
permissible competition as with
illegal conspiracy does not, standing
alone, support an inference of
antitrust conspiracy. To survive a
motion for summary judgment or for
a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking
damages for a violation of § 1 must
present evidence 'that tends to
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exclude the possibility'
alleged conspirators
independently.
that the
acted
. . . Thus, on a motion for summary
judgment in a case involving alleged
violations of Section 1, "courts have held
that a plaintiff must show the existence of
additional circumstances, often referred to as
'plus' factors, which, when viewed in
conjunction with the parallel acts, can serve
to allow a fact-finder to infer a conspiracy."
. . . These "plus factors" may include: "a
common motive to conspire," . .. evidence
that "shows that the parallel acts were
against the apparent individual economic
self-interest of the alleged conspirators," . . .
and evidence of "a high level of interfirm.
communications," . . . .
B. On Motion to Dismiss.
We are reviewing the grant of a motion to
dismiss, not the grant of a motion for
summary judgment, however. To survive a
motion to dismiss, as we have explained, an
antitrust claimant must allege only the
existence of a conspiracy and a sufficient
supporting factual predicate on which that
allegation is based.
As discussed in part II.C. of this opinion, the
pleaded factual predicate must include
conspiracy among the realm of "plausible"
possibilities in order to survive a motion to
dismiss. Nagler suggests that a pleading of
facts indicating parallel conduct by the
defendants can suffice to state a plausible
claim of conspiracy. . . . Thus, to rule that
allegations of parallel anticompetitive
conduct fail to support a plausible
conspiracy claim, a court would have to
conclude that there is no set of facts that
would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that
the particular parallelism asserted was the
product of collusion rather than coincidence.
Of course, if a plaintiff can plead facts in
addition to parallelism to support an
inference of collusion-what we have
referred to above as "plus factors" at the
summary judgment stage-that only
strengthens the plausibility of the conspiracy
pleading. But plus factors are not required to
be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based
on parallel conduct to survive dismissal. ...
We cannot know at the pleading stage
whether the plaintiffs here will seek to rely
on such an inference from parallelism based
on "plus factors" or not. But there is no
reason we can perceive to require the
plaintiffs to include allegations of "plus
factors" in their complaint, since they may
not be required to establish "plus factors" at
trial-if, for example, they can prove
conspiracy directly.
We acknowledge that district courts have
occasionally elided the distinction between
the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) and
Rule 56 motions on the basis of a well-
founded concern that to do otherwise would
be to condemn defendants to potentially
limitless "fishing expeditions"--discovery
pursued just "in case anything turns up"-in
hopes, perhaps, of a favorable settlement in
any event. In several recent cases, including
this one, district courts have dismissed
Sherman Act complaints because they did
not contain substantial allegations of facts
beyond "conscious parallelism" sufficient to
support an inference that the defendants'
actions were more likely than not
conspiratorial....
The district court viewed the requirement
that Section I plaintiffs plead "plus factors"
as sensible because anti-trust laws do not
prohibit parallel conduct and because "the
defendants [need] notice of plaintiffts']
theory of the conspiracy." . . . To these
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considerations, the defendants add a third on
appeal: the fear that, unless anti-trust
plaintiffs are required to plead "plus
factors," "any claim asserting parallel
conduct [will] survive a motion to dismiss."
We are not unsympathetic to these concerns,
but we find the arguments based on them
ultimately unconvincing. At the pleading
stage, we are concerned only with whether
the defendants have "fair notice" of the
claim, and the conspiracy that is alleged as
part of the claim, against them-that is,
enough to "enable [the defendants] to [, inter
alia,] answer and prepare for trial," . . .- not
with whether the conspiracy can be
established at trial.
The Nagler Court admonished that while an
antitrust defense will often prove "diffuse,
prolonged, and costly," . . . the remedy to
that problem is not to be found in
abandoning the rules of notice pleading and
raising the bar on plaintiffs in the absence of
a legislative mandate to do so. ... Thus, in a
regime that contemplates the enforcement of
antitrust laws in large measure by private
litigants, although litigation to summary
judgment and beyond may place substantial
financial and other burdens on the
defendants, neither the Federal Rules nor the
Supreme Court has placed on plaintiffs the
requirement that they plead with special
particularity the details of the conspiracies
whose existence they allege. ...
We are mindful that a balance is being
struck here, that on one side of that balance
is the sometimes colossal expense of
undergoing discovery, that such costs
themselves likely lead defendants to pay
plaintiffs to settle what would ultimately be
shown to be meritless claims, that the
success of such meritless claims encourages
others to be brought, and that the overall
result may well be a burden on the courts
and a deleterious effect on the manner in
which and efficiency with which business is
conducted. If that balance is to be
recalibrated, however, it is Congress or the
Supreme Court that must do so. ...
IV. Applying the Notice Pleading Standard
to This Appeal
Accepting as true the facts alleged in the
amended complaint, which are described at
some length in the Background section of
this opinion, above, and drawing all
inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, we
conclude that the plaintiffs have satisfied
their burden at the pleading stage.
As the district court pointed out, to support
their single claim of a conspiracy under
Section I of the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs
allege an agreement to employ two
anticompetitive tactics to maintain their
respective monopoly control over discrete
geographic markets. . . . Pursuant to the first
tactic, the defendants allegedly conspired "to
collectively keep CLECs from successfully
entering [the defendants' respective]
markets." . . . Pursuant to the other, they
allegedly agreed "to refrain from attempting
to enter each other's markets as CLECs." . .
The amended complaint alleges that the
conspiracy began on February 6, 1996,
around the time the Telecommunications
Act became law, and has continued to the
present day. . . . It further alleges that the
defendants together control more than ninety
percent of the market for local telephone
service in the continental United States, . . .
and that they, together with other, unnamed
"persons, firms, corporations and
associations," engaged in the conspiracy, . .
.. While the amended complaint does not
identify specific instances of conspiratorial
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conduct or communications, it does set forth
the temporal and geographic parameters of
the alleged illegal activity and the identities
of the alleged key participants. It further
alleges that the conduct was undertaken
specifically to preserve historic monopoly
conditions, and to thwart the procompetitive
purposes of the Telecommunications Act, . .
. a claim that, if true, would doubtless
constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade.
And it specifically alleges an effect on
interstate commerce, noting that the
defendants provide local telephone and
high-speed Internet services "across state
lines," that they "regularly and frequently
solicited customers and sent bills and
received payments via the mail throughout
the United States," and that the "marketing,
sale and provision of local telephone and/or
high speed Internet services regularly occurs
in and substantially affects interstate trade
and commerce."...
With respect to the allegation that the
defendants conspired not to invade each
other's territory, the amended complaint
asserts that most of the defendants are
dominant in particular geographic areas that
surround small pieces of territory controlled
by other defendants, yet none has attempted
to compete meaningfully in the surrounded
territories. . . . The amended complaint
further alleges that the ILECs have conceded
that competing as CLECs would be
inherently profitable, because they have
complained that the Telecommunications
Act requires them to charge CLECs below-
cost rates for network access. . . . In
addition, the amended complaint points to
the alleged admission by defendant Qwest's
CEO that such competition "might be a
good way to turn a quick dollar but that
doesn't make it right," even though Qwest
was losing considerable amounts of money
at the time the statement was made....
The factual allegations in support of the
alleged conspiracy to keep CLECs from
entering the ILECs' respective territories are
that the ILECs have engaged in a variety of
activities, such as interfering with the
CLECs' customer relationships by
continuing to bill customers who switched to
the CLECs' services, denying the CLECs
access to essential network equipment and
facilities, and providing erroneous and
confusing bills to the CLECs for their
services, all designed to drive the CLECs
out of business. . . . According to the
amended complaint, the defendants have
frequent opportunities to organize and
conduct their conspiracy through industry
organizations, . . . and a common incentive
to do so, because were even one ILEC to
decline to participate, a successful CLEC in
its territory would be better positioned to
compete against other ILECs and would
demonstrate that CLECs could succeed in
the absence of anti-competitive conduct, . . ..
We conclude that these allegations are
sufficient to "give the defendant fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests," . . . and to "enable [the
defendants] to answer and prepare for trial,"
. . .. Under the principles we have described
and our decision in Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX
Corp., supra, these allegations are enough
successfully to withstand a motion to
dismiss.
Whether the plaintiffs will be able to prevail
in response to a motion for summary
judgment after discovery or at trial is, of
course, an entirely different matter. We have
and express no view as to the merits of the
plaintiffs' underlying claims and mean to
imply none. Indeed, our analysis of the
arguments made on appeal, which we have
stated at some length, convinces us that it is
premature to arrive at any such view. But
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even if "it . .. [were to] appear [to us] on the
face of the pleadings that a recovery is very
remote and unlikely . . . that is not the test"
on a motion to dismiss, . . . and would not
warrant an affirmance here.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the
judgment of the district court and remand
the case to the court for further proceedings.
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"Supreme Court to Review Antitrust Case Against Phone Companies"
The New York Times
June 27, 2006
Stephen Labaton
The Supreme Court announced Monday that
it would consider a lawsuit that accuses the
nation's largest telephone companies of
violating federal antitrust law by conspiring
to carve up local markets to preserve their
monopolies.
AT&T, Verizon and Qwest asked the court
to rule after they failed to persuade an
appeals court that the large consumer action
should be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The complaint by the consumers did not
offer direct evidence of a conspiracy.
Instead, it relied on the fact that the
companies had engaged in "parallel
conduct" of not moving into each other's
service areas.
The phone companies said the standard set
by the appeals court was so low that it
would inevitably encourage baseless
lawsuits.
The case has gained attention because it
could set the standard for motions to dismiss
antitrust claims filed under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. A collection of influential
business interests, some of whom have been
defendants in antitrust cases, has filed briefs
supporting the phone companies. They
include the United States Chamber of
Commerce, the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers, the National Association of
Manufacturers and companies in the airline,
commodities, credit card and chemical
industries.
The appeals court told the telephone
companies that there would be ample
opportunity for them to make
trial that there was not enough
prove a conspiracy.
the case at
evidence to
The telephone appeal, Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, No. 05-1126, will be heard in the
Supreme Court's next term, which begins in
October, along with a second antitrust
appeal that the court decided Monday that it
would hear. That case, which also poses
issues of importance to both businesses and
consumers, raises the question of whether
Weyerhaeuser, the large forest products
company, unlawfully injured a tiny rival by
paying too much for saw logs.
In the late 1990's and early 2000's, the price
of some types of saw logs used to make
lumber increased while the price of
hardwood lumber decreased, narrowing
margins and forcing more than two dozen
unprofitable saw mills to close.
A federal jury found that Weyerhaeuser
monopolized the market through its large
purchases of red alder logs in the Pacific
Northwest at high prices, in violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The jury awarded Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Company, a small rival saw mill,
damages of $26.3 million, which a judge
then tripled to $78.8 million.
The Bush administration has filed a brief
asking the Supreme Court to reverse the
decision. It argues that the decision of the
lower court "threatens to chill pro-
competitive conduct by companies that bid
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aggressively in order to ensure access to
inputs or to increase their output." The case
is Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber, No. 05-38 1.
The justices, as they near the end of their
current term, rejected a third antitrust
appeal, filed by the Federal Trade
Commission, which sought to punish a
major drug maker for reaching a settlement
with a generic maker. The effect of the
settlement was that it kept the generic drug
off the market.
In that case, the commission found itself in
the unusual position of being at odds with
the Bush administration.
Representing the administration, the
solicitor general sided with the
pharmaceutical industry in support of a
decision by a federal appeals court that
approved a settlement between Schering-
Plough and a generic drug company,
Upsher-Smith Laboratories. The
administration asked the Supreme Court to
reject the commission's appeal.
The trade commission had challenged the
settlement between the drug makers because
it delayed the generic company from
bringing a rival drug to the market. As such,
the commission said it violated Section 1 of
the Sherman Act and the Hatch-Waxman
Act, which Congress passed in 1984 to
accelerate the development of lower-cost
generic drugs.
But the United States Court of Appeals for
the 11th Circuit, in Atlanta, disagreed. It
found that the settlement did not violate
antitrust law but simply resolved costly and
vexatious litigation. A recent study by the
trade commission has found a sharp increase
in deals between brand and generic drug
makers, which some officials say are having
the effect of reducing competition for high-
cost drugs.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision,
Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of
New York, and Senator Charles E. Grassley,
Republican of Iowa, said Monday that they
would introduce a bill to restrict agreements
that block generic drugs from coming to
market. The legislation, which is also
sponsored by two other Democrats, Senator
Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont and Senator
Herb Kohl of Wisconsin, faces an uphill
battle.
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"High Court Loads Up on Business Cases"
CNNMoney.com
July 11, 2006
Shaheen Pasha
The U.S. Supreme Court may be in recess
until the fall, but Corporate America is
already keeping a close eye on a number of
influential business cases on the high court's
docket for next term.
Corporate appeals were long neglected by
the Supreme Court, leaving the business
world to rely on the sometimes vague
rulings of the lower appeals courts.
But under Chief Justice John Roberts-once
a corporate attorney himself-the high court
has again shined a spotlight on corporate
concerns, granting review to over a dozen
business-related appeals since last term.
And while legal observers are hesitant to call
the Supreme Court's decision to take on
such a caseload "pro-business," there is a
feeling that the court's sudden interest in
business litigation will help shape the
direction for corporations going forward.
Antitrust Cases on the Docket
Antitrust cases figure prominently on the
agenda, with legal observers keeping a close
watch on a lawsuit that claims some of the
nation's major telephone carriers conspired
to carve up the market amongst themselves
in order to create mini-monopolies that
worked against consumers.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly will test
whether the high court sides with lower
courts in determining that a case can go
forward into the discovery stage of litigation
even when there's no direct evidence against
the defendants.
The consumers bringing the case against the
carriers cited "parallel conduct," or similar
practices, in the way the phone companies,
which include AT&T, Verizon and Qwest,
conducted business and set prices. They
asked the courts to allow them discovery in
order to build a case.
The tussle between the telephone companies
and consumers has the potential to be huge
for companies because it could determine
what criteria a plaintiff needs in order to sue,
said Jeff Lamken of law firm Baker Botts.
"There is a fair amount of concern that if
you allow someone to say 'I think there's a
conspiracy' without a sufficient reason to
derive an inference, you could end up with
massive amounts of litigation over cases that
are frivolous," he said. "When you're
talking about millions of documents during
the discovery procedure, going through
litigation can be ruinously expensive."
Another antitrust case has raised concern
from the business community, as well as the
Bush administration, which asked the
Supreme Court to weigh in on whether
Weyerhaeuser violated antitrust laws by
engaging in "predatory buying."
In Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber, Ross-Simmons
Hardwood-a now defunct saw mill-
claimed that Weyerhaeuser paid more to
hoard alder saw logs in order to create a
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monopoly on the timber and drive
competitors out of business.
Lower courts awarded Ross-Simmons $78.7
million in damages but legal experts expect
the Supreme Court to overturn that verdict.
Washington Legal Foundation's Samp said a
previous case called Brooke Group v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., created a two-
part criteria for predatory pricing which
shows that the company accused of having a
monopoly lost money in the short-term from
lowering its prices and would have to raise
the price of a product significantly down the
road to make up for the loss-a practice
which would damage consumers.
But in Weyerhaeuser's case, the company
paid a higher price to buy the raw materials
but continued to make a profit. Without
direct proof that the company paid more
specifically to drive out competition, Samp
said he believed the high court will likely
overturn the lower court's verdict.
And that has broad implications for what
constitutes a violation of antitrust law.
The Supreme Court traditionally returns to
session on the first Monday in October.
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"Wrong Standard Used in Dismissing Antitrust Complaint; Action Reinstated; 'Modest
Burden"'
New York Law Journal
October 4, 2005
Mark Hamblett
A federal appeals court has breathed new
life into an antitrust action alleging that local
phone companies conspired to keep out
competition and stay away from each other's
turf.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge
Robert Sack, found that a lower court judge
applied the wrong standard in dismissing an
action brought against the so-called "baby
Bells," and it ruled that there is no
heightened pleading standard for antitrust
actions in the United States.
The ruling came in Twombly v. Bell Atlantic
Corporation, 03-9213, a case that charged
that local carriers attempted to frustrate the
purpose of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.
One of the most prominent features of the
act was that the baby Bells, the remnants
from the 1984 break-up of the American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., agreed to open
their lines to allow competitors to connect
their own lines and compete locally for
subscribers. In return, the baby Bells were
allowed to enter the market for long-distance
phone service.
The complaint charged that the baby Bells
agreed not to compete against one another in
their respective markets for local telephone
and high-speed Internet service, and
conspired to prevent competitors from
entering those markets, thus violating
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Southern District Court Judge Gerard Lynch
dismissed the case, finding that the
complaint failed to allege sufficient facts
from which a conspiracy could be inferred.
Dealing with a motion to dismiss, Judge
Lynch applied the Second Circuit's case law
with respect to Sherman Act claims where
the defendants are accused of "parallel
conduct" as part of a conspiracy to restrain
trade.
He reasoned that allegations of parallel
behavior by competing companies is not
enough to violate the Sherman Act unless
the allegations include actions that indicate
an actual agreement to restrain trade.
"...[A]llowing simple allegations of parallel
conduct to entitle plaintiffs to discovery
circumvents both §l's requirement of a
conspiracy and Rule 8's (of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure) requirement that
complaints state claims on which relief can
be granted," he said.
Such a complaint must fail, Judge Lynch
said, if plaintiffs fail to allege at least one
"plus factor": a factor that "tends to exclude
independent self-interested conduct as an
explanation for defendant's parallel
behavior."
An example of such a plus factor, he said,
might be "evidence that the parallel behavior
would have been against individual
defendants' economic interests absent an
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agreement, or that defendants possessed a
strong common motive to conspire."
But Judge Sack, joined by Judges Reena
Raggi and Peter Hall, disagreed.
"We have consistently rejected the
argument-put forward by successive
generations of lawyers representing clients
defending against civil antitrust claims-that
antitrust complaints merit a more rigorous
pleading standard, whether because of their
typical complexity and sometimes
amorphous nature, or because of the related
extraordinary burdens that litigation beyond
the pleading stage may place on defendants
and the courts," Judge Sack said.
While the case law does not present a
"bright-line rule for identifying the factual
allegations required to state an antitrust
claim," he said, it suggests "that the burden
is relatively modest."
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, plaintiffs are merely required to
satisfy the "notice pleading," standard: make
a short and plain statement of the claims
sufficient to give the defendant fair notice.
The application of Rule 8 to the Sherman
Act, he said, is "relatively straightforward."
Under § 1 of the Sherman Act, he said, a
plaintiff must generally "allege 1) the
defendants were involved in a contract,
combination or conspiracy that 2) operated
unreasonably to restrain interstate trade,
together with the factual predicate upon
which those assertions are made."
Courts have held that, on a motion for
summary judgment, that a plaintiff must
show "plus factors" where the defendants'
so-called parallel conduct might be
explained by competitors acting on the same
information and in the same economic
interests.
But Judge Sack said, "We are reviewing the
grant of a motion to dismiss, not the grant of
a motion for summary judgment."
Plus factors, he said, are not required for an
"antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to
survive dismissal."
Judge Sack said the circuit was well aware
that district courts occasionally have
"elided" the distinction between the standard
applicable for summary judgment and the
standard for motions to dismiss based "on
the well-founded concern that to do
otherwise would be to condemn defendants
to potentially limitless 'fishing expeditions"'
in discovery.
Judge Lynch was not alone among Southern
District judges who have required plaintiffs
to allege plus factors in the context of a
motion to dismiss. And, in his opinion,
Judge Lynch said requiring plus factors
made sense because the antitrust laws do not
prohibit parallel conduct in and of itself and
because defendants need notice of the
plaintiffs' "theory of the conspiracy."
On their appeal, the baby Bells chimed in
with another concern-that unless plaintiffs
are required to plead plus factors "any claim
asserting parallel conduct [will] survive a
motion to dismiss," and antitrust cases will
"clog the courts for years, cost defendants
millions of dollars to defend, and.. .threaten
to reward plaintiffs' attorneys for bringing
meritless claims."
Judge Sack did not agree.
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"We are not unsympathetic to these
concerns, but we find the arguments based
on them ultimately unconvincing," he said.
"At the pleading stage, we are concerned
only with whether the defendants have 'fair
notice' of the claim, and the conspiracy that
is alleged as part of the claim, against
them,"-enough to enable the defendants to
answer and prepare for trial-and "not with
whether the conspiracy can be established at
trial."
J. Douglas Richards and Michael M.
Buchman of Milberg Weiss Bershad &
Shulman represented the plaintiffs along
with attorneys from Schiffrin & Barroway in
Bala Cynwyd, Pa.
The defendants were represented by Marc C.
Hansen of Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd &
Evans and attorneys with Kirkland & Ellis;
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw; and Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr.
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Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.
(05-381)
Ruling Below: (Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d
1030 (9th Cir. 2005)., cert granted 126 S. Ct. 2965; 74 U.S.L.W. 3720 [2006]).
A number of small sawmill companies sued Weyerhaeuser, alleging that it engaged in
anticompetitive predatory-bidding by paying higher-than-market prices for sawlogs and then
hoarding them in an attempt to deprive competitors. In 2003, a jury awarded one of these
companies, the now-defunct Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., a $26.25 million verdict
which was automatically tripled to $78.75 million under federal antitrust law. The Ninth Circuit
unanimously upheld the verdict, declining to import an established test for predatory-pricing
cases into the predatory-bidding setting. That test-the Brooke Group test-requires plaintiffs to
show that the monopolist lost money in the short term by reducing prices and that it was likely to
recoup that loss in the long run by increasing prices. Weyerhaeuser, supported by a number of
major corporations and the Bush Administration, argues that the Brooke Group test should apply
to predatory-bidding cases as well as predatory-pricing cases.
Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff alleging predatory buying may, as the Ninth Circuit
held, establish liability by persuading a jury that the defendant purchased more inputs "than it
needed" or paid a higher price for those inputs "than necessary," so as "to prevent the Plaintiffs
from obtaining the [inputs] they needed at a fair price"; or whether the plaintiff instead must
satisfy what the Ninth Circuit termed the "higher" Brooke Group standard by showing that the
defendant (1) paid so much for raw materials that the price at which it sold its products did not
cover its costs and (2) had a dangerous probability of recouping its losses.
CONFEDERATED TRIBES of Siletz Indians of Oregon
V.
WEYERHAEUSER Company
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided May 31, 2005
T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judge: to monopolize the Pacific Northwest input
market for alder sawlogs through its
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber purchases of sawlogs. Ross-Simmons
Company brought this action against prevailed in a jury trial on both its
Weyerhaeuser Company for antitrust monopolization and attempted
violations under Section 2 of the Sherman monopolization claims. After trebling the
Act. Ross-Simmons alleged that jury's damages award, the court entered
Weyerhaeuser monopolized and attempted judgment for Ross-Simmons and denied
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Weyerhaeuser's motion for judgment as a
matter of law or for a new trial. The court
also awarded attorneys' fees and costs to
Ross-Simmons. Weyerhaeuser appeals the
court's denial of its motion for judgment as
a matter of law or for a new trial, and seeks
reversal of the judgment. Weyerhaeuser also
separately appeals the district court's award
of attorneys' fees and costs to ensure that
any reversal of the judgment or remand for a
new trial would also result in reversal of the
award of attorneys' fees and costs. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291, and we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The forests west of the Cascade Mountains
in Oregon and Washington contain
sufficient hardwood to support the only
concentration of hardwood sawmills in the
western United States. These mills are part
of what is often called the "alder industry"
after the area's predominant hardwood
species, which accounts for 95% of the
annual Pacific Northwest hardwood lumber
production. The three principal players in
the alder portion of the hardwood industry
are: (1) timberland owners and loggers who
supply alder sawlogs; (2) production
facilities, including sawmills, that buy
sawlogs and process them into finished alder
lumber; and (3) purchasers who buy
hardwood lumber from production facilities.
Both parties in this case fall under the
second category: they operate sawmills.
The plaintiff-appellee, Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Company, was a pioneer
in the alder lumber business, starting in
1962. It operated its mill in Longview,
Washington continuously until it went out of
business in 2001. From 1990 to 1997, Ross-
Simmons experienced modest prosperity,
but from 1998 to 2001, its production
declined. From 1998 to 2001, sawlog prices
increased while finished lumber prices
decreased. This was unusual: historically,
the price of alder sawlogs fluctuated with
the price of finished lumber. Because its
materials costs went up and its production
went down, Ross-Simmons incurred losses
totaling nearly $4.5 million, forcing it to
shut down in 2001. Ross-Simmons blamed
its failure on Weyerhaeuser.
The defendant-appellant, Weyerhaeuser
Company, was established in 1900. In 1980,
it acquired Northwest Hardwoods, Inc. (also
"Weyerhaeuser"), and now owns six
hardwood sawmills in the Pacific Northwest.
Weyerhaeuser is one of the largest
manufacturers of hardwood lumber in the
world. From 1998 to 2001, the period in
which Ross-Simmons's profits dropped,
Weyerhaeuser's share of the Pacific
Northwest market for alder sawlogs was
approximately 65%.
Ross-Simmons alleged that Weyerhaeuser
artificially increased sawlog prices to drive
Ross-Simmons and other competitors out of
business. At trial, Ross-Simmons offered
testimony and other evidence to prove that
Weyerhaeuser attempted to eliminate
competitors by driving up sawlog prices and
restricting access to sawlogs through: (1)
predatory overbidding (i.e., paying a higher
price for sawlogs than necessary); (2)
overbuying (i.e., buying more sawlogs than
it needed); (3) entering restrictive or
exclusive agreements with sawlog suppliers;
and (4) making misrepresentations to state
officials in order to obtain sawlogs from
state forests. Weyerhaeuser attributed Ross-
Simmons's failure to substandard
equipment, inefficient operations, poor
management, and inadequate capital
investment.
The court instructed the jury on the
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applicable law, including the elements of
both monopoly and attempted monopoly, the
law regarding anticompetitive conduct in the
form of predatory overbidding, and the issue
of damages. With respect to overbidding, the
court instructed the jury that, if it found that
Weyerhaeuser paid higher prices than
necessary for sawlogs, the jury could regard
that as an anticompetitive act. The jury
found for Ross-Simmons on both the
monopolization and attempted
monopolization claims, and awarded
damages of $26,256,406. After trebling the
damages award, the court entered judgment
in the amount of $78,769,218 against
Weyerhaeuser. The court then denied
Weyerhaeuser's motion for judgment as a
matter of law or for a new trial, and awarded
attorneys' fees and costs to Ross-Simmons.
Weyerhaeuser appeals the judgment,
arguing that: (1) it is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law because it had no market
power in the alder sawlog market and the
alleged anticompetitive acts were not
actionable under § 2 of the Sherman Act, (2)
it is entitled, in the alternative, to a new trial
because the jury instructions misstated the
law of predatory overbidding, and (3) it is
entitled to reversal of the judgment because
Ross-Simmons's damages theory was
speculative. Weyerhaeuser also appeals the
court's grant of attorneys' fees and costs to
Ross-Simmons so that any reversal of the
judgment or remand for a new trial would
also result in reversal of the award of
attorneys' fees and costs.
II. ANALYSIS
Weyerhaeuser's challenges to the court's
denial of its motion for judgment as a matter
of law or for a new trial present us with a
legal question of first impression: whether
the prerequisites set forth in Brooke Group
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
for establishing liability in sell-side
predatory pricing cases apply in cases where
a defendant engages in buy-side predatory
bidding by raising the cost of inputs. We
address this legal issue at the outset,
applying a de novo standard of review. For
the reasons discussed below, we conclude
that Brooke Group does not control in the
buy-side predatory bidding context at issue
here.
Our conclusion that Brooke Group does not
apply here disposes of Weyerhaeuser's
challenge regarding a new trial due to
erroneous jury instructions in its entirety.
The court properly instructed the jury
regarding predatory overbidding. Our
holding that Brooke Group is inapplicable
also partially resolves Weyerhaeuser's
challenge regarding judgment as a matter of
law. Because Weyerhaeuser further
contends that the evidence was insufficient
to support the jury's verdict, we must
examine that contention, however. After
doing so, we conclude that substantial
evidence did support the jury's finding of
attempted monopolization. Thus, we affirm
the court's denial of Weyerhaeuser's motion
for judgment as a matter of law or for a new
trial.
Two issues remain unresolved after we
address the issue related to Brooke Group.
They are: (1) damages, and (2) attorneys'
fees and costs. We resolve them as follows.
First, we uphold the jury's award of
damages because it was based upon an
appropriate estimate of damages. Second,
we conclude that the court properly granted
attorneys' fees and costs in favor of Ross-
Simmons. Accordingly, we affirm.
A. ISSUES RELATED TO BROOKE
GROUP
1. Inapplicability of Brooke Group
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Monopoly power exercised on the buy-side
of the market is called "monopsony" power,
and can violate § 2 of the Sherman Act. Both
sides of the market affect allocative
efficiency, and hence consumer welfare.
Antitrust laws are thus concerned with
competition on the buy-side of the market as
much as on the sell-side of the market.
Weyerhaeuser argues that, regardless of
whether a case involves sell-side predatory
pricing or buy-side predatory bidding, the
same standard of liability should apply.
Weyerhaeuser invites the court to borrow
the standard of liability set forth in Brooke
Group, a sell-side predatory pricing case. In
Brooke Group, the Court created a high
standard of liability, holding that a plaintiff
bringing a claim under § 2 of the Sherman
Act based on predatory sell-side pricing
must show that: (1) "the prices complained
of are below an appropriate measure of its
rival's costs," and (2) "a dangerous
probability" existed that the rival would later
"recoup[] its investment in below-cost
prices" once it stopped such pricing. Thus,
to establish liability under Brooke Group, a
plaintiff had to show that its competitor
operated at a loss and was likely to recoup
its losses. Weyerhaeuser contends that the
same standard should apply in buy-side
predatory bidding cases. Specifically,
Weyerhaeuser argues that the jury
instructions were erroneous because the
court did not instruct the jury that
overbidding for sawlogs could be
anticompetitive conduct only if
Weyerhaeuser operated at a loss and a
dangerous probability of its recoupment of
losses existed. Similarly, Weyerhaeuser
argues that, as a matter of law, the alleged
predatory overbidding was not actionable
anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman
Act because Ross-Simmons did not satisfy
the two Brooke Group requirements. We
reject Weyerhaeuser's arguments regarding
the applicability of Brooke Group.
The Brooke Group Court established a high
liability standard for sell-side predatory
pricing cases because of its concern with the
facts that consumers benefit from lower
prices and that cutting prices often fosters
competition. The Court stated that "low
prices benefit consumers regardless of how
those prices are set, and so long as they are
above predatory levels, they do not threaten
competition." The Court further recognized
that above-cost pricing is either
"competition on the merits, or is beyond the
practical ability of a judicial tribunal to
control without courting intolerable risks of
chilling legitimate price-cutting." As a
result, the Court did not want to make the
standard of liability "so low that antitrust
suits themselves became a tool for keeping
prices high."
We recognize that in buy-side predatory
bidding cases, as in sell-side predatory
pricing cases, the price level itself is the
anticompetitive weapon. However, an
important factor distinguishes predatory
bidding cases from predatory pricing cases:
benefit to consumers and stimulation of
competition do not necessarily result from
predatory bidding the way they do from
predatory pricing. We turn now to the short-
term and long-term effects of predatory
bidding.
In a predatory bidding scheme, a firm pays
more for materials in the short term, and
thereby attempts to squeeze out those
competitors who cannot remain profitable
when the price of inputs increases. No
consumer benefit results during this
predation period if the firm raises or
maintains the same price level for its
finished products. Although consumers
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might temporarily benefit if a firm lowered
prices during the predation period, a
reduction in prices would place even greater
pressure on competitors, thereby increasing
the threat to competition arising from the
predatory bidding. Thus, even though a
short-term benefit to consumers might occur
in some predatory bidding situations, serious
concerns about the threat to competition
would concurrently arise in those situations.
Moreover, predatory bidding claims do not
directly challenge a firm's decision to cut
prices; instead, they focus on a firm's
decision to raise the cost of inputs.
Therefore, the concerns the Brooke Group
Court expressed about depriving consumers
of the temporary benefit of low prices do not
necessarily apply when predatory bidding is
at issue.
In the long run, to carry out a predatory
bidding scheme successfully, a firm would
have to recoup the higher costs it had paid
for its materials. If it succeeded in driving
out competition, during this recoupment
period the firm would likely pay less for its
materials while charging consumers a higher
price. The firm would have little incentive to
pass on the benefit of lower input prices to
consumers when it possessed greater market
power and needed to recoup the higher costs
it had paid for its materials. Thus, the overall
effect of a predatory bidding scheme would
result in harm to consumers.
Although in some situations rising input
prices might encourage new companies to
enter the supply side of the market and
expand output, thereby increasing
innovation and efficiency so that consumers
benefit in the long run through price
decreases and product improvements, this is
not such a situation. The nature of the input
supply at issue here does not readily allow
for market expansion. The evidence shows
that, during the alleged predation period, the
supply of alder sawlogs remained relatively
stable or declined. Nothing suggests this
situation will change-alder sawlogs are "a
natural resource of limited annual supply in
a relatively inelastic market." Thus, at least
in this case, predatory bidding is less likely
than predatory pricing to result in a benefit
to consumers or the stimulation of
competition. As a result, the concerns that
led the Brooke Group Court to establish a
high standard of liability in the predatory
pricing context do not carry over to this
predatory bidding context with the same
force. Therefore, the standard for liability in
this predatory bidding case need not be as
high as in predatory pricing cases.
Accordingly, we hold that the high standard
of liability in Brooke Group does not apply
here because this case involves predatory
bidding in a relatively inelastic market, not
predatory pricing.
Our decision in Reid Bros. Logging Co. v.
Ketchikan Pulp Co. provides further support
for our holding today that the prerequisites
in Brooke Group do not apply here.
Although the Supreme Court decided
Brooke Group after we decided Reid Bros.,
Brooke Group involved a different factual
situation and did not overrule Reid Bros. In
Reid Bros., we affirmed a finding of liability
under § 1 of the Sherman Act that was based
in part on a predatory buying claim. The
plaintiff in Reid Bros. argued that the
defendants conspired to bid preclusively on
timber sales at higher prices than necessary
to block the plaintiff from buying necessary
timber. The defendants argued that the
district court erred by finding predatory
bidding when there was no evidence that the
high prices paid for timber would prevent
the defendants from covering their marginal
costs on the ultimate sale of the processed
timber. We rejected the defendants'
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argument and held that such a "blind
application of a numerical test would only
frustrate the intent of the Sherman Act."
This statement that a rigid, numerical test
should not apply when a buy-side
overbidding scheme was at issue further
supports our holding that Brooke Group is
inapplicable here. Thus, our conclusion that
Brooke Group does not apply is consistent
with our precedent. We now turn to the
effect our conclusion has on Weyerhaeuser's
arguments for a new trial and for judgment
as a matter of law.
2. New Trial
We generally review a court's ruling on a
motion for a new trial for an abuse of
discretion. However, because
Weyerhaeuser's motion for a new trial
rested solely on the ground that the jury
instructions misstated the law regarding
Ross-Simmons's overbidding claim, we
review the court's denial of the motion for a
new trial de novo. Because we hold today
that Brooke Group does not govern in this
case, the court did not need to instruct the
jury that overbidding for sawlogs could be
anticompetitive conduct only if
Weyerhaeuser operated at a loss and a
dangerous probability of Weyerhaeuser's
recoupment of its losses existed. The
instructions as a whole provided sufficient
guidance regarding how to determine
whether conduct was anticompetitive.
Moreover, the instructions were consistent
with Supreme Court precedent stating that a
defendant violates the Sherman Act by using
monopoly power 'to foreclose competition,
to gain a competitive advantage, or to
destroy a competitor."' Thus, the jury
instructions "fairly and adequately covered
the issues presented, correctly stated the law,
and were not misleading." Accordingly, we
affirm the court's denial of Weyerhaeuser's
motion for a new trial.
3. Judgment as a Matter of Law
"We review [the] district court's denial of
[the] motion for judgment as a matter of law
de novo." Our holding regarding the
inapplicability of Brooke Group resolves
one of the issues related to Weyerhaeuser's
challenge to the denial of judgment as a
matter of law: Weyerhaeuser's contention
that, as a matter of law, the alleged
predatory overbidding could not be
actionable anticompetitive conduct under §
2 of the Sherman Act because Ross-
Simmons did not show that Weyerhaeuser
operated at a loss and that a dangerous
probability of Weyerhaeuser's recoupment
of its losses existed. Because Brooke Group
does not apply in this case, Ross-Simmons
did not have to meet the high standard of
liability in Brooke Group before relying
upon predatory overbidding to satisfy the
anticompetitive conduct requirement. Our
holding regarding Brooke Group does not
resolve Weyerhaeuser's argument that Ross-
Simmons's evidence was insufficient to
support the jury's verdict, however.
Accordingly, we now turn to the issue of
whether substantial evidence supports the
jury's verdict. We conclude that the record
contains substantial evidence.
"Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." When
reviewing the record as a whole, we must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party, keeping in mind that
"credibility determinations, the weighing of
the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge." In reviewing a
defendant's entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law in the antitrust context, we
presume that "a reasonable jury . .. know[s]
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and understand[s] the law, the facts of the
case, and the realities of the market."
To establish attempted monopolization
under § 2 of the Sherman Act, Ross-
Simmons had to demonstrate that
Weyerhaeuser: (1) engaged in predatory or
anticompetitive conduct, (2) had a specific
intent to monopolize, and (3) a dangerous
probability of Weyerhaeuser's achievement
of monopoly power in the relevant market
existed. Additionally, Ross-Simmons had to
show causal antitrust injury. We first
examine whether the record contains
substantial evidence of anti-competitive
conduct.
a. Anticompetitive conduct
Anticompetitive or predatory acts are those
that tend to exclude or restrict competition
''on some basis other than efficiency." The
record contains substantial evidence of over-
bidding for sawlogs to support the jury's
finding of anticompetitive conduct. The
evidence shows that during the period of
alleged predation: (1) sawlog prices
increased while prices for finished lumber
decreased, (2) Weyerhaeuser had a dominant
share of the market for alder sawlogs and an
ability to control alder sawlog prices, (3)
Weyerhaeuser suffered declining profits due
to the high prices it was paying for raw
materials, and (4) Weyerhaeuser employed a
strategy of raising sawlog prices. Based on
this evidence, the jury could reasonably
have concluded that Weyerhaeuser engaged
in anticompetitive conduct by overbidding
for sawlogs. We need not analyze whether
substantial evidence supports the other
alleged anticompetitive acts because the
evidence of predatory overbidding
sufficiently supports the finding that
Weyerhaeuser engaged in anticompetitive
conduct. We now turn to the issue of
whether substantial evidence supports the
jury's finding of specific intent.
b. Specific intent
Attempted monopolization requires proof of
intent to monopolize or eliminate
competition. The record contains substantial
evidence of specific intent to eliminate
competition based on: (1) Weyerhaeuser's
anticompetitive conduct itself, (2) the
testimony of Weyerhaeuser's employees,
and (3) Weyerhaeuser's business projections
regarding sawlog prices.
Anticompetitive conduct alone can satisfy
the specific intent requirement if the conduct
"form[s] the basis for a substantial claim of
restraint of trade" or is "clearly threatening
to competition or clearly exclusionary." As
discussed above, Ross-Simmons offered
evidence that Weyerhaeuser overpaid for
sawlogs while its profits declined.
Weyerhaeuser's overbidding for sawlogs
clearly threatened competition because it
restricted competitors' access to the limited
supply of sawlogs. Thus, Weyerhaeuser's
conduct on its own supports a reasonable
inference of specific intent to eliminate
competition.
The testimony of Weyerhaeuser's
employees further showed that
Weyerhaeuser intended to control prices and
eliminate competition. One of
Weyerhaeuser's former senior analysts,
Eugene Novak, acknowledged on the stand
that Weyerhaeuser had the power-and was
aware of its power-to influence prices in
the alder sawlog market. Novak also
authored a memorandum regarding the costs
of sawlogs and lumber in which he stated
that the increase in sawlog prices despite
Weyerhaeuser's predominant market share
made no sense. Novak estimated that, due to
the excessive prices Weyerhaeuser paid for
sawlogs, it "had given up some $40 to $60
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million dollars in the last three years." He
testified that his boss, Vicki McInnally, who
was a member of the senior management
team, told him that "that was the strategy
that [Weyerhaeuser] designed." A former
sales manager for Weyerhaeuser, Cliff
Chulos, also testified that "it was taken as a
given by everyone that [Weyerhaeuser]
could influence price; that [Weyerhaeuser]
had to be a major influence." Thus, the
testimony in the record supports the finding
that Weyerhaeuser specifically intended to
eliminate competition.
Moreover, Weyerhaeuser's business
projections about sawlog prices indicated
that it planned to lower the prices it paid for
sawlogs after acquiring a greater market
share as a result of decreased competition.
Weyerhaeuser tracked competitors' profit
margins and estimated the potential effects
of targeted increases in sawlog costs on the
ability of low-margin competitors to survive.
Such evidence also supports an inference
that Weyerhaeuser sought to foreclose
competition rather than simply to increase
its own business. Thus, when viewed in its
entirety, the evidence sufficiently supports a
finding of specific intent to control prices
and eliminate competition. We now turn to
the question of whether substantial evidence
supports the finding that a dangerous
probability of Weyerhaeuser's achievement
of monopoly power existed.
c. Dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power
Monopoly power is the "power to control
prices or exclude competition." In
determining whether there is a dangerous
probability of monopolization, we consider
"the relevant market and the defendant's
ability to lessen or destroy competition in
that market." To control prices unilaterally,
Weyerhaeuser had to have obtained market
power. Ross-Simmons could demonstrate
that Weyerhaeuser had market power either
by presenting direct evidence of the
injurious exercise of that power or by
presenting circumstantial evidence that:
defined the relevant market, demonstrated
that the defendant held a dominant share of
the market, and showed that significant
barriers to entry into and expansion within
the market exist. We hold that substantial
evidence supports the jury's finding that a
dangerous probability of Weyerhaeuser's
achievement of monopoly power existed.
The record contains some direct evidence
that could support the jury's finding that a
dangerous probability of Weyerhaeuser's
achievement of monopoly power existed.
The testimony from Weyerhaeuser's
employees showed that Weyerhaeuser had
the power to influence prices and had used
its power to raise the price of sawlogs. This
direct evidence of Weyerhaeuser's injurious
exercise of market power is substantial
enough by itself to support the jury's finding
of a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power. We nonetheless examine
the circumstantial evidence as well because
that evidence provides additional support for
the jury's finding.
(i) Market share
Weyerhaeuser does not dispute Ross-
Simmons's data that, during the relevant
time period, Weyerhaeuser's share of the
relevant market was approximately 65%.
Weyerhaeuser's business records showed
that its share was 64% in 1998, with
projected increases. We have held a 44%
market share sufficient as a matter of law to
support a finding of market power for
attempted monopolization. Thus, we
conclude that Weyerhaeuser's
approximately 65% market share supports a
finding of market power.
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Market share alone, however, does not raise
an inference of a dangerous probability of
achieving monopoly power if there are "low
entry barriers or other evidence of a
defendant's inability to control prices or
exclude competitors." We therefore turn to
the issue of whether significant barriers to
entry and expansion existed.
(ii) Barriers to entry and expansion
"Entry barriers are additional long-run costs
that were not incurred by incumbent firms
but must be incurred by new entrants, or
factors in the market that deter entry while
permitting incumbent firms to earn
monopoly returns." Such barriers may
include legal license requirements, control
of an essential resource, entrenched buyer
preferences, and higher capital costs for new
entrants. Entry barriers that justify a finding
of market power must "be capable of
constraining the normal operation of the
market to the extent that the problem is
unlikely to be self-correcting." We conclude
that the high capital costs new entrants faced
and the limited availability of sawlogs were
barriers to entry that justified an inference of
monopoly power.
At the outset, we address Weyerhaeuser's
argument that the entry of four new mills
during the alleged predation period
demonstrated a lack of barriers to entry. We
have held that the entry of new competitors
does not necessarily demonstrate a lack of
barriers to entry. If new entrants are
"insufficient to take significant business
away from the predator, they are unlikely to
represent a challenge to the predator's
market power." The evidence did not show
that the four new entrants took significant
business from Weyerhaeuser or that they
had a significant market share. In fact,
evidence suggests that Weyerhaeuser's
market share actually increased even though
the four new mills entered the market.
Moreover, the evidence indicates that, as
soon as the new entrants came into the
market, they had to pay the sawlog prices
Weyerhaeuser set. Thus, the evidence does
not show that the four new entrants could
take enough business away from
Weyerhaeuser to allow the market to correct
itself. As a result, the entry of new
competitors did not foreclose the possibility
that barriers to entry existed. We now turn to
the issue of whether higher capital costs and
limited sawlog availability were barriers to
entry.
Ross-Simmons offered expert testimony to
support the proposition that the higher
capital costs associated with entering the
market constituted a barrier to entry. The
record contains evidence that the advent of
expensive new machines and product-
grading, which did not exist when
Weyerhaeuser entered the market, made
market entry less feasible because new
entrants had difficulty matching the
necessary technology. The need for this new
technology raised the cost of entering the
market to $20-$25 million. While
Weyerhaeuser also had to incur costs for
machinery and product-grading, it was able
to do so over time without bearing the
burden of heavy front-end costs to gain
entry into the market. Thus, substantial
evidence supports the inference that higher
capital costs were a barrier to entry.
With respect to the availability of raw
materials, Weyerhaeuser argues that there
were sufficient sawlogs available for all
competitors if they could afford to buy them.
However, Weyerhaeuser purchased
approximately 65% of the available sawlogs
during the period of alleged predation. The
evidence further shows that Weyerhaeuser
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raised the price of sawlogs and entered into
exclusive agreements that restricted
competitors' access to sawlogs. By thus
controlling or influencing a number of the
available sawlog sources, Weyerhaeuser
restricted access to the already limited
sawlog supply. Weyerhaeuser's dominance
in the market for sawlogs, its overbidding
practices, and its restrictive arrangements
together support the inference that the
limited supply of sawlogs was a barrier to
entry.
The evidence shows that significant barriers
to entry existed in the sawlog market in the
form of high capital costs and limited raw
materials, and that Weyerhaeuser had a
dominant share of the market. Moreover, the
record contains direct evidence of
Weyerhaeuser's injurious exercise of market
power. Therefore, we hold that substantial
evidence supports the jury's finding that a
dangerous probability of Weyerhaeuser's
achievement of monopoly power existed.
Because substantial evidence shows that
Weyerhaeuser engaged in anticompetitive
conduct through predatory overbidding,
intended specifically to eliminate
competition, and a dangerous probability of
Weyerhaeuser's achievement of monopoly
power existed, we uphold the jury's verdict
against Weyerhaeuser on the attempted
monopolization claim. Accordingly, we
affirm the court's denial of Weyerhaeuser's
motion for judgment as a matter of law.
B. REMAINING ISSUES
Two issues remain for our consideration: (1)
damages, and (2) attorneys' fees and costs.
For the reasons stated below, we uphold
both the jury's damages award and the
court's grant of fees and costs to Ross-
Simmons.
1.Damages
We give substantial deference to a jury's
damages award. In antitrust cases, we accept
a degree of uncertainty when evaluating
damages awards because of the inherent
"difficulty of ascertaining business
damages" when "the vagaries of the
marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge
of what [a] plaintiffs situation would have
been in the absence of the defendant's
antitrust violation." We will affirm the
jury's damages award if it is not based upon
"speculation or guesswork." "It is sufficient
if a reasonable basis of computation is
afforded, although the result be only
approximate." We conclude that the jury
based its award upon an appropriate estimate
of damages.
Ross-Simmons's models for estimating
damages properly relied upon the
fundamental assumption that Weyerhaeuser
maintained artificially high costs in the
sawlog market during the damages period.
Ross-Simmons's estimates were based either
on testimony regarding Weyerhaeuser's
annual loss in profits due to higher sawlog
costs or on a decade's worth of data
regarding Weyerhaeuser's average profit
margin prior to the predatory period. The
models accounted for changing market
conditions by: (1) using data for actual sales
and production of finished lumber, which
took into account any reduced market
demand or decrease in market prices for
finished lumber, and (2) assuming that
Weyerhaeuser could have controlled sawlog
costs to maintain its previous profit margins
relative to the price of lumber. The
evidence, as discussed above, supports the
assumption that Weyerhaeuser had such
control. Thus, we conclude that Ross-
Simmons's damages models were not
speculative, but provided a reasonable basis
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for computing damages. Accordingly, we
uphold the jury's award of damages.
2. Attorneys' Fees and Costs
We uphold a court's award of attorneys'
fees unless it abused its discretion or
committed a clear error of law. Because we
affirm the jury's verdict of liability for
attempted monopolization, Ross-Simmons
remains a prevailing party entitled to
attorneys' fees and costs. Thus, the district
court properly granted attorneys' fees and
costs to Ross-Simmons.
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude that Brooke Group does not
apply in this predatory bidding case because
benefit to consumers and stimulation of
competition are less likely to result here than
in predatory pricing cases. A plaintiff
bringing a claim under § 2 of the Sherman
Act based on predatory overbidding in a
relatively inelastic market need not show
that the defendant operated at a loss and that
a dangerous probability of the defendant's
recoupment of those losses existed to
succeed on its claim. Substantial evidence
supports the jury's finding that
Weyerhaeuser was liable for attempted
monopolization. Therefore, we affirm the
court's denial of Weyerhaeuser's motion for
judgment as a matter of law or for a new
trial. The jury based its damages award upon
a reasonable estimate of damages.
Therefore, we affirm the jury's damages
award. Finally, because we affirm the jury's
verdict, we also affirm the court's award of
attorneys' fees and costs to Ross-Simmons.
AFFIRMED.
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"High Court Will Revisit Weyerhaeuser Case"
The Oregonian
June 27, 2006
Dylan Rivera
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider
overturning a Portland jury's verdict that
Weyerhaeuser had established an illegal
monopoly in the market for alder saw logs,
the court announced Monday.
The Bush administration and some of the
biggest names in corporate America have
weighed in against the verdict, saying it
imposed an unduly vague test for deciding
when a company has a monopoly on
industrial ingredients.
In 2003, the jury found that Weyerhaeuser
had used its market dominance to hoard
alder saw logs and drive a small mill out of
business. The jury awarded $26.25 million
to the defunct Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co. of Longview, Wash. a sum that
was automatically tripled to $78.75 million
under federal antitrust law. More than a
dozen other small mills followed on the
verdict in securing settlements and
judgments totaling about $50 million.
Last year, a panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals, based in San Francisco,
unanimously upheld the finding.
The Supreme Court action and a rising tide
of corporate opposition to the verdict and the
9th Circuit ruling make it clear that the case
raises questions that go far beyond a small
sector of the Northwest timber industry.
"Probably every major corporation in the
country could be sued somewhere in the 9th
Circuit," said Janet McDavid, an attorney
for the Business Roundtable, an association
of the chief executives of the nation's
biggest companies, with combined annual
revenue of more than $4.5 trillion. "The
implications are really quite extraordinary
and much more far-reaching than this would
appear."9
An attorney representing Ross-Simmons and
other plaintiffs said the Bush
administration's support for Weyerhaeuser
reveals an effort to dismantle the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890.
"The Bush administration is striving to have
an appropriate element in its campaign-
finance portfolio to go to big business and
say, 'Look at what we're doing,"' said
Michael Haglund with Portland law firm
Haglund, Kelley, Horngren, Jones & Wilder.
Weyerhaeuser, based in Federal Way,
Wash., has argued its innocence throughout
the proceedings. Monday, it said it was
"gratified" that the court would review the
9th Circuit's opinion.
"We believe that the court's decision to
review this case underscores the national
importance of the issues we have raised,"
said Kenneth F. Khoury, Weyerhaeuser
senior vice president and general counsel. "It
is important to the business community that
there be clear standards established before
any business can be found to have engaged
in so-called predatory buying."
Legal experts agreed Monday that the case
raises two questions: How tough should it be
to prove monopolization of an industrial
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ingredient? How should that standard
compare with a more established test for
monopolization of a consumer product?
Under antitrust law, companies create illegal
monopolies in consumer products when they
control a high share of a defined market and
price their products low enough to drive
competitors out of business. Such "predatory
pricing" practices have drawn scrutiny
when, for example, large bookstores have
used high-volume sales to sell books at
lower prices than smaller competitors can
offer.
But companies also can create monopolies
when they use "predatory bidding" by
paying higher than going rates for essential
production ingredients.
In a case called Brooke Group Ltd. vs.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the
Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that plaintiffs
in predatory-pricing cases must meet a two-
part test: They must show the monopolist
lost money in the short term by lowering
prices and that it was likely to recoup its
losses later by raising prices.
Weyerhaeuser contends that it should be
held to that standard.
"The fact is that Weyerhaeuser was making
money, despite the fact that it was paying
higher prices," said McDavid, the attorney
for the Business Roundtable. "There are a
lot of reasons that a company might choose
to pay more than someone else for a
product."
For example, McDavid said, a company
might want to keep a key supplier happy, or
to bulk up its inventories in anticipation of
rising demand for its products.
Some legal experts said they were surprised
that the court took the case, because lower-
court decisions on predatory bidding are
rare. Ross-Simmons was only the second
win by a plaintiff in such a case in 30 years.
Critics have focused on instructions to the
jury approved by U.S. District Court Judge
Owen Panner in Portland, which said the
jury could find Weyerhaeuser had a
monopoly if it bought more logs "than it
needed" or paid more "than necessary."
Haglund, the plaintiffs attorney, said in
court filings that Weyerhaeuser did not
properly bring up the two-part Brooke
Group test at trial. Furthermore, he said
Monday, Ross-Simmons had objected to
more than Weyerhaeuser's log purchasing
practices.
Ross-Simmons alleged that Weyerhaeuser
defrauded the state of Oregon by lying about
its market dependence on state-owned logs
to obtain special rights to buy alder logs
from the state. It also negotiated contracts
with large timberland owners requiring them
to sell exclusively to Weyerhaeuser or give
the company a "last look" at competitors'
bids so that it could outbid them.
The Supreme Court's decision to take the
case indicates that the court was dissatisfied
with the 9th Circuit's logic, said John
Kirkwood, an antitrust expert at Seattle
University's law school.
Kirkwood, who has consulted for the
plaintiffs, said he thinks the Brooke Group
standard is too tough for plaintiffs. But he
also believes the 9th Circuit's ruling gave
plaintiffs too much latitude.
"I'd like to see a test in which the plaintiff is
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required to prove long-run harm to
suppliers," Kirkwood said.
Plaintiffs, he said, should have to show harm
not only to themselves but also to broader
constituencies, such as consumers-or
producers of critical industrial supplies.
By that logic, Kirkwood said, plaintiffs
would need to prove Weyerhaeuser bought
more logs than it needed at higher prices in
the short term and that the long-term effect
gave Weyerhaeuser so much control that it
could force prices down in the long run.
Though timberland owners selling logs to
Weyerhaeuser would benefit from short-
term price hikes, it could make them lose
money over the long run, he said.
Weyerhaeuser shares closed at $60.50, up 20
cents, in trading on the New York Stock
Exchange on Monday.
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"Antitrust Trade and Practice; News; What Standard Should Be Applied in Predatory
Bidding Cases?"
New York Law Journal
June 20, 2006
Neal R. Stoll and Shepard Goldfein
Any firm with an arguably dominant market
presence that bids for inputs against
competitors, for the meantime, should take
note of a recent U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit decision affirming liability
for the conduct of predatory bidding. The
potential ramifications of the decision are
alarming.
In a typical predatory pricing case, a
plaintiff complains that a competitor has
priced its products too low, in order to force
its rivals out of business and subsequently
recoup its losses by gaining control over
prices in the market. In its seminal decision
on predatory pricing, Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the
U.S. Supreme Court held that predatory
pricing cases must be analyzed according to
a two-part test that measures: (1) whether a
defendant's prices "are below an appropriate
measure of its rival's costs" and (2) whether
"the competitor had a dangerous probability
... of recouping its investment in below cost
prices." In order to recover, a plaintiff must
meet both parts of the test.
While the Court recognized that these
prerequisites to recovery would not be easily
established, it concluded the high standard
was appropriate because "the costs of an
erroneous finding of liability are high" and
mistaken inferences would "chill the very
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to
protect."
Not Predatory Pricing, but Bidding?
But what if the complaint is not for
predatory pricing, but rather predatory
bidding? Should the analysis be any
different? Is the margin of error lower? This
was the question that the Ninth Circuit faced
recently in Confederated Tribes of Siletz
Indians of Oregon v. Weyerhaeuser Co. Its
answer was resoundingly, "Yes." But are
there any principled reasons for treating one
differently than the other? This is the
question facing the Supreme Court as it
considers whether to grant certiorari in
Weyerhaeuser.
On May 26, 2006, the Federal Trade
Commission and the antitrust division of the
U.S. Department of Justice jointly submitted
an amicus brief urging the Court to grant
certiorari. The agencies asserted that,
contrary to the Ninth Circuit's holding, there
is no principled reason for treating predatory
bidding differently from predatory pricing.
In Weyerhaeuser, Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co. and other sawmills sued
Weyerhaeuser Co., a major forest products
firm. Both Ross-Simmons and
Weyerhaeuser operated sawmills in the
Pacific Northwest that bought alder sawlogs
and processed them into finished alder
lumber. From 1998 to 2001, sawlog prices
increased while finished lumber prices
decreased. During this time period,
Weyerhaeuser held approximately 65
percent of the Pacific Northwest market for
alder sawlogs. Also during these years,
Ross-Simmons experienced a decline in
production and, along with a number of
other alder sawmills in the region, became
unprofitable and shut down.
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Ross-Simmons went to court, claiming that
Weyerhaeuser increased sawlog prices in
order to drive Ross-Simmons and other
competitors out of business. It alleged that
Weyerhaeuser caused their exit by, among
other things, predatory bidding (paying a
higher price for sawlogs than necessary) and
overbuying (buying more sawlogs than it
needed). The jury returned a verdict in favor
of Ross-Simmons that, after trebling by the
district court, resulted in a judgment of over
$78 million in damages.
Ninth Circuit Affirmation
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, explicitly
refusing to apply the Brooke Group
predatory pricing test. As framed by the
court, the issue was whether the Brooke
Group prerequisites "for establishing
liability in sell-side predatory pricing cases
apply in cases where a defendant engages in
buy-side predatory bidding by raising the
cost of inputs." The court concluded that
"Brooke Group [did] not control in the buy-
side predatory bidding context at issue" in
the case.
The court explained that "[i]n a predatory
bidding scheme, a firm pays more for
materials in the short term, and thereby
attempts to squeeze out those competitors
who cannot remain profitable when the price
of inputs increases." It acknowledged that in
both predatory pricing and predatory
bidding cases, "the price level itself is the
anticompetitive weapon." It then attempted
to distinguish predatory bidding from
predatory pricing by finding that "the
concerns the Brooke Group Court expressed
about depriving consumers of the temporary
benefit of low prices do not necessarily
apply when predatory bidding is at issue."
According to the court, in the short term,
predatory bidding does not result in
consumer benefit if the bidding firm does
not drop its prices for its finished products.
In the long term, when the bidding firm is in
its "recoupment" period and is making up
for the higher costs it paid for its materials,
it will have little incentive to drop its prices
to consumers. Thus, "the overall effect of a
predatory bidding scheme would result in
harm to consumers." Finding alder sawlogs
to be "a natural resource of limited annual
supply in relatively inelastic market," the
court held that since "predatory bidding is
less likely than predatory pricing to result in
a benefit to consumers or the stimulation of
competition.. .the standard for liability in
this predatory bidding case need not be as
high as in predatory pricing cases."
The Ninth Circuit also reviewed the
adequacy of the following jury instructions:
"One of Plaintiff s contentions in this case is
that the Defendant purchased more logs than
it needed or paid a higher price for logs than
necessary, in order to prevent the Plaintiffs
from obtaining the logs they needed at a fair
price. If you find this to be true, you may
regard it as an anti-competitive act." The
court found these instructions to fairly and
adequately cover the issues presented and
correctly state the law in the case.
So, as the law now stands in the Ninth
Circuit, a plaintiff can bring a claim for
predatory bidding merely by alleging that it
could not buy as much as it wanted at a
"fair" price and that its competitor was
buying more than it "needed" or paying
more than "necessary" for what it bought.
FTC, DOJ Joint Brief
The Federal Trade Commission and the U.S.
Department of Justice filed a joint amicus
brief urging the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in Weyerhaeuser. The agencies
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argued that "the decision below threatens to
chill procompetitive behavior." Their joint
position is that, "the rationales for Brooke
Group 's stringent standard of proof for
predatory-pricing claims are generally
applicable in the context of predatory-
buying claims as well."
According to the agencies, there are two
fundamental flaws in the Ninth Circuit's
analysis. First, the court focused on harm to
consumers without even analyzing whether
increased prices were likely to occur in the
output market. The court appeared to
assume that Weyerhaeuser's bidding
conduct would confer significant market
power in the market for finished alder
lumber. This demonstrated a
misunderstanding of the theory of predatory
bidding that predicts recoupment will occur
primarily through the ability of the
monopsonist bidder to raise prices in output
market in the long run once it excludes its
competitors from obtaining supra-priced
inputs. However, contrary to this theory, the
Weyerhaeuser jury effectively found that the
output market for finished alder lumber was
competitive.
Second, in its zeal to protect "consumers,"
the court focused exclusively on the
potential harm to purchasers in the output
market, while ignoring the effects on sellers
in the input market. If the price of alder
sawlogs goes up, sellers of sawlogs will reap
the benefits in the short term. And those
sellers will be harmed in the long term only
if recoupment is successful. The court also
ignored the fact that increased input prices
are often a sign of vigorous competition.
They can reflect a buyer's efficiency or
lower cost structure, or an effort to identify
high-quality suppliers.
Agencies' Arguments
The agencies argued that the same reasons
that led the Brooke Group Court to require a
stringent standard of proof for predatory
pricing claims apply equally to predatory
bidding claims. In the same way that
lowering prices is the mechanism for both
predatory pricing and stimulating
competition in an output market, raising
prices is the mechanism for both predatory
bidding and stimulating competition in an
input market. In both cases, "[a] rule that
attempted to distinguish precisely between
competitive and anticompetitive bidding
would be 'beyond the practical ability of a
judicial tribunal to control without courting
intolerable risks of chilling legitimate
[conduct]."' As with predatory pricing, the
risk of false negatives is low because
predatory bidding schemes "are rarely tried,
and even more rarely successful." Any
broader rule than that imposed by Brooke
Group "could lead to false positives and
thereby 'chill the very conduct the antitrust
laws are designed to protect.'
Finally, the agencies were highly critical of
the jury instructions that the court approved
in Weyerhaeuser. The instructions failed to
set forth any objective standard for the jury
to apply in determining whether the
challenged conduct was truly
anticompetitive. Nor did they offer any
guidance on how the jury should determine
whether the price Weyerhaeuser paid for
alder sawlogs was higher than "necessary,"
or what would have constituted a "fair"
price to Ross-Simmons. In short, the
instructions offered no meaningful guidance
but instead laid out a standard that was
"entirely unadministrable and wholly
subjective, and [failed] to provide
meaningful criteria for distinguishing
legitimate competition from anticompetitive
conduct."
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The agencies' amicus opinion in
Weyerhaeuser coincides with a series of
hearings the agencies are conducting on
single-firm conduct and antitrust law, with
the goal of exploring how to identify and
address anticompetitive exclusionary
conduct. Recognizing that the "proper
treatment of single-firm conduct under the
antitrust laws presents some of the most
complex issues facing the [agencies], the
courts, the antitrust bar, and the business
community," the first full day of sessions is
scheduled to address the topic of predatory
pricing. Hearings are to be held between
June and December 2006, and a number of
scholars and practitioners have been invited
to participate in panel discussions. At the
end of the hearings, the agencies plan to
prepare a comprehensive joint report.
Conclusion
While the practical results of these hearings
remain to be seen, it is encouraging that the
agencies are taking a closer look at single-
firm conduct. It is even more encouraging
that they filed the amicus brief in
Weyerhaeuser in response to the untenable
and unworkable decision of the Ninth
Circuit. However, until the Supreme Court
resolves the question of what standard
should be applied in predatory bidding
cases, businesses have cause to beware of
their bidding practices, especially if they
might be subject to Ninth Circuit law. And
until then, it would appear that in the Ninth
Circuit the standards for predatory bidding
liability have been set "so low that antitrust
suits themselves [will become] a tool for
keeping prices high."
Neal R. Stoll and Shepard Goldfein are
partners at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom. Joanna Warren, an associate of the
firm, assisted in the preparation of this
article.
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"Weyerhaeuser Monopoly Verdict Upheld"
The Oregonian
June 1, 2005
Dylan Rivera
A federal appeals court on Tuesday upheld a
$78.75 million judgment against
Weyerhaeuser, affirming a Portland jury
verdict that the company had run an illegal
monopoly in the market for alder sawlogs.
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit unanimously
supported the 2003 finding, which favored
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.,
based in Longview. The now-defunct
producer of alder lumber con-tended
Weyerhaeuser had run it out of business.
Ross-Simmons and 13 other small sawmill
companies have sued Weyerhaeuser's
Portland-based Northwest Hardwoods
Division, saying it hoarded sawlogs to choke
off rivals from a growing niche that turns
alder logs into lumber for furniture and
musical instruments. They said the timber
giant paid higher-than-market prices for logs
and sometimes let logs rot to deprive
competitors.
"The testimony in the record supports the
finding that Weyerhaeuser specifically
intended to eliminate competition," the
court's opinion says.
The antitrust litigation has cost
Weyerhaeuser about $145 million in
settlements and judgments, a relatively small
sum for a company that had $1.3 billion in
profits last year. Legal experts said the
appeals court ruling could have a wider
reach as a precedent for antitrust cases
involving raw materials for manufacturing.
"This is a huge victory for small and
medium-sized companies in any log market
in the West," said Michael Haglund, the
plaintiffs' attorney. "A company that
accumulates a large market share cannot
push log prices up with the goal of
eliminating its competition . . . That means
the vibrancy in the log market will
continue."
Weyerhaeuser said it was "very
disappointed" with the opinion.
"It remains our position that our conduct has
been lawful and fully consistent with the
standards set by the United States Supreme
Court," the company said in a statement.
"We believe that this panel of the 9th Circuit
failed to follow appropriate Supreme Court
precedent, so we will seek further review."
Company's Next Step
Weyerhaeuser spokesman Frank Mendizabal
said the company wasn't sure whether it
would ask the full 9th Circuit to reconsider
the case or appeal directly to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Fourteen companies, including Ross-
Simmons, have brought claims against
Weyerhaeuser on the alder issue.
The claims of two defunct mills are
scheduled for trial later this year: H.R. Jones
Veneer Inc., a subsidiary of States Industries
Inc. of Eugene, and Pacific Hardwoods-
South Bend Co. of South Bend, Wash.,
owned by TreeSource Indus-tries Inc. of
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Tumwater, Wash.
The Confederated Tribes of the Siletz-part
of the original Ross-Simmons suit in U.S.
District Court in Portland, but not awarded
damages-has asked the court to rehear its
case.
Ross-Simmons was awarded damages of
$26.25 million, which were automatically
tripled to $78.75 million under federal
antitrust law.
The Ross-Simmons verdict helped prompt
Weyerhaeuser to settle the claims of many
of the 14 companies for a total of about $50
million.
The 9th Circuit opinion puts enormous
pressure on Weyerhaeuser to settle
remaining claims, said William Andersen,
an antitrust specialist at the University of
Washington School of Law in Seattle.
"If you're a plaintiff in a case like this in the
9th Circuit, I think you're in good shape,"
Andersen said. "Defendants in cases that
look like this will be very anxious to settle."
The court called its opinion a "first
impression," indicating no other circuit
courts have ruled on the issue it was facing.
That makes it highly unlikely the Supreme
Court would hear an appeal by
Weyerhaeuser, because the Supreme Court
generally waits for lower courts to issue
conflicting verdicts before entering into
questions that don't raise urgent
constitutional issues, said Howard A.
Shelanski, an antitrust expert with the
University of California at Berkeley Law
School.
The 9th Circuit rejected an argument by
Weyerhaeuser that would have made it
harder for plaintiffs to prove monopolization
claims, Shelanski said.
Under antitrust law, companies can create
illegal monopolies when they have a high
market share in a defined market and price
their products below cost in an effort to
drive competitors out of business, Shelanski
said. Such "predatory pricing" practices
have drawn scrutiny when, for example,
large bookstores such as Barnes & Noble
use large volume sales to sell books for
lower prices than smaller competitors can
offer.
But companies also can create monopolies
when they pay too much for essential
production ingredients in "predatory
bidding," that raises costs for competitors
and pushes them out of business, Shelanski
said. The Weyerhaeuser appeal turns on how
to define predatory bidding.
Two-part Test
The U.S. Supreme Court established in a
1993 case called Brooke Group Ltd. vs.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. that
plaintiffs in predatory pricing cases must
meet a two-part test: They must show a
monopolist lost money by lowering prices
and that it was likely to recoup its losses
later by raising prices.
That's a tough standard to meet, said UW's
Andersen, because it's difficult to show that
a company is likely to have enough control
over a market to be able to raise prices in the
future.
Weyerhaeuser argued that Ross-Simmons
should have had to meet the two-part test in
proving that Weyerhaeuser had a monopoly
on alder sawlogs.
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The 9th Circuit rejected that argument,
saying predatory bidding claims should not
face the two-part test. That's because such
bidding typically has the short-term effect of
raising prices for competitors and
consumers.
Implicit in the Brooke opinion was the idea
that courts should be reluctant to interfere
with companies that are offering lowered
prices for consumers, Shelanski said. But by
interfering in a predatory bidding situation,
courts don't risk scuttling lowered prices, he
said.
"Right out of the gate, lower prices are good
for consumers," Shelanski said. "There's
nothing about high prices that right off the
bat is good for consumers. The high prices
might be good for producers (of logs), but
the antitrust laws are consumer-focused."
The opinion also came as a big win for the
Portland law firm Haglund, Kelley,
Horngren & Jones, which has only 12
attorneys. San Francisco-based Heller
Ehrman White & McAuliffe, one of the top
100 firms in the nation, represented
Weyerhaeuser on the appeal.
The opinion came during the trading day on
the New York Stock Exchange, where
Weyerhaeuser shares closed at $64.15, up 13
cents.
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KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
(04-1350)
Ruling Below: (Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Intern. Co., 119 Fed.Appx. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005)., cert
granted 126 S. Ct. 2965; 74 U.S.L.W. 3720 [2006]).
Teleflex sued KSR for infringement of a patent related to the throttle control assembly for an
electronic gas pedal, and the district court granted summary judgment for KSR, holding the
patent to be invalid because it was obvious. The district court held the invention to be obvious
because all the important parts of the invention were previously patented. The Federal Circuit
Court reversed, holding that a combination of prior inventions should not be considered to be an
obvious patent unless if would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine them
in that way.
Question Presented: Whether the Federal Circuit has erred in holding that a claimed invention
cannot be held "obvious", and thus unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), in the absence of
some proven 'teaching, suggestion, or motivation' that would have led a person of ordinary skill
in the art to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed."
TELEFLEX, Inc., Petitioner,
V.
KSR Int'l Co., Respondent.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
Decided January 6, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
SCHALL, Circuit Judge.
Teleflex Incorporated and Technology
Holding Company (collectively, "Teleflex")
sued KSR International Co. ("KSR") in the
United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan for infringement of
U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 B1 ("the '565
patent"). On December 12, 2003, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of
KSR, after determining that claim 4 of the
'565 patent, the sole claim at issue, was
invalid by reason of obviousness. Teleflex
Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581
(E. D. Mich. 2003). Teleflex now appeals
the district court's decision. For the reasons
set forth below, we vacate the grant of
summary judgment and remand the case to
the district court for further proceedings.
DISCUSSION
I.
Claim 4 of the '565 patent relates to an
adjustable pedal assembly for use with
automobiles having engines that are
controlled electronically with a device
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known as an electronic throttle control. As
such, the assembly of claim 4 incorporates
an electronic pedal position sensor (referred
to in claim 4, and throughout this opinion, as
an "electronic control"). The electronic
control is responsive to the pedal pivot and
thereby generates an electrical signal
corresponding to the relative position of the
gas pedal between the rest and applied
positions. Claim 4 specifically provides for
an assembly wherein the electronic control
is mounted to the support bracket of the
assembly. This configuration avoids
movement of the electronic control during
adjustment of the pedal's position on the
assembly. Claim 4 reads:
A vehicle control pedal apparatus (12)
comprising:
a support (18) adapted to be mounted to a
vehicle structure (20);
an adjustable pedal assembly (22) having
a pedal arm (14) moveable in force [sic] and
aft directions with respect to said support
(18);
a pivot (24) for pivotally supporting said
adjustable pedal assembly (22) with respect
to said support (18) and defining a pivot axis
(26); and
an electronic control (28) attached to said
support (18) for controlling a vehicle
system;
said apparatus (12) characterized by said
electronic control (28) being responsive to
said pivot (24) for providing a signal (32)
that corresponds to pedal arm position as
said pedal arm (14) pivots about said pivot
axis (26) between rest and applied positions
wherein the position of said pivot (24)
remains constant while said pedal arm (14)
moves in fore and aft directions with respect
to said pivot (24).
The numbers in claim 4 correspond to the
numbers in Figure 2 of the '565 patent.
The specification of the '565 patent indicates
that prior-art pedal assemblies incorporating
an electronic control suffered from being too
bulky, complex, and expensive to
manufacture. See '565 patent, col. 1, 11. 48-
53. It was this problem that the '565 patent
set out to address. See id. col. 2, 11. 2-5.
Teleflex sued KSR in the Eastern District of
Michigan, alleging that KSR's adjustable
pedal assembly infringed claim 4 of the '565
patent. KSR moved for summary judgment
of invalidity of claim 4 based on
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The
district court granted KSR's motion after
determining that claim 4 was obvious in
view of a combination of prior art
references. Teleflex timely appealed the
district court's decision. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(1).
II.
This court reviews a district court's grant of
summary judgment de novo. TorPharm Inc.
v. Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 336 F.3d 1322,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003). "In a patent case, as
in any other, summary judgment may be
granted when there are no disputed issues of
material fact, ... or when the non-movant
cannot prevail on the evidence submitted
when viewed in a light most favorable to it."
Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc., 367 F.3d 1381, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
The movant carries the initial burden of
proving that there are no genuine issues of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed.
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2d 265 (1986). If the movant shows a prima
facie case for summary judgment, then the
burden of production shifts to the
nonmovant to present specific evidence
indicating there is a genuine issue for trial.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202
(1986). "When ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, all of the nonmovant's
evidence is to be credited, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in the
nonmovant's favor." Caterpillar Inc. v.
Deere & Co., 224 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). "Where the evidence is
conflicting or credibility determinations are
required, the judgment should be vacated
rather than reversed, and the case should be
remanded for further proceedings." Jones v.
Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1531 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
"The grant of summary judgment of
invalidity for obviousness must be done on a
claim by claim basis." Knoll Pharm., 367
F.3d at 1383. Because patents are presumed
valid, "the accused infringer must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that each
claim that is challenged cannot reasonably
be held to be non-obvious." Id.; see also
Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer
Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir.
1998). Clear and convincing evidence exists
when the movant "places in the mind of the
ultimate fact finder an abiding conviction
that the truth of its factual contentions are
'highly probable. "' Colorado v. New
Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316, 104 S. Ct. 2433,
81 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1994).
A patent claim is obvious, and thus invalid,
when the differences between the claimed
invention and the prior art "are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art."
35 U.S.C. § 103; see also Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14, 86 S. Ct. 684, 15
L. Ed. 2d 545 (1966); In re Dembiczak, 175
F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1999). While
obviousness is ultimately a legal
determination, it is based on several
underlying issues of fact, namely: (1) the
scope and content of the prior art; (2) the
level of skill of a person of ordinary skill in
the art; (3) the differences between the
claimed invention and the teachings of the
prior art; and (4) the extent of any objective
indicia of non-obviousness. See Graham,
383 U.S. at 17-18. When obviousness is
based on the teachings of multiple prior art
references, the movant must also establish
some "suggestion, teaching, or motivation"
that would have led a person of ordinary
skill in the art to combine the relevant prior
art teachings in the manner claimed. See Tec
Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich. Inc., 192 F.3d
1353, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Pro-Mold
& Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75
F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The
nonmovant may rebut a prima facie showing
of obviousness with evidence refuting the
movant's case or with other objective
evidence of nonobviousness. See WMS
Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d
1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
"The reason, suggestion, or motivation to
combine [prior art references] may be found
explicitly or implicitly: 1) in the prior art
references themselves; 2) in the knowledge
of those of ordinary skill in the art that
certain references, or disclosures in those
references, are of special interest or
importance in the field; or 3) from the nature
of the problem to be solved, 'leading
inventors to look to references relating to
possible solutions to that problem. "' Ruiz v.
A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (quoting Pro-Mold, 75 F.3d at
1572). "Our case law makes clear that the
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best defense against the subtle but powerful
attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness
analysis is rigorous application of the
requirement for a showing of the teaching or
motivation to combine prior art references."
Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999; see also Ruiz,
234 F.3d at 665 (explaining that the
temptation to engage in impermissible
hindsight is especially strong with
seemingly simple mechanical inventions).
This is because "combining prior art
references without evidence of such a
suggestion, teaching, or motivation simply
takes the inventor's disclosure as a blueprint
for piecing together the prior art to defeat
patentability-the essence of hindsight."
Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999. Therefore, we
have consistently held that a person of
ordinary skill in the art must not only have
had some motivation to combine the prior
art teachings, but some motivation to
combine the prior art teachings in the
particular manner claimed. See, e.g., In re
Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ("Particular findings must be made as
to the reason the skilled artisan, with no
knowledge of the claimed invention, would
have selected these components for
combination in the manner claimed."
(emphasis added)); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d
1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("In other
words, the examiner must show reasons that
the skilled artisan, confronted with the same
problems as the inventor and with no
knowledge of the claimed invention, would
select the elements from the cited prior art
references for combination in the manner
claimed." (emphasis added)).
III.
On appeal, Teleflex argues that we should
vacate the district court's grant of summary
judgment and remand the case because the
district court committed multiple errors in its
obviousness determination. First, Teleflex
urges that the district court erred as a matter
of law by combining prior art references
based on an incorrect teaching-suggestion-
motivation test. Second, it contends that
genuine issues of material fact still remain
as to whether a person of ordinary skill in
the art would have considered it obvious to
combine prior art in the manner stated in
claim 4. Finally, Teleflex argues that the
district court erred by not properly
considering the commercial success of
Teleflex's patented assembly and by failing
to give adequate deference to the
patentability determination of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO").
KSR responds that the district court did
apply the correct teaching-suggestion-
motivation test, and that, under that test, the
court correctly concluded that no genuine
issues of material fact existed so as to
prevent the grant of summary judgment.
KSR contends that the district court properly
discounted the declarations of Teleflex's
experts because their opinions were based
on mere legal conclusions. KSR also
contends that the district court properly
dismissed Teleflex's evidence of commercial
success because Teleflex failed to establish a
nexus between commercial success and the
claimed invention. Finally, KSR argues that
the district court gave proper deference to
the PTO.
We agree with Teleflex that the district court
did not apply the correct teaching-
suggestion-motivation test. We also agree
that, under that test, genuine issues of
material fact exist, so as to render summary
judgment of obviousness improper. For
these reasons, we vacate the decision of the
district court and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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IV.
After comparing the teachings of the prior
art with claim 4 of the '565 patent, the
district court concluded that, at the time of
the invention, all of the limitations of claim
4 existed in the prior art. The court
explained that U.S. Patent No. 5,010,782,
issued to Asano et al. ("the Asano patent"),
disclosed all of the structural limitations of
claim 4 with the exception of the electronic
control. Teleflex, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 592
("Asano teaches an adjustable pedal
assembly pivotally mounted on a support
bracket with the pedal moving in a fore and
aft directions with respect to the support and
the pivot remaining in a constant position
during movement of the pedal arm.").
Electronic controls were well known in the
prior art. Id. Consequently, after finding a
person of ordinary skill in the art would
have been motivated to combine Asano and
electronic control references, the district
court granted KSR's motion for summary
judgment of invalidity by reason of
obviousness.
The district court based its finding of a
suggestion or motivation to combine largely
on the nature of the problem to be solved by
claim 4 of the '565 patent. Id. at 593-94. The
court determined from the patent's
specification that the invention of the '565
patent was intended to "solve the problem of
designing a less expensive, less complex and
more compact [assembly] design." Id. at
593. The court then explained that U.S.
Patent No. 5,819,593, issued to Rixon et al.
("the Rixon '593 patent"), also "suffered
from being too complex because the pedal
position sensor is located in the pedal
housing and its fore and aft movement with
the adjustment of the pedal could cause
problems with wire failure. Thus, the
solution to the problem required an
electronic control that does not move with
the pedal arm while the pedal arm is being
adjusted by the driver." Id. at 594. The court
then concluded that "a person with ordinary
skill in the art with full knowledge of Asano
and the modular pedal position sensors
would be motivated to combine the two
references to avoid the problems with Rixon
'593." Id.
The district court also found an express
teaching to attach the electronic control to
the support bracket of a pedal assembly
based on the disclosure of U.S. Patent No.
5,063,811, issued to Smith et al. ("the Smith
patent"). The court explained that Smith
teaches the use of a "rotary potentiometer ...
attached to a fixed support member and
responsive to the pedal's pivot shaft." Id.
Moreover, the court stated that Smith
provided express teachings as to the
desirability of attaching the electronic
control to a fixed support member in order
to avoid the wire failure problems disclosed
in the Rixon '593 patent and solved by the
'565 patent: "The wiring to the electrical
components must be secure from the
possibility of chafing which will eventually
result in electrical failure. Thus, the pedal
assemblies must not precipitate any motion
in the connecting wires themselves ...." Id.
(quoting the Smith patent, col. 1, 11. 33-38).
Finally, the district court explained that the
prosecution history of the '565 patent
bolstered its finding of a suggestion or
motivation to combine the Asano and
electronic control references. The court
explained that the patent examiner initially
rejected the '565 patent in view of the
teachings of U.S. Patent No. 5,460,061,
issued to Redding et al. ("the Redding
patent"), and the Smith patent. The examiner
stated that the Redding patent disclosed the
assembly structure of claim 4 and that Smith
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disclosed the electronic control attached to
the assembly support structure. The patentee
overcame the rejection, the court explained,
by adding the limitation requiring the
position of the assembly's pedal pivot to
remain constant during adjustment of the
assembly. (The position of the pedal pivot of
the Redding patent does not remain constant
during adjustment of the assembly position.)
However, the Asano patent discloses an
assembly where the position of the pivot
remains constant during adjustment of the
pedal assembly. Therefore, the district court
reasoned, had Asano been cited to the patent
examiner, the examiner would have rejected
claim 4 as obvious in view of the Asano and
Smith patents. Id. at 595.
We agree with Teleflex that the district
court's analysis applied an incomplete
teaching-suggestion-motivation test in
granting KSR summary judgment. This is
because the district court invalidated claim 4
of the '565 patent on obviousness grounds
without making "findings as to the specific
understanding or principle within the
knowledge of a skilled artisan that would
have motivated one with no knowledge of
[the] invention to make the combination in
the manner claimed." Kotzab, 217 F.3d at
1371. Under our case law, whether based on
the nature of the problem to be solved, the
express teachings of the prior art, or the
knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art,
the district court was required to make
specific findings as to whether there was a
suggestion or motivation to combine the
teachings of Asano with an electronic
control in the particular manner claimed by
claim 4 of the '565 patent. See Kotzab, 217
F.3d at 1371; Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1357.
That is, the district court was required to
make specific findings as to a suggestion or
motivation to attach an electronic control to
the support bracket of the Asano assembly.
The district court correctly noted that the
nature of the problem to be solved may,
under appropriate circumstances, provide a
suggestion or motivation to combine prior
art references. However, the test requires
that the nature of the problem to be solved
be such that it would have led a person of
ordinary skill in the art to combine the prior
art teachings in the particular manner
claimed. See Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1357. We
have recognized this situation when two
prior art references address the precise
problem that the patentee was trying to
solve. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357
F.3d 1270 at 1276 ("This record shows that
the district court did not use hindsight in its
obviousness analysis, but properly found a
motivation to combine because the two
references address precisely the same
problem of underpinning existing structural
foundations."). In this case, the Asano patent
does not address the same problem as the
'565 patent. The objective of the '565 patent
was to design a smaller, less complex, and
less expensive electronic pedal assembly.
The Asano patent, on the other hand, was
directed at solving the "constant ratio
problem." The district court's reliance on the
problems associated with the Rixon '593
patent similarly fails to provide a sufficient
motivation to combine. This is because the
Rixon '593 patent does not address the
problem to be solved by the '565 patent;
rather, it suffers from the problem. The court
did not explain how suffering from the
problem addressed by the '565 patent would
have specifically motivated one skilled in
the art to attach an electronic control to the
support bracket of the Asano assembly.
Neither do we agree with the district court's
reliance on the express teachings of the
Smith patent. This is because the statement
in the Smith patent that "the pedal
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assemblies must not precipitate any motion
in the connecting wires," does not
necessarily go to the issue of motivation to
attach the electronic control on the support
bracket of the pedal assembly. In other
words, solving the problem of wire chafing
is a different task than reducing the
complexity and size of pedal assemblies.
What is more, the Smith patent does not
relate to adjustable pedal assemblies;
therefore, it does not address the problem of
wire chafing in an adjustable pedal
assembly.
Our view of the case is not altered by the
'565 patent's prosecution history. That is
because a court's task is not to speculate as
to what an examiner might have done if
confronted with a piece of prior art. Rather,
a court must make an independent
obviousness determination, taking into
account the statutory presumption of patent
validity. See TorPharm, 336 F.3d at 1329-
30 ("Where the factual bases of an
examiner's decision to allow a claim have
been undermined-as in other cases where
prior art not before the examiner is brought
to light during litigation-a court's
responsibility is not to speculate what a
particular examiner would or would not
have done in light of the new information,
but rather to assess independently the
validity of the claim against the prior art
under section 102 or section 103. Such
determination must take into account the
statutory presumption of patent validity.").
We also agree with Teleflex that the
presence of genuine issues of material fact
rendered summary judgment inappropriate.
KSR, in the first instance, failed to make out
a prima facie case of obviousness. The only
declaration offered by KSR-a declaration
by its Vice President of Design Engineering,
Larry Willemsen-did not go to the ultimate
issue of motivation to combine prior art, i.e.
whether one of ordinary skill in the art
would have been motivated to attach an
electronic control to the support bracket of
the assembly disclosed by Asano. Mr.
Willemsen did state that an electronic
control "could have been" mounted on the
support bracket of a pedal assembly.
(Willemsen Decl. at P33, 36, 39.) Such
testimony is not sufficient to support a
finding of obviousness, however. See, e.g.,
In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1995) ("' Obvious to try' has long been held
not to constitute obviousness."). Mr.
Willemsen also provided the following as a
"specific motivation to combine" an
electronic control with an adjustable pedal
assembly:
An increasing number of vehicles sold in
the United States came equipped with
electronic throttle control systems because
such systems offered various operational
advantages over cable-actuated throttle
control systems ... In order to function in a
vehicle whose engine incorporated an
electronic throttle control, the adjustable
pedal assembly ... would have had to be
coupled to an electronic pedal position
sensor.
(Willemsen Decl. at P34, 37, 39.) This
statement may be factually correct.
However, the issue is not whether a person
of skill in the art had a motivation to
combine the electronic control with an
adjustable pedal assembly, but whether a
person skilled in the art had a motivation to
attach the electronic control to the support
bracket of the pedal assembly.
In addition, Teleflex offered two
declarants-Clark J. Radcliffe, Professor of
Mechanical Engineering at Michigan State
University; and Timothy L. Andresen, a
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former engineer at Ford Motor Company
and McDonnel-Douglas Corporation-in
rebuttal of the declaration of Mr. Willemsen.
Mr. Radcliffe stated, inter alia, that "the
location of the electronic control" (Radcliffe
Decl. at P15) in claim 4 "was a simple,
elegant, and novel combination of features,"
(Radcliffe Decl. at P16) as opposed to the
Rixon '593 patent's attachment of the
electronic control to the assembly housing,
which was both electrically and
mechanically complex (Radcliffe Decl. at
P17). Mr. Andresen also stated that the non-
obviousness of claim 4 was reflected in
Rixon's choice to mount the electronic
control to the assembly housing instead of
the assembly's support bracket. (Andresen
Decl. at P5.) At the summary judgment
stage of a proceeding, it is improper for a
district court to make credibility
determinations. See, e.g., Jones, 727 F.2d
1531. Therefore, by crediting KSR's expert
declarant and discrediting the two declarants
offered by Teleflex, the district court erred
as a matter of law.
V.
In sum,
(1) We hold that, in granting summary
judgment in favor of KSR, the district court
erred as a matter of law by applying an
incomplete teaching-suggestion-motivation
test to its obviousness determination. The
correct standard requires a court to make
specific findings showing a teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine prior
art teachings in the particular manner
claimed by the patent at issue.
(2) Under this standard, we hold that
genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have been motivated, at the time the
invention was made, to attach an electronic
control to the support structure of the pedal
assembly disclosed by the Asano patent.
(3) We consequently vacate the decision of
the district court and remand the case for
further proceedings on the issue of
obviousness, and, if necessary, proceedings
on the issues of infringement and damages.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
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"Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Patent and Clean Air Act Cases"
Legal Times
June 27, 2006
Tony Mauro
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
answer a crucial question that arises in
virtually every patent application: When is
an invention so obvious that it does not
deserve a patent?
The question is posed in KSR International
v. Teleflex, which could produce "the most
important patent ruling in a decade," said
Michael Barclay, a patent specialist at
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. "I can
hardly think of a patent case I've handled in
25 years where obviousness isn't an issue."
Teleflex sued KSR, a Canadian company,
for patent infringement, claiming its patents
on a gas-pedal design for trucks infringed on
a Teleflex patent. KSR, in turn, said that
Teleflex's patented design was so obvious
that it should not have been given a patent.
A district court judge sided with KSR, but
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reversed.
On the issue of obviousness the federal
circuit, which was created in 1982 to handle
patent appeals, uses a test that asks whether
"teaching, suggestion, or motivation" drawn
from prior inventions would have led a
person of ordinary skill to the claimed new
invention. Critics say this test has no basis in
the law and has made it too hard to prove
obviousness, leading to the granting of
questionable patents.
The standard poses "substantial obstacles" to
proving obviousness and "unnecessarily
sustains patents that would otherwise be
subject to invalidation," Solicitor General
Paul Clement told the Court in a brief urging
the justices to take up the case. "It forecloses
competitors from using the public
storehouse of knowledge that should be
freely available to all."
The KSR case is likely to draw interest from
all factions in current disputes over patent
and intellectual property law. Obviousness is
often an issue in litigation over the validity
of "business method" patents, for example.
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"Justices Get Down to Business"
The Wall Street Journal
June 27, 2006
Ben Winograd and Jess Bravin
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court
widened its fall docket yesterday, accepting
a bevy of business-related cases that touch
on issues varying from antitrust to global
warming.
The case list underscores that the court, with
two new Bush appointees, is ready to make
its mark on economic issues as well as
matters such as abortion.
The marquee case accepted involves
regulation of so-called greenhouse gases
believed by some to contribute to global
climate change. Twelve states and several
cities and environmental groups say the
Bush administration has shirked its duty to
regulate auto emissions thought to cause
climate change.
Several automotive- and oil-producing
states, along with industry groups, argue that
the administration wasn't obliged to act on
the issue. It should be "for the electorate to
decide and not for the judiciary to decide,"
said Robin Conrad, senior vice president of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's litigation
arm.
In 2003, the Environmental Protection
Agency reversed a Clinton administration
finding and said the Clean Air Act doesn't
grant it authority to regulate greenhouse
gases. Even if it did, the agency said,
regulation should be postponed until more is
known about the health and environmental
consequences. The plaintiffs, led by
Massachusetts, claimed the agency misread
the law and that scientific evidence has
made clear that global warming has harmful
effects.
The Clean Air Act directs the EPA
administrator to set emission standards for
pollutants from car engines that "in his
judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare." Groups siding with the EPA,
including the American Petroleum Institute
and the Engine Manufacturers Association,
have said carbon dioxide emissions aren't
pollutants.
The EPA prevailed at the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia,
although the judges couldn't agree on the
reason why. One found the agency could
choose not to use authority granted under
federal law, while another said
Massachusetts and other plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue for actions they deemed
harmful to humanity at large.
(Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency)
The court agreed to consider two cases
concerning the scope of federal antitrust
laws. In the first, the justices will determine
how much evidence plaintiffs must present
in conspiracy allegations to go forward with
litigation. In a suit filed on behalf of
customers since 1996, the plaintiff,
represented by the class-action firm Milberg
Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP, alleged
that telecom firms BellSouth Corp., Qwest
Communications International Inc., SBC
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(now AT&T Inc.) and Verizon
Communications Inc. conspired to avoid
competing in each other's territory, driving
prices higher for their customers.
The Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
in New York, found the plaintiff had shown
enough to proceed to discovery-an often
costly endeavor in which defendants can be
compelled to turn over reams of records.
Fearing that future plaintiffs could file
frivolous claims to induce settlements, a host
of corporate interests-including airline,
credit card and wireless communications
companies-asked the court to accept the
case.
The other case concerns "predatory
bidding," or the practice of buying raw
goods at inflated prices to drive out smaller
competitors. The plaintiff alleged that
Weyerhaeuser Co., a leading hardwood
manufacturer, paid a higher price and
ordered more of a particular type of logs
than necessary to run its business, thereby
limiting supply and driving prices higher for
competitors. The Ninth Circuit Court, in San
Francisco, upheld an $80 million jury award
for the plaintiff.
(Bell Atlantic v. Twombly; Weyerhaeuser v.
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber)
The justices also will review a dispute over
gas-pedal designs to consider when an
invention is too obvious to win protection in
the U.S. patent system. The high court's
decision to review the "obviousness"
doctrine in patent law came in litigation
between KSR International Co., a Canadian
maker of gas pedals, and Teleflex Inc., an
industrial engineering company that claims
KSR violated several patents it owns.
The case is being watched by patent experts
who are following a decision by the
Washington-based Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals, a special patent law court. The
Federal Circuit in January 2005 made it
harder to challenge patented inventions for
being too obvious, ruling the challenger
must prove existing "teaching, suggestion or
motivation would have led a person of
ordinary skill in the art" to come up with the
invention. The high court hasn't reviewed
patent obviousness since 1966 when it ruled
in a case involving the John Deere Co.,
today known as Deere & Co.
(KSR International v. Teleflex)
Last week, the court ruled that employers
could face liability for a host of actions that
constitute retaliation against workers who
file discrimination claims. Yesterday, it
agreed to review how much back pay
workers may seek when alleging
employment discrimination under the 1964
Civil Rights Act.
Specifically, the justices will decide when
the statute of limitations starts running on
wage discrimination claims-when the
employer made the payment decision or
each time the worker receives a substandard
paycheck.
(Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber)
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"The Patent Epidemic:
It's wasting companies' money and slowing the development of new products"
LEGAL AFFAIRS
January 9, 2006
Michael Orey
A man "has a right to use his knife to cut his
meat, a fork to hold it; may a patentee take
from him the right to combine their use on
the same subject?" -Thomas Jefferson
The order was potentially a big one for KSR
International Co. General Motors Corp.
(GM) wanted the Canadian auto parts maker
to supply gas pedals for its 2003 Chevrolet
and GMC light trucks and sport-utility
vehicles. But not just any pedals. GM
wanted adjustable ones that could move
back and forth to accommodate drivers of
different heights. And it wanted the pedals
to send an electronic signal, rather than
using a mechanical cable, to change the
engine speed when a driver stepped on or off
the accelerator.
Both features had been around the
automobile industry for a number of years,
so KSR set about designing a combination.
Not so fast, warned a March, 2001, letter
from Teleflex Inc. (TFX ), a Limerick (Pa.)
competitor that had gotten wind of KSR's
discussions with GM. Teleflex claimed its
patents covered all combinations of an
adjustable pedal with an electronic sensor
and that anyone else making them would be
infringing. If KSR wanted to proceed, the
letter said, it needed to pay Teleflex a
royalty. Rejecting the demand, KSR sealed
the deal with GM, which it still supplies.
Teleflex sued KSR, and the companies are
now locked in litigation. KSR's defense is
simple: U.S. law does not allow patents for
inventions that are "obvious." Nothing could
be more obvious, KSR says in court filings,
than a combination of "preexisting, off-the-
shelf components" that each perform
"exactly the same function" for which they
were originally designed. In essence, KSR's
argument is that Teleflex may as well have
patented the combination of the refrigerator
and the light bulb. Rodger D. Young,
Teleflex's attorney, counters: "The fact that
Device A and Device B exist does not make
it...obvious that they should be put together."
HIGH COURT INTEREST
KSR has asked the U.S. Supreme Court to
weigh in. If it does, the gas pedal dispute
will join a high court docket unusually rich
in patent cases this term, with the collective
potential for broadly reshaping current law.
The justices have not taken such an interest
in the area since 1965.
How to determine when an invention is
"obvious" is one of the most critical and
contentious issues in patent circles. Over the
past two decades, critics say, the hurdle for
passing the obviousness test has been
steadily lowered, and the U.S. is now awash
in a sea of junk patents. Some are just plain
silly, such as a patent for "a method [of]
exercising and entertaining cats" (basically
teasing them with a laser pointer), or another
for "an animal toy that a dog may carry in its
mouth" (which not only sounds suspiciously
like a stick but also looks like one in the
patent drawings).
But many perceive a serious threat. A
coalition of businesses, including Microsoft
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(MSFT ), Cisco Systems (CSCO ), VF,
Hallmark Cards, and Fortune Brands (FO )
has jointly filed its own brief in the KSR
case asking the Supreme Court to take
corrective action. Two dozen intellectual-
property law professors have made a similar
filing. Massive overpatenting, the professors
say, "creates an unnecessary drag on
innovation," forcing companies to redesign
their products, pony up license fees for
technology that should be free, and even
deter some research altogether.
The tide shows no sign of turning. In 2004,
the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office issued
181,000 patents, up from 99,000 in 1990.
New applications, meanwhile, are being
filed at a rate of about 400,000 per year. If
the Patent Office closed its doors today it
would need two years just to clear the
backlog.
One reason for this explosion is the natural
tendency of patents to track broad economic
and technological trends. Just as the early
20th century saw the advent of large-scale
patenting of chemicals, the past two decades
have witnessed the spread of patents on
computer software, business methods, and
genes. Controversy often accompanies the
expansion. For example, critics say many
business method patents, for processes that
perform operations, are often nothing more
than combinations of age-old practices with
a computer or the Internet.
In an article in The National Law Journal
last month, New York attorney Barry
Schindler expressed the current patent-
everything-in-sight mentality. Seizing on a
recent ruling by a Patent Office
administrative board that said method
patents don't even need to make use of
technology, he advised companies to "now
seek U.S. patent rights for any unique
business method covering every conceivable
business operation, such as methods of
billing clients, hiring employees, marketing
products or service.. .or simply obtaining
funding."
All this complicates day-to-day life for a
range of businesses. Companies operating in
patent-choked environments are at continual
risk of tripping over someone else's
intellectual property. Microsoft Corp. is now
defending itself in 35 to 40 patent
infringement suits simultaneously, and
Cisco Systems Inc. faces seven. That in
itself is a sign something is amiss, says
Robert Barr, who was chief patent counsel
for Cisco from January, 2000, to July, 2005.
Barr, who now teaches at the University of
California at Berkeley School of Law, says
it's too easy for engineers to inadvertently
infringe patents just by doing their normal
work. "That's not what the law is intended to
do," he says. "There shouldn't be patents on
things that people will just routinely invent."
Barr adds that "the idea of the obviousness
test is to root these things out."
Old Economy companies face similar
trouble. Apparel maker VF Corp., for
instance, regularly gets letters complaining it
has infringed bra patents. "In the old days
you would think of these things as the
tinkering of a technician who knew his way
around women's apparel.. .and wouldn't even
think about getting a patent on it," says Peter
Sullivan, the attorney who filed the brief in
the KSR case on behalf of VF and others.
"How many bra patents can you possibly
have?"
Defeating even a dubious patent can take
tremendous resources. After Storage
Technology Corp. (MSFT ) sued Cisco for
patent infringement, it took Cisco six years
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and $10 million to get a jury to declare last
June that StorageTek's patent was invalid.
(StorageTek was purchased by Sun
Microsystems Inc. (SUNW ) a week before
the verdict.) Even before the trial, Cisco
believed the disputed technology was
obsolete and no longer used by its
customers. But it still had its engineers
remove it from its routers because of the
potential for draconian damages or an
injunction if Cisco had lost.
DEFENSIVE PATENTING
Those kinds of litigation-driven business
decisions can waste resources and money.
So can another strategy known as defensive
patenting. To ward off claims of
infringement from others, companies pump
up their own patent portfolios. Cisco has
gone from obtaining a few hundred patents
annually to around 1,000. "A large part of
that investment is to assure that if someone
wants to assert patents against us, we will
have some countervailing tools," says Cisco
General Counsel Mark Chandler.
It's the patent world's equivalent of mutually
assured destruction. Instead of suing,
companies agree to license each other their
intellectual property. "A network router, a
golf club, a software program.. .a bra all
become more expensive as more and more
patent holders must be paid royalties," notes
the brief filed in the KSR case by Cisco and
others.
To many observers, one of the primary
culprits in this situation is the evisceration of
the obviousness test by the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals. That has led to a flood of
low-quality patents being granted, and made
it particularly difficult to challenge a patent
in court on the ground of obviousness. In
2001, Microsoft settled a suit by
Priceline.com (PCLN ) for infringing its
"name-your-price" auction patent. Yet to
this day, Andy Culbert, Microsoft's top in-
house patent litigation counsel, says the
Priceline patent is a prime example of an
obvious combination of two things that
already existed: reverse auctions and the
Internet.
KSR initially was able to persuade a court
that Teleflex's invention was obvious. After
Teleflex filed suit in federal court in Detroit,
Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff considered
evidence from engineering experts on
whether combining an adjustable pedal with
an electronic sensor would have been
obvious to someone having skill in the area.
He concluded that it would and ruled on
summary judgment in December, 2003, that
Teleflex' patent was invalid. (Teleflex sold
its pedal unit to a private-equity group last
August. It now operates in Troy, Mich.,
under the name DriveSol Worldwide Inc.)
But in January, 2005, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated Judge Zatkoffs
ruling. The court, which hears nearly all
patent appeals, said the judge had not
followed its rule for inventions based on a
combination of existing elements. That rule
says courts-and patent examiners--can't
reject an invention as obvious unless they
can point to specific references suggesting
the elements could be combined. Those
references are typically previous patents or
technical literature.
Defenders of the rule say it prevents
hindsight bias-the natural tendency of a
person to regard something as obvious once
she sees it-by requiring documented
evidence that an idea was easily within
grasp. KSR and others who oppose the rule
say it is contrary to guidelines set by the
Supreme Court, which last considered the
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issue 40 years ago. And they say it doesn't
square with how the world works.
Microsoft attorney Culbert notes that new
technology emerges all the time that isn't
written about in scientific journals or other
published materials, particularly in fast-
developing areas such as software. Other
commentators have noted that, in many
fields, what gets written down is precisely
what isn't obvious, guaranteeing that what
the Federal Circuit Court requires won't be
found. The bottom line: Rulings rejecting
patents on the basis of obviousness are rare,
and massive overpatenting continues to be a
thriving business.
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"Teleflex Patent Declared Valid in Infringement Complaint Against KSR"
Intellectual Property Today
April 25, 2005
A United States Federal Circuit Court has
ruled that an automotive pedal system patent
owned by Teleflex, Inc., headquartered in
Plymouth, Mich., is valid in Teleflex's
complaint against KSR International Co.,
based in Southfield, Mich.
In its ruling, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a
previous summary judgment that determined
the patent was invalid and remanded the
case to the district court for further
proceedings.
The patent at issue, U.S. Patent No.
6,237,565 Bl, described a product that
combined an electronic throttle control
(ETC) with an adjustable pedal system
(APS). The patent was originally ruled as
invalid by U.S. District Court (Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division)
Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff for the reason
that combining these two progressive
technologies was deemed "obvious," as
claimed by KSR.
However, Teleflex's attorney, Steven Susser,
argued that combining the two technologies
was not obvious as a matter of law because
there was no clear and convincing evidence
that there was a motivation to combine the
two technologies. The Federal Circuit
agreed that KSR had not demonstrated
Teleflex's patent to be invalid as a matter of
law.
ETC is a revolutionary method of delivering
fuel to the car engine electronically as
opposed to mechanically, while APS is a
relatively new technology that allows a
driver to adjust the position of the gas and
brake pedals to suit his or her size and
comfort.
Susser, shareholder with Southfield, Mich.-
based Young & Susser, said, "The Federal
Circuit here rejected a hindsight-based
analysis and instead found that the
combination of two ground-breaking
automotive technologies was not necessarily
obvious at the time of its conception."
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